Paper

Part Four: The Identity of Waqf and Comparative Dialogue

What do the rules of waqf describe, and where do its shared features and its differences lie?

Its link to the blog’s introductory texts: The Introduction sets out its comparison and the limits of transfer in §§10 and 11, and the Framework places the waqf among the international frameworks in its §6.

1. From the Definition of Waqf to the Explanation of Its Identity

The definition “making the principal inalienable and devoting the benefit to charitable ends” (taḥbīs al-aṣl wa-tasbīl al-manfaʿa) contains a relationship between property and an intended benefit. Chapters 1 and 2 set out the conditions of creation and of the property, and the rights of its parties; Chapter 4 then set out the arrangement of expenditure and work that delivering the benefit requires. The chapters that followed then revealed that protecting the dedication requires specifying decision-making powers, enabling those who seek protection, regulating change, and knowing what remains when endowed properties and persons succeed one another and what arises when several awqāf are linked. In this way the description of waqf widens from the elements of the disposition to the rules that make it a working institution.259

The identity of waqf becomes clear when these relationships come together in a specific legal form. Once its school or its law, its valid stipulation, the property to which it attaches and the positions of its parties have been identified, it becomes possible to state what is binding in it, what is permissible and what is barred. Describing “the waqf system”, however, requires in addition an examination of the rules, bodies and relationships through which awqāf are created, operate, connect and are reviewed. A study of a single waqf does not encompass that system, even if it reveals some of its rules. Nor do we combine the rulings of the schools and countries presented into a hypothetical law that we then apply to a single case.

The book uses “purpose institutions” as an analytical name for institutions in which property is bound to a purpose and over which legally constrained powers are exercised. The name is not a juristic characterisation (takyīf) of waqf, nor a universal statutory category. Its use is to set different forms before questions that allow comparison: What constrains the property? Who holds its ownership and its obligations? Who changes the way it is used? And who has a route to objection and remedy?

Hence four (4) judgements are kept apart. Legal identity specifies what makes a disposition a waqf in the system that governs it. A characteristic describes a way of working that is established by its evidence, and other institutions may share it. A comparative difference requires a specified counterpart against which a difference with an effect appears. Superiority in addressing an educational, health or urban problem, by contrast, requires evidence on outcome and cost. Establishing the first judgement does not entail establishing the others, and a characteristic does not lose its usefulness if it is found in something other than waqf.

Footnotes

  1. Ibn Qudāma, al-Muqniʿ [The Satisfying], with al-Sharḥ al-kabīr [The Great Commentary] and al-Inṣāf [Fairness], vol. 16, p. 361. The qualification by conditions is a view of al-Zarkashī reported by al-Mardāwī; the passage was checked against the digital text (see Chapter 4, n. 104); the image of the printed edition was not examined here. Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf [Rulings Governing Awqāf], pp. 37–39, especially para. 34 on p. 38; checked against images of the printed edition. References to chapters in the body are internal, and the details of the sources are collected in the book’s bibliography. ↩

2. Dedicated Property: Ownership, Dhimma and Representation

The disagreement over legal personality was set out in Chapter 8, §6; its value appears when one asks: if the mutawallī (waqf administrator) contracts for the waqf, in whose dhimma (legal capacity to bear obligations) does the debt arise? Al-Zarqāʾ presents an approach under which the debt first enters the mutawallī’s dhimma and he then has recourse for it against the waqf; al-Zarqāʾ favours its attaching directly to the waqf’s dhimma. He reads the idea of personality from the rulings, even where its technical name is absent. In his account the question is not one of exchanging an old name for a modern one: the choice of who bears the obligation affects the identification of whom the creditor claims against, and in what capacity.260

Nada Moumtaz, in the passage read in Chapter 8, §6, infers legal personality from the waqf’s survival after its founder, from dealings in its name, and from the independence of its property from the debts of the nāẓir (waqf administrator) and of the entitlement-holder (mustaḥiqq). She builds her reading on literature and practice that she studied; her interpretation is therefore not to be attributed to the wording of the jurists themselves. Linking it with al-Zarqāʾ’s preferred view reveals two different questions: protecting the waqf’s property from the debts of persons, and attributing the waqf’s debts to a dhimma of its own. One may strengthen the inquiry into the other, but it does not establish it on its own.261

This distinction is useful in comparison. Under § 80 of the Civil Code, the German foundation (Stiftung) is a legal person without members, and under § 84 it has a board that manages and represents it. Here the modern text states expressly who bears the personality and who represents. Brinz, whose view was set out in the same section of Chapter 8, conceives of purpose-bound property (Zweckvermögen) without an owning subject, so his explanation differs from attributing the property to a legal person; his theory is therefore not to be taken as the law of the contemporary German foundation. The difference between the two approaches helps to specify the question, and does not justify transferring the answer of either to every waqf.262

Within waqf itself, the juristic constructions (takhrīj) of ownership differ. Al-Zarqāʾ presents the view that ownership of the asset remains with the founder (wāqif) according to Abū Ḥanīfa and the Mālikīs, and then discusses how it is to be explained. In the Ḥanbalī text expounded by al-Buhūtī, if no nāẓir has been stipulated and the one for whom the waqf is made (al-mawqūf ʿalayh) is determinate (maḥṣūr), administration (naẓar) over his share is established for him, and this is reasoned from ownership and income (ghalla). The precise formulation is therefore: authority (wilāya) to administer does not by itself create ownership of the asset; ownership and administration may coincide on two bases that must be identified. It is therefore not correct to say, without qualification, that the nāẓir does not own the asset in any school.263

The comment to section 507 of the American model Uniform Trust Code places legal title with the trustee, without the benefits of ownership. This is another formulation separating what the manager may do from his using the property for his own benefit. A useful comparison asks about the basis of ownership, its content and the limits on disposing of it, and then about where the obligation and the claim lie; it does not stop at putting an “owner” on one side and a “non-owner” on the other. The reference here remains the Uniform Trust Code model in its specified text, not English law, nor the laws of all the American states.264

The study draws from this that describing dedicated property requires four (4) interrelated identifications: the owner, or the explanation of the absence of one; who bears the debt; who represents the body; and who holds the benefit. This is a tool for ordering the reading, not a claim that waqf is unique in separating these positions. It prevents, for example, inferring a freedom to reclaim the property from the survival of the name of ownership, or inferring an absence of liability from the view that there is legal personality. Each effect has its own ruling and its own evidence.

Footnotes

  1. Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, p. 25, para. 23 and its first footnote; and pp. 34–36, paras 30–31. His preferred view on who bears the debt is taken from the footnote, not from the body of the paragraph alone. The passages were checked against their images. ↩

  2. Moumtaz, God’s Property, 37; and see the limits of projecting concepts, 20–21. The author’s reading is a primary source for her own view, and a secondary source for what she attributes to others. The comparison between her and al-Zarqāʾ is this book’s own work, and does not establish that she refers to him. ↩

  3. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), §§ 80 and 84, in the wording of the reform of foundation law of 16 July 2021 (BGBl. I S. 2947), in force since 1 July 2023. § 80 was checked against the image of the Gazette, p. 2947, and against its official page, as in n. 27. § 84 was consulted on the official website on 19 October 2026. Brinz, Lehrbuch der Pandekten, Bd. 3, Abt. 2, 456–457, 478; p. 456 was checked against the image. ↩

  4. Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, p. 35; al-Buhūtī, Sharḥ Muntahā al-irādāt [Commentary on The Utmost of Aims], vol. 2, p. 412. The two qualifications in the text: the absence of a stipulated nāẓir, and the determinacy of the mawqūf ʿalayhim. The Mālikī ruling is reported here from al-Zarqāʾ’s account, not from a new survey of the school. ↩

  5. Uniform Trust Code (2000, Last Revised or Amended in 2003), comment to section 507, printed p. 91; and sections 704, 706(a), 410(b) and 413. The version of the model is the one specified in n. 75; it is not legislation in force in all states. The wording on legal title comes from the comment to the section, not from its text. ↩

3. Purpose and Creation: The Limits of Contrasting Waqf with the State

The phrase “the founder’s will” is not enough to explain how a waqf comes into being. Chapters 1 and 2 contain restrictions relating to the capacity of the creator, the property, the rights of others and the form of words (ṣīgha), and Chapter 7 contains powers that the law establishes even if they were not stipulated. The will to dedicate operates within an arrangement that determines what of it is accepted and what is not. This requires separating three (3) questions: Does the purpose qualify? When does the disposition take place? And what is the function of documentation, registration or governmental recognition in its effect?

The difference between the first and third questions appears in the counterparts. Article 18 of the French law of 1987 on patronage (mécénat) requires a non-profit purpose of public benefit, and ties the capacity of a foundation (fondation) recognised as being of public utility to the recognition decree taking legal effect. For the German foundation, coming into being requires the act of foundation and recognition by the competent authority of the Land under § 80(2). The French endowment fund (fonds de dotation), by contrast, in the text of article 140 issued in 2008, acquires its personality on publication of the declaration filed with the administration. Recognition and publication are two different acts, each with its own legal effect.265

The existence of a required positive purpose in the French text is enough to rule out the claim that requiring, in principle, that the purpose qualify is specific to waqf alone. This does not mean that “qurba” (an act of drawing near to God) and “public benefit” coincide in content or in the body that interprets them. Nor may the inquiry be shifted, without a basis, from the eligibility of the benefiting side (al-jiha al-mawqūf ʿalayhā) to the founder’s inner intention; a disagreement over what the condition attaches to changes the comparison itself. We showed this confusion in “ʿAmman yanfarid al-waqf?” [Compared with Whom Is Waqf Unique?] and in the two outcome papers of the distinctiveness tests; the claim that requiring the purpose to qualify is specific to waqf is therefore not revived here as a distinctive feature established for it.266

The Saudi evidence read here is not enough to rule out that recognition is constitutive. Article 8 of the Regulation Organising Niẓāra (the Office of Waqf Administration) Work places registration of the waqf with the General Authority for Awqaf after its documentation before the competent body, and takes the date on which the Regulation came into force into account for the start of the time limit. This article establishes the order of documentation and registration, and does not by itself settle whether documentation is constitutive of the waqf or declaratory of it. The German provision is therefore not to be set against an unqualified statement that a Saudi waqf comes into being without a constitutive act by the state.267

Likewise, Egyptian Law 48 of 1946 on the Rulings of Waqf makes a formal official attestation (ishhād) a condition of validity for the acts listed in its Article 1, and its Article 4 specifies two grounds for refusing to hear it — that it contains a prohibited or void disposition, or that the person making the attestation lacks capacity — with a route for a grievance. Restricting the power of refusal does not make the procedure without effect on validity. This is historical evidence of an Egyptian legal form, not a ruling on all awqāf nor on current Egyptian law.268

The question that waqf brings to comparative dialogue is therefore the relationship between the source of a rule and the function of the authority that applies it. A juristic standard may precede modern legislation, and legislation may then intervene in the conditions of validity, registration or supervision. The effect of this must be examined for each ruling, instead of making “outside the state” and “inside the state” two descriptions that explain all forms. As for the claim that the standard for a purpose to qualify is independent of the state in a way unique to waqf, the Indian comparison treated in the works cited in n. 266 did not settle it, because the subject of the ruling cited there differs from the subject in question; it is therefore not raised into a finding of this chapter.

Footnotes

  1. French Law No. 87-571 of 23 July 1987 on the development of patronage (Loi n° 87-571 du 23 juillet 1987 sur le développement du mécénat), art. 18. The two paragraphs used were checked against the image of document 1, printed p. 1, in the French Conseil d’État file “Recrutement au tour extérieur, au titre de 2026: rédaction d’une note administrative” [External Recruitment for 2026: Drafting an Administrative Memorandum], the official extract, retrieved on 25 October 2026. They matched the consolidated government text from the website of the Government of New Caledonia dated 1 July 2021; it was not possible to compare them with the Légifrance page or with the image of the Journal officiel. The extract is a check of the two passages, not a survey of all the provisions of the law and its amendments. § 80(2) BGB is cited in the wording checked against the image of the Gazette and its official page, as in nn. 27 and 262. French Law No. 2008-776, art. 140 II, is the compared text as issued, referred to where the effect of publication is set out in Chapter 1, §5; no claim is made to cover its later amendments. ↩

  2. Bandar, “ʿAmman yanfarid al-waqf?” [Compared with Whom Is Waqf Unique?], “Ḥaṣīlat al-ʿirqayn: iʿādat al-imtiḥān bi-naẓīr thānin wa-ḍābiṭ thālith” [The Outcome of the Two Strands: Retesting with a Second Counterpart and a Third Control], and “Ḥaṣīlat imtiḥān daʿwā al-tarkīb” [The Outcome of Testing the Combination Claim] (1 August 2026); unpublished papers. They are cited for the precedence of the question and its methodological result; the evidence for the legal comparison is identified in the chapter’s notes. What is relied on is the outcome of these works, which criticise the claim of distinctiveness; it does not make the place of the purpose’s qualification equivalent to evidence of inner intention. The comparison of the source of qualification in India remained inconclusive, because the subject of the ruling cited differs from the subject in question. ↩

  3. General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat tanẓīm aʿmāl al-niẓāra [Regulation Organising Niẓāra Work], Article 1, p. 4, and Article 8, paragraph 1, p. 7. The ruling rests on the Authority’s versions of 2023 and 2025, and the passage used was found identical in both by comparing the images. The qualification on the start of the time limit: the date of documentation or the date on which the Regulation came into force. A description of documentation as constitutive or declaratory is not to be drawn from this alone. ↩

  4. Egypt, Law 48 of 1946 on the Rulings of Waqf, arts 1 and 4, p. 4. Both articles were checked against the official image. It is used here as historical evidence in its verified wording, and the question of its current legal effect is not reopened. ↩

4. Change: Who Assesses the Maṣlaḥa, and Who Gives Permission?

Chapter 7, in §§2 and 4, identified a difference in the requirement of prior permission, according to Abū Zahra’s account of the juristic form: Abū Zahra presents founder-stipulated substitution (istibdāl, putting other property in the place of endowed property) in the specific form without a requirement to seek the judge’s permission, and Ibn ʿĀbidīn affirms that the judge’s overriding supervisory authority remains.269 By contrast, section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Act requires the Commissioner’s permission, based on necessity or benefit, together with the prior approval of the Government and procedures for objection and appeal.270 There, this ruling was distinguished from the mere denial that the judge must carry out the disposition himself, and the disagreement over the validity of the stipulation and the reported view requiring the permission of the judge (ḥākim) were preserved; the claim of a difference is therefore confined to the comparison stated.

What the difference adds to the question of identity is the identification of a ruling in one waqf form, not a division of all institutions into a free waqf and a constrained counterpart. The fatwā (juristic opinion) of Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh on selling a waqf with the permission of the sharia judge (al-ḥākim al-sharʿī) shows another waqf form in which permission is established.271 Abū Zahra’s account also excludes the mosque, and the Indian section is confined to the dealings in immovable property that it lists, with an exception for inam grants, which are referred to section 41. The difference therefore does not carry over to every change of purpose or of entitlement, and does not by itself indicate speed, integrity or good outcomes.

Footnotes

  1. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr [The Triumph of the Almighty], vol. 6, pp. 227–228; Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār [The Reply to the Perplexed], Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, pp. 384–387; Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf [Lectures on Waqf], pp. 179–180, para. 167. Abū Zahra was checked against the image. From Fatḥ al-qadīr, al-Anṣārī’s report at the end of p. 228 was checked against the image (n. 188), while the rest of pp. 227–228 and Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s text remain as their digital texts. The ranks of the evidence and the conflict between the reports are set out in Chapter 7; the denial that the judge must carry out the transaction himself is therefore not, on its own, evidence that his permission need not be sought. ↩

  2. The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, section 34, pp. 29–30 of the revised version from India Code; the latest amendment in its footnotes is Act 26 of 2013. The sections used were checked against the revised version, and the amendments obtained, up to Act 19 of 2024, were examined within the limits of the texts obtained; no change to the compared ruling appeared in what was examined; that does not establish that all amendments up to 2026 were examined. The prior approval of the Government was added, and the appeal moved to the court, by Act 38 of 1998, s. 2, Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, p. 129; it came into force on 22 January 1999 according to the footnote of the revised version, and the commencement notification itself was not opened. The version is not to be described as a facsimile of the 1959 original. ↩

  3. Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 386, on the judge’s overriding supervisory authority. Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh, Fatāwā wa-rasāʾil samāḥat al-Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh [The Fatwās and Epistles of His Eminence Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh], compiled by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Qāsim, Mecca edition, 1399 AH, vol. 9, p. 171, fatwā 2441. We have not found the publisher of this edition; the passage was checked against a copy of it. The example is confined to the sale of a waqf in the fatwā, and is not a comparative rule covering the whole Ḥanbalī school. ↩

5. The Right of Review: The Existence of a Body Is Not the Same as Access to It

Chapter 6 revealed that the validity of an entitlement and the route to protecting it are two connected questions. A rule may allow the people of the waqf to know its deed without giving them every power in its administration, and it may make an application for removal dependent on standing or permission. A comparison therefore does not achieve its purpose if it ends with the finding that both systems have a judge or a supervisory body.

An example is section 59(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act, in the chapter specific to the math, a kind of Hindu religious institution that the Act calls math: the suit for removal is brought by the Commissioner, or by two (2) or more persons having an interest, with his written consent. This is not equivalent to the statement “the entitlement-holder may remove the mutawallī”, nor is the route reduced to the case reaching the court. Number, permission and standing are conditions that affect the ability to initiate litigation. The math and the specific endowments attached to it have a separate chapter that distinguishes its rules from the rules on removal and succession in another chapter; the different rules are therefore not to be combined into a single route of claim.272

In the American model Uniform Trust Code, section 706 separates the person who applies for removal from the power of the court, just as the modification sections separate initiating the proceeding from deciding it. This directs the reading to the person with standing, the ground and the remedy, without assuming that they are the same as in a particular waqf form. This book has not completed the comparison of the written-permission requirement in section 59 with the standing of the applicant for removal in a specified juristic form; the existence of review outside the manager is shared across the evidence, while how far access to it is similar is unresolved.273 The closest juristic form we have found is the requirement of appointment (tawliya) or the judge’s permission for a claim by the mawqūf ʿalayh to the asset of the waqf, according to the position on which fatwā is given (al-muftā bihi) among the Ḥanafīs, which was set out in Chapter 6, §6. The subject of that claim is the waqf itself, not removal; it is thus a counterpart in requiring permission to initiate litigation, and it does not complete the comparison. Our research did not find, in the texts it examined, written standards for granting permission that lend themselves to comparison.274

This limit is useful in describing waqf itself. Independence in administering property does not entail independence of the route of complaint, and the existence of judicial jurisdiction does not establish that everyone harmed has standing to invoke it. The comparison is more precise when it asks about the information needed for proof, who may request it, who has standing, whether a claim can be barred and who reviews that bar, and then about the remedy available. These are questions that put to use the tools we worked out in Chapter 6; they are not comparative findings that we established merely by putting them in a list.

Footnotes

  1. Tamil Nadu Act, section 59(1), p. 54; and section 44, p. 40, which excludes the math and the specific endowments attached to it from the specified sections of the chapter. The text is from the revised version identified in n. 270. The comparison of the standing of the applicant for removal on this route with a single juristic form has not been completed. ↩

  2. Uniform Trust Code, comment to section 507, printed p. 91; and sections 704, 706(a), 410(b) and 413. ↩

  3. Bandar, “Man yamlik al-daʿwā?” [Who Holds the Action?], §4.3; and the text of the fatwā in n. 164. ↩

6. Continuity of Purpose and Change of Property: What Do the Detailed Rulings Add?

Chapter 8 showed that the transfer of the dedication to the substitute does not necessarily carry with it every power of change, and that succession among the holders of an office does not pass every special permission to them. The detailed rulings (furūʿ) on founder-stipulated substitution worked out which stipulations follow the property, what appointment of an agent (tawkīl) or of an executor (īṣāʾ) is valid, and how the price is protected during the transfer. From them we take here the comparative question: which rulings follow the substitute property, which powers follow the office, and which require a fresh basis?275

The replacement test presented in §8 did not test these detailed rulings in the Indian comparator. What it established as shared on continuity is the filling of some offices, the keeping of the register and the handling of impossibility; it does not cover every new ruling that the reading of waqf revealed. Drawing this line preserves the value of the detailed rulings: they widen the comparative question and identify the corresponding text that is needed, without being counted as a difference that has not been established.

Likewise, continuity is not the same as perpetuity in all forms. Al-Zarqāʾ favours the reasoned position (ijtihād) of the Mālikīs on limited duration, and the German § 80 permits a foundation for a fixed period whose property is consumed in achieving its purpose. Where a rule of preserving the principal is compared with a rule of consumption, the form of the waqf and the form of the foundation must first be identified. A difference in duration or in the consumption of property may occur within a single institutional category, in waqf itself and in the foundation itself; no absolute separation between waqf and everything else is therefore to be built on it.276

This is a comparison of the rules on continuity. The continuity of service examined in Chapter 8, however, also requires financing and work that fulfil what the right calls for; it is therefore not to be inferred from the validity of the transfer of property alone.

Examining the modification of a charitable purpose, or cy-près, shows why what has changed must be determined before an institution is described as flexible. Under section 413 of the American model Uniform Trust Code, as amended in 2003, if a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve or wasteful, the court may modify or terminate the trust, directing its property in a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes. The text lays down the principle that the property does not revert to the settlor or his successors, with a defined exception in subsection (b) for a term providing for distribution to a noncharitable beneficiary: that the property is to revert to a living settlor, or that twenty-one (21) years have not yet passed since the creation of the trust when the term takes effect. The comment explains that modification may affect an administrative term or a term relating to distribution.277

The subject of this power is wider than transferring a valid dedication and its stipulations to a substitute asset, as in the form of substitution worked out in Chapter 8. There the question is: what passes to the substitute, and who has the power to repeat the disposition? Here the question is: when does the impossibility of a particular purpose permit the court to intervene, and to what purpose or body is the property directed? The comparison helps to separate a change of the asset in which the dedication is held from a change in the manner of using the benefit; it neither makes cy-près a translation of every substitution nor justifies transferring the court’s powers to the nāẓir. Nor does this American formulation represent the law of trusts in every country or period.

Footnotes

  1. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, p. 229; the base text of Tanwīr al-abṣār [Enlightening the Eyes] with al-Ḥaṣkafī’s commentary and Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s gloss, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 385. The detail of the transfer of stipulations, the limits of repetition, of agency and of testamentary appointment, and the protection of the price are worked out in Chapter 8, §§2–5, with the ranks of its digital texts and its checks. These detailed rulings are not to be generalised to other forms of transfer. ↩

  2. Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, p. 50, the footnote continued from p. 49 on paragraph 49; and § 80(1) BGB, in the wording checked against the image of the Gazette, as in n. 262. Agreement among the schools on limited duration is not to be inferred from al-Zarqāʾ’s preference. ↩

  3. Uniform Trust Code (2000, Last Revised or Amended in 2003), section 413(a)–(b) and its comment, printed pp. 71–73. This is a comparison with the text of the model itself in its specified version, not a judgement on a law in force in all states. ↩

7. Relationships between Institutions: Where Does the Description of the Waqf System Advance?

Chapter 9 showed that a relationship between two awqāf may lie in a right over an asset, in a yield (rayʿ) serving another body, in the administration of shared income-producing properties (mustaghallāt), or in financing the revival of a waqf. Each relationship has its own rules on ownership, designated use (maṣrif) and authority. Bringing managers or assets together under one name does not explain what happened to the rights, and the survival of the awqāf’s names does not establish the independence of decision and property.

This distinction appears in the Saudi regulation on reviving awqāf: its Article 22 distinguishes between merging the niẓāra, merging administration and merging assets, and keeps for each form its own restrictions, as Chapter 9 set out. Article 15 of the historical Egyptian law contains a special arrangement for investing substitute funds deposited in the court treasuries: shares are created in shared income-producing properties, and the authority to administer them changes, while what belongs to each waqf is distributed to its designated use by its nāẓir. This is a separation between some levels of administration and of dedication, not an abolition of the linked awqāf.278

The mere support of one institution by another, however, is not specific to waqf. The French article 140(I), in its text published in 2008, permits an endowment fund to redistribute its income to support a non-profit legal person in works of public benefit. This is a counterpart to the function of financing between institutions, not to all the conditions of lending, merger or rights over assets that Chapter 9 studied.279

A funding institution may be linked with a beneficiary institution while the unit counted by statistics differs from the property described by fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). The System of National Accounts 2025, in its pre-edit version, specifies a particular arrangement in paragraph 26.8: a charitable institution contracts with a fund manager to establish an open-ended waqf fund, and the public donate by purchasing its units. The charitable institution is the beneficiary and the economic owner of all the units, and the function of the fund in this description is the financial management of the institution’s portfolio, with the reinvestment of profits or the distribution of specified amounts of them. Paragraph 26.21 places these funds among “captive financial institutions”, because the beneficiary institution is their sole client.280

Two differences that affect the description of waqf follow from this specification. The fund’s units are not its assets, and the beneficiary institution is not the individuals to whom the service is provided. Attributing economic ownership of the units to the institution does not give the patient or the student ownership of the endowed principal, nor does it establish for the patient or the student a right to reclaim the donated money. Nor is every waqf of a mosque or a school classified in the financial sector; what the determination applies to is the arrangement that the paragraph described. The System of National Accounts itself distinguished between economic and legal ownership, and its function is to measure economic activity. The word “ownership” in it is therefore not an automatic answer to the question of al-Zarqāʾ or al-Buhūtī about ownership of the substance (raqaba), the dhimma and authority.281

AAOIFI’s Financial Accounting Standard 37 keeps a different breadth for the unit. In its introduction it makes the closest counterparts of the waqf institution “non-profit sector charitable bodies with endowment funds”, and mentions the founder’s instructions, the rulings of the sharia and investment functions, together with religious, educational, cultural and financial benefits. Its scope covers waqf institutions established and operating in accordance with the rulings of the sharia, whatever their legal status, including the virtual institution established without legal or regulatory registration or documentation. Its definition of beneficiary also covers those entitled to services and programmes, alongside those entitled to the returns on the property. The existence of a financial reporting standard therefore does not confine the institution’s subject to investment or the distribution of cash.282

The result is that describing a financing relationship requires pinning down what was dedicated, what each body administers, what it is entitled to, and what it is obliged to provide. In the picture drawn by the System of National Accounts, the fund may be counted as a separate unit and another institution may hold its benefit, that institution then working in education or medical care. AAOIFI’s picture, for its part, also extends to a waqf institution that provides the service. The boundaries of each unit are therefore identified before their funds are aggregated or their outcomes compared: the fund’s return describes a financing capacity, the number of services describes the operator’s work, and the entitlement-holder’s standing shows what he can claim from each of them. This is a result whose elements our paper “Maṣfūfat ʿanāṣir al-waqf wa-l-uṭur al-dawliyya” [The Matrix of Waqf Elements and International Frameworks] has already set out; its usefulness appears here when it is linked with the rules of the waqf network.283

A single body may carry out both investment and service; in that case the functions are combined, and it remains necessary to distinguish its obligation towards the dedicated property from its obligation towards the entitlement-holder of the benefit. The number of bodies and the limits of reporting vary with the case, while the relationship between resource and service remains a subject that needs to be set out. This result is bounded by the basis of each description: a statistical or accounting classification does not by itself create legal personality or a power of disposition. The comparison allows both classifications to be drawn on in describing property and work, while the effects of ownership, obligation and claim are referred back to the texts that establish them.

Hence the question of Chapter 9 passes into the comparison: how do the rules preserve the boundaries of each dedication when work or financing is shared? The burden of administration may fall through pooling, but that is an effect that needs measuring; what the text establishes is the distribution of competence, property and right. Here accounting enters in identifying the share of each dedication, finance in setting out the debt and the source of its repayment, the courts in correcting infringement, and urban planning in overlapping rights of use. These are connections imposed by the subject of the work; they are not decorative descriptions added to the word waqf.

Not all these relationships have yet been compared with similar legal counterparts. The permissible conclusion is that the waqf network widens the subject of the Dustūr and reveals rules that confining attention to the single waqf neglected; whether it is unique in having those rules, or performs better in operating the network, are two questions that need other evidence.

Footnotes

  1. General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat iḥyāʾ al-awqāf al-majhūla wa-l-muʿaṭṭala [Regulation on Reviving Unknown and Disused Awqāf] (Umm al-Qurā, 2 October 2026), art. 22, especially paragraphs 3–5; the official text was checked in Chapter 9. And Egyptian Law 48 of 1946, art. 15, in Qānūn bi-aḥkām al-waqf al-ṣādir bi-l-qānūn raqm 48 li-sanat 1946, muʿallaqan ʿalā mawāddihi bi-aʿmālihi al-taḥḍīriyya [The Law on the Rulings of Waqf Issued as Law No. 48 of 1946, with Its Articles Annotated from Its Preparatory Works], pp. 51–52. Its scope is the substitute funds held in the court treasuries, after a year has passed without a request from the parties concerned to apply the preceding article, and on the request of the Minister of Justice to the competent court; it is not shared administration of waqf property in general. See the detail of the two forms and their sources in Chapter 9, §4. ↩

  2. French Law No. 2008-776, art. 140 I, the Gazette text in WIPO Lex, in the as-issued wording specified in n. 28. What is new here is linking the income-redistribution limb to the question of relationships between institutions; it is not the verification of a new text, nor a judgement on all the current rules governing the fund. ↩

  3. European Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations and World Bank, System of National Accounts 2025, New York, 2025, ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/2/Rev.6, the official version marked Pre edit version, paras 1.3, 26.8, 26.21 and 26.88. Para. 26.8 is on p. 800 of the PDF file, para. 26.21 on pp. 802–803, and para. 26.88 on p. 815; these are the file’s page numbers, since no printed pagination appears on the pages cited. The determination concerns the arrangement described, not all awqāf nor the beneficiary institution of the arrangement. ↩

  4. System of National Accounts 2025, paras 1.3, 26.8, 26.21 and 26.88. ↩

  5. Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Financial Accounting Standard 37, Financial Reporting by Waqf Institutions, final English text, 2020, IN1, p. 6; scope and the definition of beneficiary, p. 7; and the definition of the virtual institution, p. 8. The phrase in the body is the standard’s own wording: “non-profit sector charitable bodies with endowment funds”. What is meant is the counterpart of the charitable body that has the fund, not the fund alone. ↩

  6. Bandar, “Maṣfūfat ʿanāṣir al-waqf wa-l-uṭur al-dawliyya” [The Matrix of Waqf Elements and International Frameworks], the axes on the attribution of ownership and on the places of classification. The matrix identified the difference between economic and legal ownership, between the fund’s units and the endowed principal, and between the beneficiary institution and the ultimate entitlement-holder; and it confined the classification as captive financial institutions to the arrangement described in the System of National Accounts. Linking this here with the distinction between resource and service is an analysis of the cases, not a claim that the standards by themselves conferred a right to claim. ↩

8. The Replacement Test: What Was Shared and What Differed?

The test compares questions drawn from the rules of waqf with another institutional arrangement, so that we know which results depend on the description of waqf and which also appear in its comparator. The comparator here is the Hindu religious and charitable endowments regulated by Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959, in the consolidated version specified in the notes, together with a judicial ruling on the legal personality of the deity. It was chosen because it played no part in building the initial framework of questions, not because it represents all purpose institutions or provides a complete historical comparison. Repeating the result of this test in another work does not count as independent evidence if it rests on the same texts and the same analysis. Within it, the rules for temples differ from the rules for maths; the ruling for one is therefore not to be transferred to the other without a basis.284

The table sets out the question, the evidence on each side and the limit of the result. “Shared” is a judgement on the specific relationship in the row, and “partly shared” means sharing established in part of what is asked, while a part remains unverified. Sharing and difference may occur together in a single row.

The question testedWhat the waqf side establishes in the bookWhat corresponds to it in the comparatorThe result and its limit
How is a purpose institution created, and what rights does its founder retain?Chapter 1 distinguishes creation from documentation and registration, and confines each form to its own systemThe right of establishment in Article 26(a) of the Indian Constitution, and the reasoning on representing the religious purpose in the Indian judgement in the Naskar case (Chapter 8, §7); the full set of the founder’s retained rights has not been worked out herePartly shared: the possibility of establishing an institution for the purpose; no similarity is established in the route of formation or in the founder’s power
How is property linked to a designated use that goes beyond personal disposition?Chapter 2 sets out dedication and the right in the asset and in the benefitThe definition of religious endowment in section 6(17) links property to the service or support of the templeShared: the link between property and the specified purpose; the definition alone does not settle where ownership ends up
Do stipulations operate under higher rules?Chapter 3 separates the interpretation of a stipulation from its validity and from the limits of acting on itSection 28(1) ties administration to the terms of the trust, usage and lawful directions, subject to the Temple Entry Act of 1947Shared: the existence of rules that constrain administration; the ranks of all these sources, and the ways in which conflicts between them are handled, have not been compared
Is the office independent of the person who holds it?Chapter 5 distinguishes the capacity from the act, and asks about the effect of combining several capacitiesThe definition of trustee in section 6(22) makes administration of the institution its criterion; the text consulted does not reveal how a person is held to account for two capacities combinedPartly shared; defining the office is not the same as establishing rules for separating responsibilities when they are combined
Does administration by itself create ownership of the asset?Chapter 2 separates the authority to administer from the basis of ownership, and preserves the forms in which administration and entitlement coincideThe Indian judgement in the Naskar case holds that the deity has legal personality and that the property is attributed to it (Chapter 8, §7), and section 28 imposes on the trustee a standard of care for the propertyShared: administration is not by itself a basis of ownership; with a difference that requires identifying the holder of ownership in each form
Does entitlement to the benefit equal the power to administer it?Chapters 4 and 6 distinguish the ground of entitlement and the route to claiming it from authoritySection 63(e) concerns deciding certain customary entitlements, and section 28 concerns the trustee’s administrationPartly shared: the distinctness of the two functions; it does not establish that the scope of the rights or the ways of protecting them are equal
Who reviews the person administering, and with what standing is the application begun?Chapter 6 separates claiming a right from protecting the purpose, and specifies the limits of the nāẓir’s powerSection 53(2) on the removal of temple trustees, and section 59(1) on suits for the removal of the trustee of a math; the latter imposes a written-permission requirement on some of those bringing the suitReview from outside the manager is established; the effect of the requirements of standing and permission on access to the courts, however, is examined separately, and a shared purpose of oversight does not cancel it
How is a matter decided when the deciding body is a party to it?Ibn Taymiyya’s view that someone other than the nāẓir and the judge should decide a dispute between them; this is a ruling on the question put to him, and does not establish a general practice285No ruling corresponding to this form, within its limits, has been identified in the texts consultedUnresolved; the absence of a ruling is not established by its not having been identified
Who has the power to change the asset, the arrangement of administration or the purpose?Chapter 7 separates the acts of change, establishes the validity of the stipulation of substitution on Abū Yūsuf’s view, and attributes the absence of a requirement to seek permission to Abū Zahra’s account of the nāẓir to whom the founder gave the right of substitutionSection 34 for exchange, sale, mortgage and long lease, sections 64–65 for schemes of administration, and section 66 for directing certain funds when the purpose fails, under its conditionsPartly shared: the regulation of the power of change. Difference in prior permission: Abū Zahra’s account of the specific substitution does not require it, while the disagreement over the validity of the stipulation is preserved. Also preserved are the reported view requiring the permission of the judge, Ibn al-Humām’s reading of it as concerning a case in which the founder did not stipulate the right for himself, and the continuing overriding supervisory authority of the judge in the juristic form presented. The Indian text requires the Commissioner’s permission after examination of necessity or benefit and publication of the proposal for objections, together with the prior approval of the Government in the version relied on
What continues when persons and endowed properties change?Chapter 8 separates succession to the niẓāra, the transfer of stipulations to the substitute and the transfer of special permissionSection 54 on succession to certain temple trusteeships, section 60 on maths, section 29 on the register, and sections 66–67 on specified destinations for funds and institutionsPartly shared: the instruments of continuity; the similarity of the transfer of stipulations to the substitute, of the repetition of permission or of its transfer by agency and testamentary appointment has not been verified here

The ninth row shows why the result is disaggregated. The two sides share the constraining of disposition, but prior permission is not a detail that this sharing erases. Conversely, the absence of judicial oversight in the form Abū Zahra presents is not to be inferred from his account’s not requiring that permission. The seventh row shows that the existence of a reviewer outside the administration is not enough to make the routes of application equal; the standing of the person bringing the suit and the possibility of reviewing a refusal of permission belong to the very structure of protection. The two lines of evidence are set out in detail in Chapter 6, §7, and Chapter 7, §4.

This table tested rules of legal design; it did not test how regularly they are applied in practice, or their economic outcome. Nor did it take in what the book set out on the relationship between the quality of the benefit and expertise, the cost of access to the right, or cooperation among several awqāf. In particular, the detailed rulings in Chapter 8 on the transfer of stipulations and powers are not established differences so long as their counterpart has not been verified. The book keeps what the test established and identifies what needs a new test; it does not turn the breadth of its material into a breadth of comparative result that its evidence has not reached.

If the claim that waqf is distinguished by the combination of its characteristics is to be tested, that combination must be specified, its elements must be shown to go together in a known form of waqf, it must then be compared with the counterpart’s combination under the same need and the same constraints, and what would refute the claim of difference must be specified — including the establishment of a counterpart that reproduces the claimed relationship and its effect. A claim about how the combination performs does not require that the institution collapse when one element is removed, for another arrangement may make up for its effect. A list of useful characteristics, or a sum of scattered differences across schools and periods, is not enough to establish this distinctiveness.

Footnotes

  1. The comparison sections are from the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, in the consolidated version specified where the Act is cited; and Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta, [1969] 3 SCR 742, 747, on the reasoning for the legal personality of the deity. The text of the right of establishment is in Article 26(a) of the Indian Constitution. The scope of sections 53 and 54 is read with the exclusion of the math in section 44, so their rules are set against sections 59 and 60. The prior approval of the Government in section 34 was added by Act 38 of 1998, which came into force on 22 January 1999 according to the footnote of the revised version. Each row judges only the parts set against each other in it, and sharing in one of them is not counted as covering the rest of the question. ↩

  2. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā [The Collected Fatwās], King Fahd Complex edition, 1425 AH / 2004, vol. 31, p. 65. His text is in an answer on a dispute between the nāẓir and the judge (ḥākim), and Makdisi quotes it in Nashʾat al-kulliyyāt [The Rise of Colleges], the translation, p. 118. The quotation is from the checked digital text, and it has not been used as evidence that this ruling was widely applied. ↩

9. East–West Dialogue: Comparison, Historical Transmission and Institutional Adoption

The trust can bring closer an understanding of the relationship between founder, manager and recipient; the foundation with legal personality can bring closer an understanding of how obligation and representation are attributed; and purpose-bound property can bring closer an understanding of the dedication of a resource. Each analogy has a place where it helps, and a limit. If waqf is called a trust, not all the rules of the American trust pass to it; and if it is called a foundation, the juristic construction of ownership in its school is not thereby settled. Comparison works on effects, alongside its work on concepts.

Comparison between languages requires reading the ruling in full, with both editions specified. In Article 3 of the Arabic text of Qadrī Pāshā’s codification, binding force (luzūm) appears, followed by the bar on the founder’s revocation. In the French translation by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Kaḥīl286 the word exécutoire appears, meaning “enforceable”, and the text then also states that the founder cannot revoke the act once it has been completed. This verbal difference alone therefore does not establish that the ruling on binding force changed, since the bar on revocation remains explicit. The Arabic compared is from the 1928 edition and the French from 1896; the Arabic copy from which Kaḥīl translated has not been identified, so the differences between these two editions are not to be attributed to the translator’s handling alone.287

In Article 4 the ruling is also cast differently: the Arabic has “the binding force of the waqf is confirmed” (yataʾakkadu luzūm al-waqf), and the French ne deviennent définitives que si, that is, the constitution of the waqf and the extinction of the founder’s ownership become final only if the judicial ruling mentioned is issued. The Arabic, however, confines this to the view of Abū Ḥanīfa and then says “the preponderant view is what preceded” (wa-l-rājiḥ mā sabaq), while the French attributes the condition to his view and states that the preponderant opinion dispenses with judicial confirmation. The difference in the wording of the condition is evident; a change in the endorsed ruling, however, is not established by isolating this sentence from the attribution of the view, its weighting and the preceding article. Settling the question requires comparing the source of the view and the original of the translation; the example adds to the examination of terminology an examination of the condition, the exception and the holder of the view.288

This precision also does work in establishing a system. When a rule is transferred into a codification or into another language, one specifies the ruling to be preserved or changed, the wording that conveys it in the terminology of the receiving body, the endorsed version, and who has the power to approve it and to decide between its versions when they differ. Calling a book a “law” does not give every article in it the rank of legislation with legal effect in the new context, nor does translation give its source that rank. This is a proposal for regulating how a text is endorsed, not a judgement on the legal effect of Qadrī’s codification in his time.

The discussions of Monica M. Gaudiosi and Hennigan show the need to separate comparison from the history of borrowing. Gaudiosi acknowledges the difference in legal title, and then compares the role of the trustee with that of the mutawallī; she is therefore not to be presented as having overlooked the difference. She considers Islamic influence on the origins of the English trust possible, while acknowledging that similarity alone does not settle the question. Hennigan criticises inferring causation from correlation. A critique of the sufficiency of the evidence does not turn into establishing that the influence did not occur, nor does similarity turn into establishing that it did.289

Dialogue can thus draw on the experience of waqf without depending on settling a single historical origin for institutions. The fiqh of substitution helps in scrutinising how the assessment of maṣlaḥa (legally relevant benefit) and permission are distributed; the fiqh of entitlement and of the ordering of income helps in separating the preservation of the resource from the rights of those present now; the waqf network helps in studying the administration of resources subject to multiple stipulations; and the counterpart models help in revealing what we overlooked of the conditions of standing, publication and appeal. Neither side is a store of solutions that the other need only receive.

Presenting waqf to an international body, however, requires a further step: identifying a problem that the body wishes to address, choosing the rule or arrangement that addresses it, and setting out what it requires in legal recognition, resources, bodies, expertise and review. What is sought may be the continued financing of a service, preventing the mixing of restricted funds, or protecting a recipient who has no power over the institution’s administration. Each problem has alternatives against which it is compared. The point of the argument here is that the heritage of waqf and its regulations offer precise forms of distributing property, power and right that are fit for this test; the superiority of their institutional adoption (tabannī, that is, choosing a waqf arrangement in a particular context, with a justification of what it adds and a comparison with the possible alternatives) in a particular country or sector is not established by this chapter.

Footnotes

  1. Tawfīq Iskārūs, “Muḥammad Qadrī Bāshā”, al-Muqtaṭaf [The Digest], vol. 48, no. 3, March 1916, pp. 253–262, the passage at pp. 260–261. He names him “ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Kaḥīl”, and states that the translation of Qānūn al-ʿadl [Code of Justice and Equity] in 1896 was made at the request of the Ministry of Public Instruction (Niẓārat al-Maʿārif) and with the confirmation of the Minister of Justice (Nāẓir al-Ḥaqqāniyya). The digital text from the al-Shārikh Archive was checked; the image of the printed edition was not examined. The report of the request and the confirmation does not identify the Arabic copy that was translated, nor does it establish that the book’s articles had legal effect as legislation. The Latin spelling in the edition’s details is kept as printed: Abdulaziz Kahil Bey. ↩

  2. Muḥammad Qadrī Pāshā, Qānūn al-ʿadl wa-l-inṣāf li-l-qaḍāʾ ʿalā mushkilāt al-awqāf [Code of Justice and Equity], Cairo: Maktabat al-Ahrām, 5th edition, 1928, arts 3–4, p. 4; Du Wakf, par Mohammed Kadri Pacha, traduit de l’arabe par Abdulaziz Kahil Bey, Le Caire: Imprimerie Nationale, 1896, arts. 3–4, p. 4. Both articles were checked in full in the images of p. 4 of each edition, including the attribution of the view and the weighting. The references of the two articles in both editions to al-Durr al-mukhtār and Radd al-muḥtār, p. 507 and pp. 499–500, agree; this is an indication of connection, not an identification of the original of the translation. The differences between the editions and the reform footnotes were examined earlier in our unpublished work “Mā lā yutarjam: taqnīn Qadrī Bāshā wa-tarjamatuhu al-Faransiyya, dirāsa waṣfiyya muqārina” [What Is Not Translated: Qadrī Pāshā’s Codification and Its French Translation, a Descriptive Comparative Study]; the documented example is used here within its limits. The Arabic examined is later than the French, so it is not to be described as the original that Kaḥīl translated, and the example does not determine that the book’s articles had legal effect as law in any particular country or period. ↩

  3. Qadrī Pāshā, Qānūn al-ʿadl wa-l-inṣāf, arts 3–4, p. 4; Du Wakf, arts. 3–4, p. 4. ↩

  4. Monica M. Gaudiosi, “The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in England: The Case of Merton College,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 136, no. 4 (1988), 1246–1247, 1255; Hennigan, The Birth of a Legal Institution, 53–54, n. 7 to chapter 3 of Hennigan’s book. The earlier reading of the two texts is relied on, with the limits on attributing each. The comparison here sets out part of the disagreement, and does not claim to re-examine the history of the origin of the trust or to have read every work of those involved. ↩

10. What Has the Chapter Identified of the Rules and Characteristics of Waqf?

The identity of waqf becomes clear through knowing what links the dedication to rights and powers as property and persons change, within its specified juristic and legal normative framework. Defining the property made inalienable, or listing the parties, is not enough for this on its own, just as establishing or denying its personality is not enough. Useful knowledge begins by identifying the effect of each ruling: who owns, who uses the benefit, who is obliged, who decides, who reviews, and what remains after the change.

From the preceding chapters and the comparisons here, characteristics described with their evidence are established: the difference between the basis of administration and the basis of ownership; the connection between the ordering of income and the grounds of entitlement; the possibility of granting a limited power of change while the dedication continues; the difference between what follows the substitute property and what is vested in the holder of an office; and the possibility of working across linked institutions while boundaries that need protecting remain. Some are shared with specific counterparts, some differ, and the comparison of some has not been completed. This is a result that describes waqf and opens research into its effects, and its value is not diminished because something other than waqf knows some of its functions.

At the level of the rules of comparison, a change in the name of the body is not enough to judge that there is a difference, and a shared aim is not enough to judge that the two are the same. The effect of the difference is to be sought in the basis of the power, the condition of its exercise, the route of claim or the destination of the property. The comparison of Abū Zahra’s account with the Indian text identified a difference in prior permission, while the reported disagreement in the sources of the Ḥanafī form remains; the French example established that institutions supporting one another is not by itself a difference; and the detailed waqf rulings revealed questions about the transfer of stipulations and powers that the test in §8 did not settle.

This is what the chapter brings to the study of the possibility of institutional adoption: a clear legal description of what is to be transferred, with knowledge of its functions, its limits and its connection with the rest of the system. After it comes testing need, suitability, cost and outcome in a specified context; and from there Chapter 11 begins.