1. Naming the Nāẓir Is Not Enough to Understand Who Judges the Work
A founder (wāqif) stipulates a learned teacher, assigns him a stipulated stipend (maʿlūm) and specifies the days of instruction. Can whoever establishes the teacher’s attendance judge his learning? Does whoever has the power to cut off his stipend have the power to strip him of his qualification to teach? And if the scholars know that he is qualified for his post, is their judgement enough to keep him in it against whoever has the power to dismiss him?
These are different questions, even if the powers they concern are combined in one person. The qualification requirement describes who is fit to hold the post; appointment (tawliya) assigns him a particular post; proof of work concerns what he did; judging its quality requires knowing what counts as doing it well; and a sanction attaches a consequence to a recognised cause. If these relationships are reduced to a pairing of a founder who funds, a nāẓir (waqf administrator) who administers and a beneficiary who enjoys the benefit, the description loses sight of how the funded work produces useful knowledge, and of how it is reviewed when it fails.
This chapter defends a narrower claim than the assertion that waqf guarantees the independence of learning: the power of an endowed institution over its work cannot be understood until one identifies, alongside the holder of the decision, the holder of the knowledge that the decision requires, the way that knowledge is established, and the effect each of them has the power to produce. The power to appoint a teacher is not in itself a power to assess his learning; and knowing his shortcomings does not automatically give the one who knows them the right to cut off his stipend. Protection in the design of the institution is complete only when the link between these two parties is set out, not merely when each of them exists on its own.
The argument starts from specific cases. Abū Zahra sets out the jurists’ disagreement over the nāẓir’s legal status; Makdisi explains qualification to teach and the bodies that grant the licence (ijāza); Ulrich Haarmann’s reading of Barqūq’s waqf deed identifies stipulations on qualification, work and absence; and al-Ghazzī transmits from the Riḍāʾiyya a separation between recording what was left undone and making the deduction, and a restriction on dismissal at the request of the powerful. Al-Buhūtī’s text then makes it possible to examine what changes in independence of action while the nāẓir’s status remains. These sources do not represent a single waqf, nor do they establish a uniform arrangement in all awqāf. But they rule out reducing waqf to preserved property or to a single administrative apparatus.
Our paper “Min al-sharṭ ilā al-ḥasm” [From Stipulation to Deduction] has already read the links of entitlement, work, monitoring, excuse and sanction, and pointed out that their existence does not establish that enforcement took place. Our book Ḥīna yūqafu al-māl li-yataḥarraka al-ʿilm [When Property Is Endowed So That Knowledge May Move] likewise separated the teacher’s attendance from the quality of his teaching. And our series “Iqtiṣād al-karāma” [The Economy of Dignity] read the Riḍāʾiyya stipulations on protecting the worker, organising work and access to the decision of the mutawallī (waqf administrator). We draw on that earlier analysis here, and examine the link between scholarly qualification and authority (wilāya) over the post, and the limits of the power of monitoring and of decision; we therefore do not present these earlier distinctions as discoveries of this chapter.127
Footnotes
-
Bandar, Ḥīna yūqafu al-māl li-yataḥarraka al-ʿilm [When Property Is Endowed So That Knowledge May Move], chapter 3, the discussion “Wa-man kāna yaḥkumu ʿalā adāʾ al-mudarris?” [And Who Judged the Teacher’s Performance?]; and “Min al-sharṭ ilā al-ḥasm: kayfa ṣārat al-waẓīfa al-taʿlīmiyya al-mawqūfa qābila li-l-murājaʿa?” [From Stipulation to Deduction: How Did the Endowed Teaching Post Become Open to Review?], in the revised form dated 22 August 2026. And Bandar, “Madkhal muwassaʿ li-l-silsila al-sādisa: Iqtiṣād al-karāma — mādhā taḥmī al-binya al-waqfiyya fī ḥayāt al-mustafīd wa-l-ʿāmil wa-l-qāʾid?” [An Extended Introduction to the Sixth Series: The Economy of Dignity — What Does the Waqf Structure Protect in the Life of the Beneficiary, the Worker and the Leader?], third edited version, 6 September 2026, the first, second and third discussions. These are references acknowledging earlier treatment in an unpublished book and two unpublished papers; the evidence on which this chapter’s argument rests is set out below, and the chapter can be read without recourse to these works. ↩
2. Who Appoints, and on Whose Behalf Is Authority Exercised?
In Abū Zahra’s account of the nāẓir’s status according to Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, the nāẓir is a representative of the poor and of the entitlement-holders (mustaḥiqqūn). In this view, the description does not depend on their choosing him, since Abū Zahra explains that he acts in the interest of the waqf on their behalf even if they did not choose and appoint him. For Abū Yūsuf, Abū Zahra presents representation of the person who appointed him, then qualifies it in the case of the judge’s appointee: “But his agency (wakāla) on behalf of the judge is not pure agency, because the judge’s appointment of him is in the nature of a judicial ruling (ḥukm), just as it is in the nature of agency.” One consequence is that he is not removed by the removal of the judge who appointed him.128
This text separates three matters that may become confused with one another: who issues the appointment, whose interest the action serves, and the legal characterisation on which the rules of the office depend. Representation of the entitlement-holders, in the account of Muḥammad’s view, does not mean election by them; while the representation exercised by the judge’s appointee, in the account of Abū Yūsuf’s view, does not call for all the rules of pure agency. Nor is it sound to build a model of waqf on calling the nāẓir an “agent” (wakīl) and then deducing the rules of his appointment, removal and continuity in office from the name alone.
A practical question follows from this. If an entitlement-holder complains of the nāẓir’s conduct, the answer to his complaint cannot be derived merely from the fact that someone else appointed the nāẓir. The characterisation as representation identifies one side of the relationship, but it does not by itself complete the route of complaint, proof and remedy. Likewise, describing the nāẓir as acting in the interest of the entitlement-holders does not give him an unlimited right to change the way the service is provided; the limits of his action depend on their own rules and stipulations. What we need is the source on which each power rests, not a widening of the word’s meaning until it carries them all.
This reading serves the chapter’s subject by distinguishing the source of power from its direction. Chapter 8 deals with the rules on its transfer when the founder dies or the nāẓir changes; the effect of the judge’s removal on whether his appointee stays in post has already been set out in Abū Zahra’s account of Abū Yūsuf’s view. What we add here is the question of the knowledge needed to exercise that power: does the person who issues the decision know for himself that the worker is qualified, or does he rely on a certificate or a report? And is the report binding on him, or information he draws on? The text on representation does not answer all of this; it locates the right question.
Footnotes
-
Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf [Lectures on Waqf], pp. 397–398, para. 328. The quotation was checked against images of the printed edition, keeping the qualification of each jurist’s view as Abū Zahra presents it. The spellings «القاضى» and «فى» are those of the printed edition. ↩
3. The Scholar’s Licence and His Appointment in a Particular Waqf
Makdisi distinguishes the licence to transmit (ijāzat al-riwāya) from the licence to teach and to issue legal opinions (ijāzat al-tadrīs wa-l-iftāʾ). For the latter he presents examples in which the candidate scholar is examined on questions or books before being granted permission. In comparing Islamic education with the Christian West, he explicitly distinguishes power based on recognised competence in a field of knowledge from power based on a recognised right to grant the licence. The distinction between knowledge and permission is thus present in his own analysis; it is not an objection we add to it on the ground that he overlooked it.129
This distinction is useful in reading educational waqf, but a third distinction is needed: the licence to teach is not the same as assigning a teaching post in a particular waqf. The first concerns the scholar’s permission and the licensee’s qualification in the field the permission specified; the second concerns an office with a stipulation, a stipend and duties. A certificate of qualification does not by itself entail a right to the stipend of a particular madrasa, just as assigning a stipend is not enough to establish that the requirements of scholarly proficiency were met. This is a separation of the objects of the two rulings, not a claim that the two tracks never came together in one person or in one historical procedure.
It is therefore unsound to make property the source of scholarly qualification, or to make scholarly qualification alone the source of all the rights attached to the post. The holder of the power of appointment may rely on a scholar, or may himself be a scholar; but the effect of each act is read according to the capacity in which it was done. The scholar who licenses his student establishes something other than what the mutawallī establishes when he assigns him a lesson and a stipend. And if a scholar holds both functions, the capacity he used in the disputed decision must be identified.
In a wider context, Makdisi goes as far as strong statements on the independence of the power to license from the ruler and on the independence of institutions of learning. What we take here is the distinction between the sources of permission and of proficiency, and his examples of it; we do not make the general statement a historical guarantee of the freedom of all madrasas or of their teachers. Freedom to grant the licence, the ability to hold a post, the ability to remain in it and freedom to choose the subject of instruction are questions none of which establishes that another obtains. The waqf deeds that follow help to set out some of them in detail, without being made to carry a judgement on the whole history of education.
The stipulation for a post may itself separate the continuity of status from the performance of the work. For the ʿAṣrūniyya madrasa, al-Nuʿaymī transmits from Nūr al-Dīn ibn Manʿa, a relative by marriage of the founder’s descendants, the wording of its waqf deed: “and that the teaching belongs to his descendants, and a deputy is appointed in place of whoever is not qualified”. He also transmits from Ibn Shaddād that some of the descendants held the post while deputies taught on their behalf.130 To the earlier distinction between qualification and appointment, this evidence adds a third matter: the possibility of assigning performance of the work to a deputy while the status remains with the person the stipulation designated. A report that the post passed to a relative is not, on its own, evidence that the relative did the work or met its proficiency requirements.
Whether this arrangement can work, however, requires stating who chooses the deputy, the limits of his work, what he is entitled to and who answers for his shortcomings; these are details that the transmitted stipulation does not supply on its own. The evidence is therefore read as one particular form of linking the continuity of status with the waqf’s need for a qualified worker, not as a general permission to assign teaching to someone unqualified for it, nor as establishing that family succession succeeded. Its facts have been set out in detail in the paper “Mā yabqā fī al-bayt: al-waqf wa-ṣifat al-usra al-ʿālima wa-ʿilmuhā” [What Stays in the House: Waqf and the Status and Learning of the Scholarly Family]; the basis of the example here is al-Nuʿaymī’s report through its declared intermediary, not that paper’s conclusion as a whole.
Footnotes
-
George Makdisi, Nashʾat al-kulliyyāt: maʿāhid al-ʿilm ʿinda al-muslimīn wa-fī al-gharb [The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning among the Muslims and in the West], translated by Maḥmūd Sayyid Muḥammad, revised and annotated by Muḥammad ʿAlī Ḥabashī and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Ibrāhīm Abū Sulaymān, introduced by Bashīr Mūsā Nāfiʿ, Cairo: Madārāt li-l-Abḥāth wa-l-Nashr, first edition, January 2015, pp. 246–247 and 417–420. The reading here is of the Arabic translation in its digital copy, not a new check against the English original or against images of the printed edition. We avoided verbatim quotation from passages where the transcription was faulty, and kept the historical judgements attributed to the author’s account. ↩
-
ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad al-Nuʿaymī, al-Dāris fī tārīkh al-madāris [The Student on the History of the Madrasas], ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn, first edition (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1410 AH / 1990), vol. 1, p. 303; and pp. 305–306, quoting Ibn Shaddād. On p. 303 al-Nuʿaymī states expressly that Nūr al-Dīn ibn Manʿa informed him about the waqf deed; the reference is therefore to his report, not to a document that was examined. The saved digital text was checked, and the report on the deputies relies on the comparison made in our paper: Bandar, “Mā yabqā fī al-bayt: al-waqf wa-ṣifat al-usra al-ʿālima wa-ʿilmuhā” [What Stays in the House: Waqf and the Status and Learning of the Scholarly Family], unpublished paper, the discussion of the ʿAṣrūniyya. Acknowledging that earlier work does not change the rank of the report from al-Nuʿaymī. ↩
4. Barqūq: Qualification, Attendance and Excuse Are Not One Stipulation
Haarmann presents parts of the waqf deed of Barqūq’s madrasa and khānqāh (Sufi lodge), and states that the earliest date in the document is 788 AH and the latest 797 AH. We rely on his published account, checked against images of its pages; we have not examined the original of the deed for this chapter. For the shaykh of the Ḥanafīs he records his qualification to teach theology (kalām), Qurʾānic exegesis, ḥadīth, and the principles (uṣūl) and branches (furūʿ) of jurisprudence, then specifies the amount of his stipend, the number of those he is to teach and the time of instruction: five hundred (500) dirhams a month, forty (40) students, and three and a half (3.5) hours from sunrise, except on Tuesdays and Fridays.131
The sciences listed are a proficiency requirement and a field of work; the hours are a time requirement; and the number of students identifies those to whom the duty relates. None of them can therefore be put in the place of another. A register may establish a person’s attendance at the specified hours without establishing his proficiency in the required sciences; and his proficiency may be established while his failure to keep the days of instruction remains a separate question. The value of the detail is that the description of the post combines requirements whose evidence, and the consequences of whose breach, can come apart.
In the same place Haarmann sets out the differences in stipends and duties among the teachers, then mentions on p. 37 the clerk of the Sufis’ absences and his recording of their attendance. This is not evidence that the clerk himself assessed the teacher or recorded his attendance; the source specifies one category for monitoring. A misleading institutional picture may arise if a researcher puts the shaykh’s stipulation, the students’ register and the sanction for absence into one line, and then presents that line as if it described a complete procedure applied to a particular person.132
The detail on leave makes this limit clearer still. Haarmann records, for the six (6) members of the teaching staff, paid leave of no more than three (3) months for the pilgrimage, a visit to Jerusalem or visiting kin, with a choice of someone to do the absentee’s work. He then distinguishes, for the post-holders (arbāb al-waẓāʾif), the obligatory pilgrimage from a voluntary one. He records the loss of the stipend, and the possibility of replacing the absentee with someone else, if an unexcused absence exceeds ten (10) days. So not every instance of absence is a breach, and no single description of leave applies to everyone in the same way. The sanction is on p. 39 of his article.133
This changes the meaning of monitoring itself. Recording attendance is not a complete ruling on entitlement to the stipend, since between the two stand the determination of the excuse, of the stand-in and of the category to which the stipulation applies. Someone paid a wage to record attendance does not, merely by recording it, have the power to cancel authorised leave or to rule on an excuse whose assessment was not entrusted to him. This is an analytical consequence of the differences among the stipulations; we do not claim that the article identified for us all the holders of those decisions in practice.
Haarmann also discusses the exclusion from admission of certain holders of posts and connections. The witnesses mentioned on p. 38 are professional witnesses, not witnesses attesting the teachers’ attendance. To explain the restriction on their admission, together with the judges, he suggests a possible conflict of roles, then puts forward another possibility connected with their ability to contest the institution’s administration through their knowledge of its stipulations. Both are Haarmann’s interpretations; we do not trace them back to a definitive reason stated by the founder.134
These pages do not set out a specific method for assessing the quality of instruction after appointment to the post. But they do set out stipulated proficiency, obligations, monitoring, excuses and financial consequences. The conclusion is therefore neither that waqf knew quality assessment in our contemporary form nor that it neglected quality. The conclusion is that we have evidence of some links in judging the work, while identifying the link of continuing assessment, and who held it, still requires evidence of its own kind.
Footnotes
-
Ulrich Haarmann, “Mamluk endowment deeds as a source for the history of education in late medieval Egypt”, al-Abhath, 28 (1980), pp. 31–47; the dates of the document are on p. 35, and the description of the teacher, his requirements and his stipend on p. 36. For the requirement of the sciences he refers to lines 777–782 of the deed. Pages 36–39 were checked against an image of the article. This is a summary of its meaning; we did not attribute the wording of the translation to the deed. ↩
-
Haarmann, “Mamluk endowment deeds”, p. 37; the clerk of the Sufis’ absences, with his reference to lines 859–861 of the deed. The scope of monitoring is not to be extended to all the staff merely because it appears in the same waqf deed. ↩
-
Haarmann, “Mamluk endowment deeds”, pp. 38–39; the teachers’ leave and the stand-in, with his reference to lines 994–995; the pilgrimage of post-holders, to lines 989–990; and unexcused absence and its consequences, to lines 992–993. The distinction between the categories comes from the article’s explanation; the details of how it was applied in disputes are not available here. ↩
-
Haarmann, “Mamluk endowment deeds”, p. 38. He puts forward two possibilities in explaining the exclusion of witnesses and judges from membership while they keep their positions; he does not transmit an explicit reason from the founder. ↩
5. The Riḍāʾiyya: A Recorder of Shortfalls, a Mutawallī Who Makes the Deduction, and a Restriction on Dismissal
Al-Ghazzī transmits the stipulations of the Riḍāʾiyya madrasa in Aleppo, known as the ʿUthmāniyya, and points out that the founder made his waqf deed in parts, which he drew up over periods of time, adding awqāf and stipulations to them. Among these he transmits the description of the teacher as one who combines the rational and the transmitted sciences, the branches and the principles; the description of the ḥadīth scholar (muḥaddith) as learned in the discipline of ḥadīth; and the assignment to the latter of two (2) days on which he reads whatever books of ḥadīth he wishes. The transmitted text thus mentions proficiency, a field and a time, and leaves the ḥadīth scholar a range of choice within a particular discipline.135
That is a defined space of choice, not absolute independence for the madrasa or for every scholar in it. It is useful because it identifies the object of power: the choice of books of ḥadīth within the work described. If one wishes to examine the nāẓir’s power over this choice, or the mutawallī’s right to forbid a book, its evidence must be opened; it is not enough to call one of them an administrator and the other a scholar. Nor does mentioning knowledge make the standard for assessing it, or the procedure for establishing it, known.
The same stipulations include: “and a nuqṭajī [a clerk who records omissions] who records what any of the staff leaves undone, so that the mutawallī may cut from his stipend the equivalent of what he left undone”. Two functions are divided in this sentence: recording what was left undone and arranging the deduction. The sentence also specifies how the amount relates to the work left undone. But the appointment and dismissal of the nuqṭajī, the extent of his independence from the mutawallī and the way to object to his record are not detailed by the sentence.136
This is a distribution of power and information within the work, while the two remain linked. The recorder’s production of the information does not make him the one who decides the deduction; and the mutawallī’s holding of the decision on the deduction does not make the recording superfluous. The description can be tested with four questions: What act is recorded? Who establishes that it was left undone? Who assesses its equivalent in the stipend? And who has the power to make the deduction? The text identifies actors and a link between what was left undone and the stipend, but it does not detail every step in calculating it or disputing it. We therefore do not fill the gap in detail with a complete table of our own.
In the same place there is a restriction that says more about the limits of decision: “If any of the rulers or governors and notables asks the mutawallī to dismiss one of the stipendiaries (murtaziqa) and appoint someone else, he is not to comply, unless he [the stipendiary] commits an offence (jurm), in which case the mutawallī, and no one else, dismisses him.” Here a request for dismissal does not take effect merely because of the rank of the person making it; the text makes dismissal depend on a cause and assigns it to the mutawallī. Protecting the purpose of the waqf is thus linked to protecting the post from replacement merely at an outside request, just as it is linked to holding to account whoever falls short in it.137
This passage does not explain what counts as an offence, or the procedures for establishing it or for the worker’s grievance. We therefore do not treat it as a complete codification of job security, we do not equate an offence with poor teaching, and we do not infer from it that judicial intervention was barred in every case. Nor does it contain anything establishing that a mutawallī actually resisted a ruler who asked for a dismissal. What is established is the restriction in al-Ghazzī’s transmission of the stipulations; what happened when it was put to the test is another question.
Three directions meet here that the label “holding to account” does not capture: a proficiency requirement before the post is held, the recording of shortfalls in the work, and protection against dismissal not based on the named cause. If we strengthen the administrator’s hand alone, we may increase his ability to remove the offender, and with it his ability to remove a worker whom someone wishes to supplant without cause. And if we protect the worker against every measure, we may turn protection into an obstacle to accountability. This tension cannot be regulated, nor its remedy tested, before the cause, the evidence, the person who produces the effect and the limits of his decision are identified. The implementation of the rule, and the possibility of its being frustrated, remain the subject of other evidence.
In the passage that follows, the text adds a relationship running in another direction. After arranging the tawliya (appointment to the administration of the waqf) among named categories of the founder’s descendants and relatives, the freedmen and their children, it assigns it to the judge of Aleppo when those mentioned have died out, and then says: “and the ḥadīth scholar, the teacher and the preacher may then (ḥīnaʾidhin) inspect his work”. A post-holder whose own work falls under the stipulations of the waqf may thus, in another relationship, hold a right to inspect the mutawallī’s work. Roles are determined by the relationship; they are not distributed among fixed classes of persons, an administrator who always oversees and a worker who does nothing but be overseen.138
The limitation “then” (ḥīnaʾidhin) prevents this ruling from being turned into a permanent council at every stage of the tawliya. The word “inspect” (istiṭlāʿ) does not by itself establish a binding effect for objection or a power of dismissal, nor does it identify the kind of expertise it requires. Likewise, we do not infer that learning was the reason for granting this right merely because its holders are a ḥadīth scholar, a teacher and a preacher, or that they were denied access before the case named. The specific value of the evidence is that it establishes a right of inspection for post-holders under a particular stipulation; it then leaves to research the identification of the procedures for exercising it and of its effects.
Technical Work: The Amount of Repair, Its Wage and Its Quality
The question of knowledge and decision extends to the maintenance of the premises in which the institution works. In the stipulations of the Shaʿbāniyya, al-Ghazzī transmits: “The waqf’s builder (miʿmār) receives two asadī coins if he works two or three days in the month; if he works more than that, he is paid the customary rate (ujrat al-mithl).” The clause ties the counter-value (ʿiwaḍ) to an amount of work, and assigns a different rule to any excess. It thus goes beyond merely naming a craftsman or assigning him a fixed stipend.139
This arrangement explains how the varying need for repair enters the obligation of expenditure. But it does not show who establishes the days or assesses the customary rate, nor does it describe the standard of sound repair or the way it is inspected. These are questions that an analysis of operation calls for, and we do not fill in their answers from the naming of the mutawallī or from describing the person doing the work as a “builder”. Nor does al-Ghazzī’s report on the upkeep of the madrasa turn this clause into an established cause of its survival or into a record of a wage that was paid.
The distinction useful for the Dustūr is that establishing the amount of work, assessing its quality and entitlement to its counter-value are connected but distinct questions. If a contemporary maintenance agreement is drafted, it can set out the work required and what counts as acceptable completion, who inspects it, and what follows from accepting it or objecting to it within the limits of the contract and the law. That is a use of the question the text raised, not an attribution of a complete acceptance procedure to the Shaʿbāniyya. Our series “al-Jamāl wa-l-ḥawāss” [Beauty and the Senses] has already worked out the link between maintenance and a variable wage; what is new here is linking it to the chapter’s distinction between knowledge and the authority to give it effect.
Assigning Work, Its Remuneration and the Property That Bears It
That the work benefits the waqf is not enough to determine who must bear its wage. In Ibn Sumayṭ’s Mukhtaṣar Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj [Abridgement of The Gift to the Needy]: “If he deputes someone else to carry out part of his function, the wage is owed by him, not by the waqf.” The case concerns the nāẓir’s deputising (istināba) of someone in part of his function; it is not to be generalised to every contract he concludes to serve the waqf. The same text restricts the nāẓir’s action to the tasks entrusted to him. The conclusion in this case is that the permissibility of deputising does not by itself stand in for a basis for charging the waqf’s property with its remuneration.140
This distinction has a contemporary use, without equating the two normative frameworks. Article 24 of the Saudi Waqf Investment Products Regulation assigns the management of the portfolio, without prejudice to the founder’s stipulation, to the nāẓir or whoever he delegates it to, permits him to assign it to a licensed capital market institution, and requires the form of the delegation and the remuneration to be specified in the management agreement. It makes exceeding the customary rate subject to the approval of the General Authority for Awqaf. This is the regulation of a particular contract; the article does not by itself specify whether the deduction is made from the principal or from the yield, and the parties’ agreement does not give them a power they do not hold.141 The design of the system thus separates the qualification of the person who performs the work, the permission to assign it, entitlement to the remuneration, and the property that may properly be charged with it. These questions may be connected in a single agreement, but the validity of one of them does not establish the rest.
Footnotes
-
Al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab [The River of Gold], Dār al-Qalam edition, 1419 AH, the discussion of the Riḍāʾiyya madrasa known as the ʿUthmāniyya; pp. 123–127 according to the digital copy. The identification of the madrasa is on p. 123, the multiple parts of the waqf deed on p. 124, and the qualifications of the teacher and the ḥadīth scholar and the working days on p. 125. The volume number has not been verified against images of the printed edition; the location is identified here by the name of the discussion and the digital page. The date of a later part of the waqf deed is not to be generalised to all the stipulations transmitted. ↩
-
Al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab, the discussion of the Riḍāʾiyya madrasa, p. 126 according to the digital copy. The wording was checked against the complete digital copy; its printed image was not checked. What al-Ghazzī’s report establishes is a conditional arrangement, not a record of deductions actually made. ↩
-
Al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab, the discussion of the Riḍāʾiyya madrasa, pp. 126–127 according to the digital copy. The restriction on requests for dismissal is on p. 126, and the order of the tawliya and the inspection on p. 127. Naming the holders of the right of inspection does not by itself identify the reason they were chosen, or the power to decide on their objection. ↩
-
Al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab, pp. 126–127. ↩
-
Al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab, the discussion of the Shaʿbāniyya madrasa, p. 117 according to the digital copy, from the edition identified in n. 18, the volume number remaining unverified. The text is transmitted from the stipulations of the waqf, and was read in full in the digital copy; no original deed (ḥujja) or printed image was examined. And Bandar, al-Silsila al-tāsiʿa: al-Jamāl wa-l-ḥawāss [Series Nine: Beauty and the Senses], third version, the third discussion; a reference acknowledging earlier treatment of the relationship between the need for repair, work and wage, while separating the stipulation from its implementation. ↩
-
Ibn Sumayṭ, Mukhtaṣar Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj bi-sharḥ al-Minhāj [Abridgement of The Gift to the Needy in Explaining The Path], vol. 2, p. 491. The passage was checked against a facsimile of volume 2 of the first edition, and the digital text matched the printed one. The question in the passage is the nāẓir’s deputising of another for part of his function, not every professional assistance. The context restricts the deputy’s work to what was entrusted to him; no permission to exceed that limit is to be derived from writing an agreement. ↩
-
General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat al-muntajāt al-istithmāriyya al-waqfiyya [Waqf Investment Products Regulation], art. 24; official text: https://www.uqn.gov.sa/decisions-and-regulations/4001176 , viewed again on 20 October 2026. Paragraph 1 restricts assignment by the founder’s stipulation and the institution’s licence, paragraph 2 specifies what the management agreement contains, and paragraph 3 restricts exceeding the customary rate (ujrat al-mithl). This passage does not by itself identify the property from which the remuneration is deducted. ↩
6. The Survival of Status and the Restriction of Action
This section tests whether the survival of the nāẓir’s status is enough to establish the independence of his decision. In al-Buhūtī’s commentary on joining a trustworthy person (amīn) to the specific nāẓir in cases of negligence (tafrīṭ) or suspicion, he says: “What appears to be the case (wa-l-ẓāhir) is that the first defers to the opinion of the second and acts only with his permission, so that the purpose of appointing him is achieved.” He then connects with this the case of joining a strong assistant to a weak nāẓir, and affirms that the first retains his hand and his administration (naẓar) and that he, not the second, is the nāẓir. These rulings occur in the context of commentary and analogy, so not all their wording is to be treated as a single base text (matn) of definitive meaning.142
The case indicates that the survival of the title of the office, and of the hand on the property, is not enough to know how much freedom of action there is. The need for another person’s permission may change while the status remains. But because the case of the assistant is joined to what precedes it by the words wa-kadhā (“and likewise”), we cannot extract from the text alone complete independence for the first in the case of assistance; we do not cut out the statement that his administration remains and disregard what is joined to it. Nor does describing the assistant as strong identify a separate professional specialism: we have no grounds to call him an expert in education or in auditing merely because the word could bear that meaning.
The effect that matters to the chapter is the possibility of changing the way a decision is made without supplanting all the persons involved. What is needed may be to make a particular action subject to permission, to add someone who assists in the work, or to transfer the whole function. Each form has its cause, its evidence and its effect. It is not justified to make them mandatory stages through which every dispute must pass, nor to count every complaint as grounds for joining someone to the nāẓir. We have organised some of these questions in “Man yaḥrusu al-mustafīd min al-muʾassasa?” [Who Guards the Beneficiary of the Institution?]; we keep the attribution of that organisation to it, and base the ruling here on the juristic text within its limits.143
This shows where jurisprudence meets administration: the juristic question identifies the power to act and its validity, while the administrative question identifies the work and the information that the person acting needs. But improving the information does not automatically change authority, just as modifying authority does not establish that the information has improved. A decision may thus come to require a second person’s permission without the second being better able to assess the quality of instruction. The design is complete only when the function of the added person, what establishes his qualification for it, and what changes in the first person’s decision because of his presence are identified.
The limits of authority also appear when the holder of the decision has a private interest in a transaction he makes. Al-Buhūtī assimilates the nāẓir of a waqf to the agent in the prohibition on selling to and buying from himself or some of his relatives, and the rationale of the rule is that he is suspect where they are concerned and may not seek the best price. But an absolute prohibition cannot properly be formulated from this passage: in the basic rule of agency there is an exception with the permission of the muwakkil (the person who appointed the agent). On leasing (ijāra) the waqf to the nāẓir’s son, al-Buhūtī transmits from Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī that it is valid if the waqf is for the nāẓir himself; if it is for someone else, he mentions three (3) views, Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī choosing validity at the customary rate (ujrat al-mithl), and al-Buhūtī then transmits from his own teachers that it is invalid. The disagreement thus concerns the effect of the benefiting side (jiha) and of the customary rate on the ruling, and cannot be reduced to the mere existence of kinship.144
The exception for the muwakkil’s permission does not mean that the nāẓir gives permission to himself, and this text is not enough to identify who holds the power of permission in every waqf. In design, it is necessary to separate the person with the interest, the person who assesses the fairness of the transaction, and the person who holds a valid power of permission, if the ruling admits one. The consequences of a violation must also be separated: the nullity of the contract where it is established, liability (ḍamān) for property destroyed or diminished on a recognised ground, and the return of a profit gained by the holder of the post are rulings whose subjects and evidence differ. The text on invalidity does not by itself establish the extent of liability, nor does it by itself require the return of every profit arising from the post. An arrangement may prevent a transaction before harm occurs, while compensation for harm already done remains another question. In this way the protection of the waqf becomes open to examination in the action itself: what did the ruling prohibit, what can a permission or a stipulation make valid, and what remains to be returned or compensated afterwards?
Footnotes
-
Al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-qināʿ [Unveiling the Mask], Ministry of Justice edition, vol. 10, p. 68. The digital text is the one relied on; the image of this passage was not examined. What is in parentheses in the original is the base text of al-Iqnāʿ [The Persuasion], while the reasoning with “what appears to be the case” (wa-l-ẓāhir) and the analogy belong to the commentary. The spelling of the quoted wording has been kept as in the digital text. ↩
-
Bandar, Man yaḥrusu al-mustafīd min al-muʾassasa? [Who Guards the Beneficiary of the Institution?], section 8. A reference to earlier work that organised the question; no mandatory ladder of intervention is imported from it, nor a ruling that every complaint by itself requires a trustworthy person to be joined to the nāẓir. ↩
-
Al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-qināʿ, Ministry of Justice edition, the chapter on agency (wakāla), vol. 8, p. 435, on assimilating the nāẓir to the agent in selling to himself and his relatives; the volume was identified from the location of the digital edition in al-Shāmila, and checked against the saved digital text. The same page transmits Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī’s detailed treatment of leasing the waqf to the son. The digital text of the page was read in full; the exception and the disagreement are mentioned in the body of the chapter, and the image of the printed edition was not examined. Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī’s view is transmitted here from Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ [The Compendium of Compendia] through al-Buhūtī. ↩
7. What Does This Reading Compare Between East and West?
Makdisi sets out the diversity of licensing bodies in the Latin West, and does not describe the licensing body there as a single, unchanging body. In his account of Paris he distinguishes the grant of the licence from admission to the body of masters and beginning to practise, and he mentions the power to withdraw the licence and the struggle over it. For Bologna he presents a stage in which the masters held the examinations and granted permission in their own names, followed by ecclesiastical intervention; and elsewhere he mentions different granting bodies. The counterpart suitable for dialogue is thus a particular arrangement at a particular time and place, not “the West” set against “waqf”.145
Makdisi describes the difference in the granting body as superficial in the context of his argument for the possibility of influence between the two tracks of the licence, and then argues from the similarity of qualification, stages and terminology. We do not attribute to him a denial of any institutional effect of the difference in body; his question in that passage concerns the historical relationship between two systems, and he himself set out the conflict between their powers. The question of this chapter, by contrast, is: what changes in the person’s right and in the institution’s action if the source of permission, or its nature, changes?
Contrasting a personal licence with a licence issued by a body is not enough. We need to examine the effect of the difference: Can the permission be withdrawn? Who withdraws it? Does losing it bar merely holding a particular post, or teaching in a wider field? Does meeting the qualifications give a right to request the licence, or is the grant left to the discretion of the person granting it? These are the points at which a difference in the rule shows an effect, instead of resting content with a difference in the names of the bodies. Some of them have material in Makdisi’s account; others need a document specific to the system being compared before their answer can be stated with certainty.
Among the material he does present is a change in Paris: he states that granting and refusing the licence were, at a first stage, left to the discretion of the grantor, and that at a later stage the qualified master was given the right to obtain the licence, while admission to the body of masters and beginning to practise remained another matter. Here it is not only the name of the body that changes; what changes is the link between established proficiency and the power to grant. According to this account, the qualified person came to have a right against the grantor, instead of qualification remaining an element assessed by the decision-maker without that right. We use the conclusion as Makdisi’s account on p. 420, not as our own verification of the decrees he cited, nor as a ruling that the scholarly licence creates a right to appointment in any waqf.
The distinction between the licence and the post in turn disciplines the waqf comparison. An endowed madrasa may finance the place of work, while the certificate of qualification is issued within a scholarly relationship that does not draw its power from ownership of the madrasa’s endowed properties. This opens the question of how two institutions or two bodies connect, and does not permit merging them into one person merely because both serve learning. Conversely, collective or public ownership by a legal person does not necessarily make the powers of qualifying, employing and reviewing a single function; each arrangement needs its own text.
We therefore do not derive the distinctiveness of waqf from the existence of a teacher, an expert, a recorder and an administrator; these are functions that may exist in other institutions. What waqf offers the comparison here is documented forms of linking dedicated property to posts and to grounds of entitlement, of restricting interference with the holders of those posts, and of distributing monitoring and decision. The dialogue benefits when both sides are asked the same question and the limits of each side’s evidence are kept. The similarity of a function does not establish that it was transmitted historically, and a difference of body does not by itself establish that one arrangement is superior to another.
Footnotes
-
Makdisi, Nashʾat al-kulliyyāt, pp. 419–425. The detail on Paris and Bologna is on pp. 419–422, and the context of the argument on influence on pp. 423–425. This paragraph presents his reading and reformulates the question of comparison; we did not open here the ecclesiastical decrees or the European references he cited, and we do not thereby claim to establish a route of historical transmission. ↩
8. A Practical Statement for a Waqf That Funds Teaching or Research
The resource-and-service statement proposed in Chapter 4 (§9) can, when applied to teaching or research, be completed by identifying the basis of each power and the knowledge needed to exercise it. After the benefit required has been described, the statement sets out who establishes the work, who assesses its quality, and who gives that assessment its effect on the post and the stipend. This is an extension of the analytical proposal, and its form and usefulness remain to be tested.
Suppose a waqf funds an academic chair. Appointing a waqf board, a professor for the chair and an annual report is not enough. We first need to know what accreditation of proficiency establishes and who grants it, and then who appoints to the chair, what the professor is bound to accomplish, who establishes that it was accomplished, and how an objection to that is dealt with. The accrediting body may be outside the waqf, or the scholarly judgement may come from specialists whom it engages; this remains a design choice that needs the basis of its competence and its rules in the country where it operates.
| The question | What the statement specifies | What does not follow from it automatically |
|---|---|---|
| Qualification to hold the post | The knowledge and expertise required, who accepts certification of them, and how long it remains valid, if limited | A right to the waqf’s stipend or to a particular vacant post |
| Appointment and work | Who holds the power of appointment, its duration, the work required, and the range of choice left to the post-holder | The appointing person’s holding scholarly judgement on every question |
| Proof of accomplishment | Who compiles the record, what the record establishes, and who corrects it when it is wrong | Judging quality merely by counting attendance or outputs |
| Quality assessment | The holder of expertise and the standard of his judgement; whether his report is a precondition of the decision or an opinion that may be departed from with stated reasons; and who decides when reports differ | A power to dismiss or to suspend the stipend merely because he is an expert |
| Effect and review | Who accepts the excuse, who gives effect to the consequence, and who hears the objection of the worker or the recipient | Protection confined to the worker, or confined to the administrator |
The usefulness of the statement shows in a small dispute. If it is said that the professor did not do his work, we ask for the allegation to be specified: Did he miss a scheduled lesson? Or did he attend and deliver work below standard? Or did his scholarly conclusion go against the funder’s wishes? Each allegation has different evidence. An attendance register may answer the first but is not enough for the second; an expert’s report may address the second, but its effect on the stipend depends on the rules of the post; and an objection to a research conclusion does not become evidence of a breach merely because the owner of the money is not pleased with it.
The weight of the report itself needs a declared choice. A specialist’s report may be made a precondition for taking a decision, or an opinion from which the decision-maker may depart while stating the reason; and a difference between two reports needs a route to resolution. We do not derive any of these options as the ruling of the waqf deeds discussed above, and we do not assume that they are equal in cost and protection. But they identify what the designer needs so that requiring expertise does not become a formality, nor every expert opinion a binding decision without basis.
The allegations may also come together: deficient work, an incorrect record, and interference by someone who does not hold the decision. In that case it is not enough to refer the complaint to a body with a good name. It should be known what that body can examine and what remedy it holds, and the worker or the recipient should be able to show the error in a record, a report or a decision. This does not require multiplying boards needlessly; one person may combine some of the functions, but the cause of each decision, its evidence and whether it can be reviewed must remain known.
This method can be put to a charitable or educational institution in different countries, because it starts from functions and evidence that can be discussed, and leaves their naming and assignment to the system concerned. What needs testing is its cost, its capacity to correct decisions, its protection of quality from funding pressure, and its prevention of professional independence turning into immunity from being held to account. These results cannot be known from the historical texts alone; they can be assessed in a specific trial by comparing decisions and their reasons before and after the statement is applied, while examining other factors that may explain the change.
From the Incumbent’s Proficiency to the Continued Supply of Those Qualified for the Post
The system depends on knowledge that does not arise from the dedication of property alone. Establishing the proficiency of the present worker is not the same as showing how someone like him will be available when he leaves or when the service expands. Our paper on the movement of actors and posts has already tested the links of training, transfer, re-employment and getting past the discontinuation of the body of origin, and its material did not establish a chain that meets them all. The presence of a scholar in an institution is therefore not to be used as evidence that waqf created his proficiency or secured the survival of a successor.146
In establishing the system, a choice that can be justified follows from this. If proficiency is available, contracting for it or drawing on an existing professional body may be considered; if it is scarce, training, sharing a service or limiting expansion to what can be delivered must be examined. Each route has its resource, cost, time and dependence on another body. A change of expertise provider requires handing over the knowledge the work needs, while respecting those of the provider’s rights that the body does not own. This is a design proposal that draws on the limit of the earlier paper; it is not a juristic ruling requiring a training apparatus for every waqf, nor a claim that historical educational awqāf secured the renewal of their experts.
Footnotes
-
Bandar, “Ḥarakat al-fāʿilīn wa-l-waẓāʾif bayna ʿuqad al-taʿlīm al-mawqūf: maṣfūfat shawāhid wa-ikhtibār iḥlāl maḥdūd” [The Movement of Actors and Posts between the Nodes of Endowed Education: An Evidence Matrix and a Limited Replacement Test], the discussion of the limits of the chains and the outcome of the test, unpublished paper. The reference is to the earlier raising of the question and to the limit of the evidence; this book does not rest on a historical claim that is not set out in it. The source of proficiency and the funds for its renewal are proposed choices for the design of the system, not historical conclusions established by a report of a scholar’s move. ↩
9. Rules of the Post and of Knowledge in the Waqf System
The cases read show that dedicating property to teaching, and to the work and maintenance connected with it, enters into the organisation of the post itself: who holds it, what he performs, when its stipend is due, and who gives effect to the consequences of breaching it. The chapter links these rulings to the knowledge needed to take the decision. Dustūr al-Waqf thus needs to state the ground of each power and the evidence for its exercise, as well as who holds it. The chapter’s findings are organised into rules of defined scope; we then derive from them characteristics of the way the work is done, without making their different sources a single historical law.
1. The judge’s appointee derives the rule on his staying in post from the characterisation of his appointment, so that he is not removed by the removal of the judge who appointed him, in Abū Zahra’s account of Abū Yūsuf’s view. In this case the appointment is in the nature of both a judicial ruling and agency, so its rules are not all to be derived from pure agency. In his account of Muḥammad’s view, the nāẓir’s representation is directed towards the poor and the entitlement-holders even though they did not choose him. The difference between the two views shows that the source of appointment, the party whose interest is served and the legal characterisation are distinct questions, and no single rule of representation is to be made from the two views (§2).
2. Entitlement to the stipend is determined by the rules on work, authorised absence and excuse in the stipulations that Haarmann presents for Barqūq’s waqf deed. Paid leave for the six (6) teachers is bounded by purpose, duration and stand-in; the detailed provision on the pilgrimage of post-holders is distinct from it; and unexcused absence has its named consequence. Proof of absence is therefore read together with the rule that governs it and the category to which that rule applies. The evidence is a researcher’s presentation of the document; and the clerk of the Sufis’ absences does not thereby become a monitor of the teachers or an assessor of the quality of their lessons (§4).
3. Deduction from the stipend is tied to the work left undone, and recording it and making the deduction are divided between the nuqṭajī and the mutawallī in the Riḍāʾiyya stipulations transmitted by al-Ghazzī. The first records what was left undone, and the second cuts its equivalent from the stipend. The rule gives the information a financial effect through the holder of the decision, but it does not detail the procedure for calculating the amount or for disputing the record, and it does not establish the recorder’s independence or that deductions were actually made (§5).
4. Dismissal at the request of the powerful is restricted by the cause and the body named in the transmitted Riḍāʾiyya stipulations. The mutawallī does not comply with a request from the ruler, the governor or one of the notables to dismiss a stipendiary and put someone else in his place unless an offence has been committed, and dismissal belongs to the mutawallī. This protects the post from having its holder changed merely at an outside request, and it coexists with the accountability of the post-holder; its limit is the transmitted case, without assuming a particular meaning of offence, a route of grievance, or a bar on judicial intervention in every case (§5).
5. The specific nāẓir’s action is subject to the permission of the trustworthy person joined to him in cases of negligence or suspicion, according to what appears to be the case in al-Buhūtī’s commentary. The survival of the nāẓir’s status is thus not enough to establish the independence of the decision. The rank of this ruling in the commentary is “what appears to be the case” (wa-l-ẓāhir); the case of the assistant connected with it does not establish the independence of the original nāẓir; and describing the assistant as strong does not identify a particular educational expertise (§6).
6. The wage for repair is tied to the amount of work in the transmitted Shaʿbāniyya stipulation. The person carrying out repairs has a stipend for two (2) or three (3) days a month, and the customary rate if the work exceeds that. The text regulates who bears the consequence of a varying need, but it does not identify who assesses that need or the standard of sound work. Counting days therefore cannot stand in for assessing quality (§5, n. 139).
Three characteristics of these waqf cases emerge from these rules. The first is linking the stipend to specified work and to the grounds of entitlement to it: what established qualification signifies differs from what proof of attendance or acceptance of an excuse signifies, and the amount of technical work differs from the quality of its performance. The second is distributing the capacity to decide between the one who produces the information and the one who gives it effect; the two roles may be combined in one person on a stated basis, so listing the offices does not dispense with setting out the relationship between them. The third is restricting the administration while preserving the possibility of holding the worker accountable. In the Riḍāʾiyya, the worker takes another position when the ḥadīth scholar, the teacher and the preacher are given the right to inspect the mutawallī’s work once the tawliya passes to the judge of Aleppo after the named categories have died out. The limitation “then” stands; inspection does not turn into a permanent council or a power of dismissal.
These characteristics link waqf to the community of knowledge, to the judiciary and to jurisprudence. The scholarly licence and appointment to a funded post are two rulings with different objects; and the holder of the power of appointment may need knowledge issued by a scholar from outside his administration. Likewise, appointment and action are governed by rules that the particular document does not exhaust. This shows some of the endowed institution’s connections with its surroundings, without establishing that the awqāf studied and the communities of learning and of the judiciary formed a unified system in a single country. What has not been established as practised, foremost among it the assessment of the quality of instruction after appointment, remains a defined question.
As for the comparison, what it establishes is narrower than a uniqueness of waqf: in Makdisi’s account of Paris, the relation of proficiency to the licence moved from the grantor’s discretion to the qualified person’s right to it, while admission to the body of masters and beginning to practise remained another matter. This reveals an effect of a change in the rule that goes beyond the name of the body; but it does not establish a complete difference between the licensing arrangement in Paris and holding a waqf post, nor does it establish a historical transmission. What the waqf evidence offers the dialogue is thus the arrangement of property, work, knowledge and decision together with its grounds, open to comparison with the corresponding case.
Accordingly, the chapter carries an analytical requirement to the Dustūr: that it state, for every decision concerning the post, its basis, the work it concerns, the knowledge on which it depends, and who has the power to give it effect. The contemporary statement proposed in §8 is an application that needs testing. Chapter 6 then takes up the capacity of the worker or the entitlement-holder to turn an objection to a record, a report or a decision into a claim that can be heard and remedied.