Paper

What remains of a waqf when its assets and its persons change?

Its link to the blog’s introductory texts: The Introduction prepares the ground for its question in §§5 and 8, and the Framework uses it in decision domains 15 and 18.

1. The Survival of a Waqf: What Is It That Survives?

An asset may leave the waqf while the dedication of the property remains, and the same asset may return while the ruling on disposing of it differs. Those in charge of an office may succeed one another without some of the power that the predecessor held passing to the successor. Books may remain known to be waqf, and the benefiting side may remain named, and then their reaching it may be disrupted. These are differences in specific rulings and acts; gathering them under the word “durability” before interpreting them obscures the question that the jurist, the historian and the designer of institutions all need.

This chapter begins from an apparent paradox in a single juristic base text (matn): when founder-stipulated substitution takes place, the second asset becomes like the first in its stipulations, and yet the holder of the stipulation does not have the power to substitute it again unless the stipulation allows for repetition. What does the transfer of the stipulations mean if the power of disposition itself does not transfer with them? The answer requires us to identify which rulings attach to the property, which power was established for the person, and to which object and time each of them applies. The question then extends to the institution: how do these rulings connect with whoever keeps the property, knows where it is and enables the entitlement-holder to enjoy its benefit?

The chapter’s thesis is that the continuity of a waqf is explained by distinguishing what continues in its ruling, what needs a basis by which its transfer is valid, and what needs renewed work for it to be realised. We will test the first and second parts with Ḥanafī detailed rulings on founder-stipulated substitution, and the third with the report on the library (khizāna) of the Maḥmūdiyya madrasa. A piece of Mālikī evidence is added on the link between permitting sale and need, and on the survival of the ḥabs (another name for waqf) in the substitute. We then set some of these relations against a specific legal comparator. The chosen case of substitution does not carry the ruling of all the schools or of all forms of change; it is a controlled way into a question wider than itself.

Our study “Kayfa yabqā al-waqf?” [How Does a Waqf Endure?] has already distinguished between the continuity of the principal, of the office, of the purpose and of the capacity to decide. This chapter takes up that distinction and identifies its relations in evidence where a specific ruling is in question: Did the stipulations transfer? Did the permission remain? Did liability attach to the price? Was the return carried out? The question remains attributed to that study, while the answer here rests on the texts presented themselves.204

Footnotes

  1. Bandar, “Kayfa yabqā al-waqf? Shurūṭ al-dīmūma wa-maṣādir al-taʿaṭṭul fī al-muʾassasa al-waqfiyya” [How Does a Waqf Endure? Conditions of Durability and Sources of Disuse in the Waqf Institution], sixth version, 24 August 2026, unpublished paper, the opening of the paper and the distinction between levels of durability. The reference shows that the question has a precedent; it does not stand in for the chapter’s evidence. ↩

2. The Transfer of Dedication Is Not the Same as Unrestricted Power of Change

In the case of founder-stipulated substitution that Ibn al-Humām presents, when the holder of authority buys the substitute for the waqf, it becomes waqf without a new creation by a specific formula: “then, when he buys the substitute for the waqf, it becomes waqf, and its being waqf does not depend on his dedicating it with a wording specific to it”. Abū Zahra explains that property bought with the price of the endowed property, or taken in its place by exchange (munāqala), takes its place in its waqf status. The operation is therefore not the ending of a waqf followed by the creation of an independent waqf with a new choice of designated use and stipulations; the link with the first waqf affects the ruling on the substitute.205

In Tanwīr al-abṣār [Enlightening the Eyes], as Radd al-muḥtār [The Reply to the Perplexed] quotes it: “When he does so, the second becomes like the first in its stipulations even if he does not mention them; then he may not substitute it.” Al-Durr al-mukhtār [The Choice Pearls] explains the prohibition of substituting it with a third on the ground that the ruling was established by the stipulation, and that the stipulation existed in the first, not the second. Ibn ʿĀbidīn mentions, quoting Fatḥ al-qadīr [The Triumph of the Almighty], the exception of wording that indicates that the power of substitution is to last.206

This text separates two effects of a single disposition. The substitute enters the earlier dedication with the stipulations it carries, so the survival of these rulings does not require their wording to be repeated. Using the power of substitution again, however, requires a scope of permission wide enough for it. Accordingly, it is not correct to infer from the phrase “like the first in its stipulations” alone that every capacity available in the first is available in the second. The text itself identified the exception of this capacity from that understanding.

This detail changes the reading of durability and flexibility together. In substitution, the material carrier of the benefit changes while the rulings of its dedication continue; in the prohibition of repetition, the scope of the next disposition narrows while the possibility of widening it by stipulation remains. Observing the sale of an endowed asset is therefore not enough to rule that the waqf has ended, and the occurrence of a valid sale is not enough to rule that the person in charge of it is free to make an unlimited series of sales. What is required is to identify the thing that changed, the ruling that continued, and the basis that permits the next step.

Nor is this an absolute continuity that separates the purpose from the validity of the property’s transfer. Ibn al-Humām presents the case in which the first asset is established, through a third party’s claim (istiḥqāq), to belong to someone other than the founder: under istiḥsān (juristic preference) the second does not remain waqf, because the exchange that made it a substitute for the first has been undone. The dedication of the substitute here depends on the validity of the link by which it entered the waqf. The survival of the purpose does not allow a third party’s right in the property itself to be overridden.207

This distinction can enrich research on dedicated property without turning into a comprehensive definition of every waqf: the continuity of a ruling through a valid substitute is not the same as the independence of the purpose from every asset and every cause of acquisition. The first is established in this case; the second needs other evidence. Even within the same case, establishing this link requires evidence that connects the substitute with the first endowed property and its stipulations; keeping a record of this is a documentary proposal, not the only route to which the text confines proof, nor a new juristic condition for the validity of waqf status.

Another aspect of this link appears in the example given by Yaḥyā ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥaṭṭāb: a ḥabs adjoining a mosque that had become too small for its congregation may be sold so that the mosque can be enlarged with it, and with its price a rabʿ (dwelling) like it is bought, to be a ḥabs. The transmitted text ties permission to need and necessity, and prohibits sale without need, whether the ḥabs is in ruins or standing.208 The need for change here is connected with an adjoining facility, and against it stands the preservation of the ḥabs in substitute property; ruin, or the survival of the building, does not on its own explain the answer. This example shares with the Ḥanafī detailed ruling the possibility that the dedication continues while its asset changes, although the ground of the permission differs. As for the transfer of all the stipulations or the repetition of the power of substitution, each case needs its own text; the ruling of the Ḥanafī detailed ruling is not carried over to the Mālikī example merely because both involve a substitute.

Footnotes

  1. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, p. 229. The wording of the passage was checked against the image of the page in the Dār al-Fikr facsimile of the Ḥalabī edition (file page 233) on 25 October 2026, and the vocalisation is from the digital text. And Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, pp. 179–180, para. 167; the passage was checked against the image of the printed edition. Abū Zahra’s reading is not counted as a historical witness independent of the chain of jurisprudence that he presents. ↩

  2. Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 385. The phrase “When he does so…” is from the base text of Tanwīr al-abṣār [Enlightening the Eyes] by al-Timurtāshī, the reasoning that follows it is from al-Durr al-mukhtār [The Choice Pearls] by al-Ḥaṣkafī, and the exception is in Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s commentary, quoting Fatḥ al-qadīr. The digital text was not checked against the image of the printed edition. The examination is confined to this detailed ruling and does not re-examine the rest of the ten stipulations. ↩

  3. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, p. 229. The passage mentions the difference between qiyās (analogy) and istiḥsān; the ruling that the body of the chapter presents here is the istiḥsān one, so it is not to be attributed to the text as the only view mentioned. This detailed ruling was checked against the image of p. 229 in the Dār al-Fikr facsimile of the Ḥalabī edition, according to the book’s data in al-Shāmila (21744); the date of the reprint was not verified. ↩

  4. Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥaṭṭāb, Ḥukm bayʿ al-waqf wa-istibdālihi wa-l-munāqala bihi wa-taʾjīrihi [The Ruling on the Sale, Substitution, Exchange and Leasing of Waqf Property], ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad al-Sharīf al-ʿĀlim, Āfāq al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Turāth [Horizons of Culture and Heritage], no. 50 (July 2005), p. 219. The example concerns the need to enlarge an adjoining mosque, with the purchase of a rabʿ like it to be a ḥabs; and on the same page sale without need is prohibited, whether the ḥabs is in ruins or standing. This text was used and checked against the facsimile earlier in our study “Ayy dawām huwa?” [What Kind of Durability Is It?], section 5-b, unpublished paper; the author here is Yaḥyā ibn Muṭahhar, not the author of Mawāhib al-Jalīl. ↩

3. The Same Asset May Return Under a Different Ruling

Another detailed ruling tests whether identifying the physical asset is enough. Ibn al-Humām says: “If he sells the waqf and it then returns to him by what is a rescission in every respect, he may sell it a second time; but if it returns by a new contract, he does not have the power to sell it, because it has become waqf, so it is as if he had bought another, unless he had made the substitution general for himself.”209

The property may remain the same property, but the route of its return affects whether it may be sold a second time. If the return was by a rescission in every respect, a second sale is permitted; if it was by a new contract, the returning asset falls under the ruling of a purchased substitute, so the first stipulation alone does not carry permission for a subsequent sale, unless the founder had made the substitution general for himself. Power here does not follow the identity of the stone and the land alone; it also follows the legal character of the transaction and the scope of the stipulation.

The most plausible explanation of the first part is that a complete rescission restores the situation that preceded the disposition, so it does not entail the creation of a new power. As for the second part, its reasoning is explicit: the asset returned as waqf, as if he had bought another. This is a reading of the detailed ruling’s effect on our question, not a complete theory of rescission and iqāla (rescission by mutual consent). We do not attach to it other forms of return that we have not examined.

The event within the scope of this detailed rulingThe ruling on the property or the power that the text statesWhat prevents confusion
Purchase of a valid substitute for the waqfThe substitute becomes waqf, and the stipulations transfer to it in the text that interprets the caseNo new dedication needs to be created
An intention to substitute the substitute againThe power of the first occasion is not enough, unless the wording allows for repetitionThe transfer of the stipulations does not automatically carry every power
Return of the asset by a rescission in every respectIt may be sold a second timeThe effect of rescission differs from the effect of a new purchase
Return of the asset by a new contractIt may not be sold a second time unless the substitution was made generalThe asset being one does not mean that the ruling on disposition is one

That result is useful to the historian as well. Inventorying assets by their names and areas is necessary, but it is not enough for dating the rights of disposition over them. The basis on which an asset left and returned must be read, together with whether it was a return to a previous state or a new entry into the waqf. Accounting and records management face the parallel question: does the asset register keep only its physical history, or does it keep the cause of its transfer and the stipulations attached to it? We do not make the juristic text evidence that a system of records existed in this form; we draw from it what the researcher must know in order to judge correctly.

Footnotes

  1. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, p. 229. The wording of this detailed ruling was checked against the image of the printed edition in the Dār al-Fikr facsimile; the vocalisation in the quotation is from the digital text. We did not rely on the garbled passages adjacent to it in the digital version, nor did we build on them a detailed account of the forms of return for a defect or by iqāla. ↩

4. The Succession of Persons and the Limits of What Passes with Them

The same difference recurs when work passes between persons. Ibn al-Humām permits the person who stipulated substitution for himself to appoint an agent for it during his lifetime, and does not permit that power to his waṣī (testamentary executor) on his death, even if he appointed him by will to exercise the substitution itself. He prohibits the qayyim from conferring substitution by will on the person whom he appoints by will over the waqf. He explains the difference between agency during life and testamentary appointment by the possibility of correcting a defect in the disposition during the lifetime of the holder of the power.210

Continuity in looking after the waqf therefore does not require that every special power that the predecessor held pass to the successor nāẓir. One person may stand in for another in some of the work, while another task needs a basis that was not obtained by that standing-in. The existence of wording that confers the power is not enough if the route of conferral itself is not valid in that case. This is a precision that the phrase “niẓāra is an office, not a person” (niẓāra being the office of waqf administration) does not by itself convey: the office itself may contain powers that differ in source and scope, some of which are established for a particular holder by a specific stipulation.

In the case where the founder stipulates substitution for himself together with another, the text distinguishes between the founder acting alone and that other person acting alone. This prevents assuming that the two positions are identical merely because they are combined in a single phrase. But these detailed rulings do not justify a general rule that a nāẓir may not appoint an agent, or that every personal power lapses on death; their object is the special power set out in the text. For each act we need a separate question: who granted it, to whom, in what wording, does the wording include whoever comes after him, and is it valid to confer this power by this route in the case studied?

It follows from connecting jurisprudence with institutional theory that the continuity of the post’s name and the appointment of a successor to it are not enough to establish the continuity of all its capacities. A power may be restricted by the qualities or expertise of its holder, by the founder’s stipulation, or by the permission of another body. Referring all of this back to “the personality of the waqf”, however, leaves a question unanswered: what does the new person represent, and what does he have the power to create or change?

The practical conclusion that we propose is to distinguish, in the succession document, between transferring possession (ḥiyāza) of the property, assigning the administration, and assigning extraordinary dispositions. The three may be combined in one person, and they may be separated. The document distinguishes the powers that may validly be passed on from those for which the new person in charge needs another valid basis, one that is not obtained merely by testamentary appointment. The aim is not to add a formal document to the history of waqf, but to make the distinction that the texts reveal visible in analysis and in contemporary design.

A piece of contemporary evidence tests the question of the source and timing of a power on another subject: the delegation of the founder’s rights and the transfer of voting while the dedication of the property remains. Article 15 of the terms of the Alinma Wareef Endowment Fund, in the update of 30 October 2023, permits the founder to delegate to the beneficiary entity the exercise of his rights at the founders’ meetings and in the resolutions issued by them. Article 16/a/10, for its part, provides that all voting rights at the meetings pass to the beneficiary entity on his death. Article 18 describes the units as endowed for the same purpose, each unit representing an equal undivided share in the fund’s assets, and they are not transferable.211 The comparison here lies in the question: Ibn al-Humām’s detailed ruling concerns the power of substitution, while the document concerns the rights of meetings and voting; neither carries the ruling of the other, and the comparison does not establish that the drafter of the document drew on the juristic detailed ruling. The voluntary delegation of rights during life is not the same as the transfer of voting conditional on death, and neither of them establishes that ownership of the units passes to the heir or that every administrative power passes. The evidence is a clause in a dated document; it has not been established here that a death occurred or that delegation or voting was exercised under it, nor that the same wording continued in a later regulation.

The question of the succession of the holder of a power is not the same as the fear that the body to which recourse is had may abuse it. In Ibn Sumayṭ’s Shāfiʿī abridgement, after the administration (naẓar) is assigned to the judge where the founder has not stipulated it for anyone, there occurs: “If it is feared that the judge will consume the waqf through his injustice, it is permissible for the one in whose hand it is to spend it on its designated uses”; he then restricts the permission to spend by the condition that the holder of the property knows its designated uses; if he does not know them, he entrusts the spending to a jurist who knows them, or asks him and then spends the property on them.212 The permitted act here is spending the property on its designated uses, and the one who performs it is the person in whose hand it is; so no general authority to change the purpose, to borrow or to substitute is to be drawn from it, nor a route of recourse for someone who spent his own money. This case adds a distinction to the construction of the system: the corruption of a particular route of protection is not the absence of all routes of authority, and so it does not close the remaining question of intervention by others when all of them have broken down and there is fear of loss.

Footnotes

  1. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, p. 229; and Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 385. The statement on agency concerns the person who stipulated substitution for himself; the statement that substitution may not be conferred by will covers the qayyim as well. Their ruling is not to be carried over to every delegation or to all the powers of the niẓāra. ↩

  2. Alinma Investment Company, Alinma Wareef Endowment Fund: Terms and Conditions, update of 30 October 2023, p. 17, Art. 15, Art. 16/a/10 and Art. 18. The image of the page from the saved facsimile was checked. These are historical terms, not proof of implementation or of the current wording; nor is the definition of the beneficiary entity in the 2026 Regulation to be carried over to them without a basis. ↩

  3. Ibn Sumayṭ, Mukhtaṣar Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj bi-sharḥ al-Minhāj [Abridgement of The Gift to the Needy in Explaining The Path], vol. 2, p. 490. The detailed ruling occurs after the statement of the judge’s general supervisory authority (naẓar). The passage was checked against the facsimile of the second volume of the first edition; so the limit of the reading is the transmission of the detailed ruling and its restrictions, not an examination of all forms of necessity or of the original Tuḥfa independently. ↩

5. Between the Asset and the Substitute: Where Does Protection Lie?

Substitution is not reduced to the two moments of selling the asset and buying its substitute. Between them lies a price that the person with the power of disposition may receive, and then consume, or die without having declared it, or that may be lost in his hand. This interval makes another question possible: by what is the link between the property and the purpose preserved when it is neither in the form of the endowed asset nor in the form of a settled substitute?

Ibn al-Humām brings together distinct rulings: sale at gross undervalue (ghabn fāḥish) is not permitted; the received price whose recipient dies without having declared it becomes a debt in his estate, and likewise what he consumed; but if it is lost in his hand, he bears no liability (ḍamān) in the case he mentions. If he buys with it goods of a kind that cannot be waqf, the goods are his and the debt is on him. He also mentions that a gift of the price after its receipt (qabḍ) is void.213

Protection works here in different places. It may strike the disposition itself, as in sale at gross undervalue; it may move the claim to the dhimma (legal capacity to bear obligations) of the person or to his estate; and it may prevent the price from leaving as a gratuitous gift. It is therefore not correct to treat every shortfall in the property as a single ground of liability, nor to treat the price as property open to free disposition merely because the form of the first asset has disappeared. Nor may we extend the denial of liability in the case of loss to every loss, even where its cause differs; the brief text here does not cover all the rulings on transgression and negligence.

From these rulings a function of financial documentation appears: separating property received on the waqf’s account from what has settled as the person’s own property, and establishing the cause of its being in his hand, its destination, and who is to be claimed against when its return is impossible. This function is more specific than the general call for transparency. If the price is received and its recipient then dies without having declared it, the text makes it a debt in his estate; hence the importance of declaring what has been received and its destination. This detailed ruling alone does not establish a general ruling on the effect of every difference in the means of proof. Historical investigation needs to know the disposition, the receipt and the declaration, not merely to count the assets at the beginning and the end of the waqf deed.

We do not infer from the abundance of protection rules that they succeeded in every reality. Rather, they define the questions of a test: was the price tracked? Could it be recovered? Did these rulings lead to a substitute that serves the purpose? Here the history of accounting and of the judiciary, and the economics of the institution, can complement the juristic question rather than repeat it.

A contemporary form of protecting property during this interval appears in the terms and conditions for the management of deposited funds of the Saudi General Authority for Awqaf. The terms concern the funds of endowed properties that were expropriated for the public interest or whose disposition the competent court approved, and they tie the Authority’s administration and investment of them to the nāẓir’s consent to the terms. They establish a duty to exercise due care, and require that the administration not breach the founder’s stipulation, that it conform to the sharia, that investments be low-risk and quickly liquidable, and that periodic reports be made to the nāẓir. They also make enabling another party to administer the funds conditional on the Authority’s consent.214

This arrangement separates the safekeeping of the property, the permission to invest it, its readiness for a substitute when needed, and the basis for changing its manager. Investment may serve the aim of growing the property and yet hinder the purchase of the substitute on time; so comparing returns is not enough without the time of need and the possibility of liquidation. This is an inference for the design of the system from the specified functions; it does not establish that this conflict occurred in the service. The terms are specific to the funds and the service mentioned; they do not establish a guarantee of value or a specific period for recovering the funds, nor that they are the ruling for all waqf funds, nor evidence of actual performance.

It was noted above that the Saudi terms cover the funds of endowed properties expropriated for the public interest. Taking an asset out of the waqf for public use differs from a substitution that the nāẓir proposes: in it the system needs to identify the basis of the power to expropriate, the route for objecting to it, and who represents the waqf in assessing the compensation, receiving it and disposing of it. These decisions may be distributed among different bodies; establishing one of them does not dispense with identifying the rest, and the recipient of the compensation does not acquire, merely by receiving it, the power to change its dedication.

A dated piece of Egyptian evidence reveals the difference between the transfer of the asset and the review of its substitute. In 1935 “al-Dalīl al-murshid” [The Guiding Manual] collected an old procedure that tied the formula of substitution to the value of the expropriated asset. It collected with it the circular of 9 August 1934, under which the sharia formulas are dispensed with in expropriation by royal decree under the expropriation law, whatever the value, and an annotation of it is made in the waqf’s register. The circular did not prevent submitting cases whose value exceeded five hundred (500) piastres to the Dispositions Panel, to consider the amount of the compensation and its adequacy. Lifting a procedure from the transfer of ownership did not close the route of reviewing the compensation. This is a description of a change in a legal procedure in its time, not a general juristic ruling that the permission for substitution may be bypassed.215

There then remains, after compensation, the question of the benefit that the asset used to provide: was the recipient receiving income (ghalla), using a place, or depending on a service linked to it? Equivalence of the substitute in value is not enough to establish that these benefits continue. The decision dossier identifies the rights and contracts affected by the removal, who has the power to manage the transition and what may be spent on it, the time needed to prepare the substitute, and the route for protecting the rights that have been established. This does not presuppose a right to additional compensation or an obligation on the public budget; the basis of each is to be sought in the context’s frame of reference. The outcome is tested by the continuity of the service or the delivery of the specific right, alongside the preservation of the value of the property, not by the mere issuing of an expropriation decision or the receipt of compensation.

Footnotes

  1. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, p. 229. The description in the body is a summary of the successive rulings on the page; we did not add to the denial of liability in the case of loss a condition from outside the page, nor did we generalise it beyond the case mentioned. ↩

  2. Saudi General Authority for Awqaf, Terms and Conditions for the Management of Deposited Funds, Arts. 1–4, pp. 2–3 of the official file saved from https://digitalcms.awqaf.gov.sa/sites/default/files/2026-05/شروط%20وأحكام%20إدارة%20الأموال%20المودعة.pdf . The two images were checked; the definition of the funds is in Art. 1, the consent in Art. 2, the change of manager and due care in Art. 3/3 and Art. 3/6, and liquidity and reporting in Art. 4/3–4. Another official version was reopened on 20 October 2026: https://digitalcms.awqaf.gov.sa/sites/default/files/2025-11/Terms-and-Conditions-for-Managing-the-Funds_0.pdf ; the provisions used agree, but the two versions were not compared in full, nor was the date of their entry into force determined. The preamble mentions Council of Ministers Resolution No. 95; its original was not opened here. The text read does not establish a specific period for recovering the funds or a complete termination arrangement. ↩

  3. Egypt, “al-Dalīl al-murshid fī al-qawānīn wa-l-awāmir wa-l-manshūrāt li-l-maḥākim al-sharʿiyya wa-l-majālis al-ḥasbiyya” [The Guiding Manual to the Laws, Orders and Circulars for the Sharia Courts and the Guardianship Councils], Maṭbaʿat al-Naṣr, 1935, printed pp. 41–42, item 51, Circular No. 6 of 9 August 1934. The two saved images (file pp. 49–50) were checked in verifying the sources of this chapter. Page 32 mentions an older procedure and a precaution that may be taken by depositing the compensation in the Awqāf treasury; so depositing is not to be made a general obligation, nor is the rule of the old procedure to be attributed to the year in which the book was compiled. The discrepancy between two places over the day of the circular of July 1917 remains; this statement does not depend on resolving it. ↩

6. Legal Personality: What Does It Explain, and What Remains After It?

Al-Zarqāʾ reads into the rulings of waqf a legal personality, even though the name is absent from the language of jurisprudence; what counts for him is the existence of the idea and of the ruling. He deals with its representation by whoever administers the waqf, and presents the disagreement over how a debt is to be construed: does it attach to the nāẓir and is then recovered, or does it attach to the waqf directly? He favours its attaching to the waqf’s dhimma directly, and criticises passing it through the mutawallī’s dhimma and then having recourse for it against the waqf. His choice thus has an effect on identifying who bears the obligation, and it is more specific than merely collecting views that agree on the name of personality. These are questions of bearing rights and debts and of representation, wider than the mere continuity of the asset after the founder’s death.216

Recognising a legal personality, however, does not by itself resolve the earlier questions. We may identify the bearer of the right and still need to state the power of its representative to sell an asset and substitute it, to delegate to others, or to transfer a special power to his successor. Likewise, establishing that some property is independent of the debts of persons does not automatically establish all the effects of personality in any modern law. So it should be stated which rulings the concept of legal personality explains, and which need another basis in authority, delegation or disposition.

In the comparative discussion, Nada Moumtaz reads the continuity of the waqf and some independence of its property as a legal personality, and refers to the work of Behrens-Abouseif; whereas Maria Macuch acknowledges the possibility of arrangements resembling dedicated institutions, while saying that Islamic law does not know the legal person in the sense she discusses. Behrens-Abouseif supports a description of personality in waqf drawn from historical practice, and then restricts the comparison by saying that its social and political effect does not seem comparable to the effect of European institutions.217

This disagreement is not settled by translating legal person into a single Arabic word, and we do not assume that it is purely a disagreement over words. We need to identify the list of effects on which each view rests: ownership of property, bearing debt, representation, litigation, survival and the capacity to decide. Some of these effects may be established in one case and others not, and the construction may differ while a partial result converges. Likewise, Moumtaz’s reference to Behrens-Abouseif is not counted as a second, independent historical witness to the facts that she took from her.

Brinz’s conception of purpose-bound property (Zweckvermögen) offers a rival question: does explaining the dedication of property require a person who bears it in the same way, or can its attachment to the purpose perform another explanatory function? We draw on the question in explaining the unity of the property by the unity of the purpose, rather than attributing it to an owning person; we do not make this German theory a historical origin of waqf, nor do we take the fact that the conception of purpose-bound property and waqf share in explaining the dedication of property as evidence that their rulings coincide.218

Here dialogue between traditions takes on its scholarly meaning. The Ḥanafī detailed rulings put to the theory of personality a question more precise than its existence or absence: how do rulings transfer to the substitute without the power to repeat the disposition automatically transferring with them? And the theory puts to the reader of the detailed rulings the question of bearing debt and of representation, whose answer may be spread across different chapters of jurisprudence. The comparison tests how far the description of personality is sufficient to explain the specific rulings, and directs our reading to those among them that need an independent ruling. We do not assume that the proponents of the theory of personality ever confused the bearer of the right with the limits of its representative’s power, nor do we claim that we have changed their theory by this presentation.

Footnotes

  1. Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf [Rulings Governing Awqāf], p. 25, para. 23 and its first footnote, whose image was examined to establish his preference; and pp. 35–36, paras. 30–31. The places mentioned were checked against the printed edition. His interpretation of personality does not remove the disagreement of the schools on ownership, nor does it make perpetuity necessary for every waqf; see his preference on limited duration, p. 50. ↩

  2. Moumtaz, God’s Property, 37; Behrens-Abouseif, “The Waqf: A Legal Personality?,” in Islamische Stiftungen, 57, 59; Maria Macuch, “Die sasanidische fromme Stiftung und der islamische waqf. Eine Gegenüberstellung,” in Meier, Pahlitzsch, and Reinfandt (eds.), Islamische Stiftungen, 20. The comparison here is the chapter’s own work, not proof of a direct debate between the authors. Moumtaz’s passage refers to Kuran 2005, which is different from the 2001 article used in Chapter 7, §7, on the question of flexibility. ↩

  3. Alois Brinz, Lehrbuch der Pandekten, Bd. 3, Abt. 2, 2. Aufl. (Erlangen: Deichert, 1888), 456–457, 478. The digital text of the book is relied on; p. 456 was checked against the image. The use here is an analytical summary, and we do not claim to have checked images of all the pages here. ↩

7. A Specific Comparator: What Does the Indian Comparison Establish?

In 1969 the Supreme Court of India decided a tax case, Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta. The reasoning of its judgement shows that the deity, as representing the religious purpose of the donor, is a legal person in which the dedicated property vests. Section 54 of the Tamil Nadu Act regulates the succession of holders of the hereditary office of trustee within its scope, with the exception of the institutions called maths under section 44. Holding property and the succession of the office-holder are thus two questions that the comparator also distinguishes.219

Chapter 7, §§2 and 4, has already set out the difference in prior permission between the selected case of founder-stipulated substitution and the Indian text.220 The assessment of maṣlaḥa was also set out there, including what is left to the nāẓir if the founder gave him this right.221 That difference is kept within its school and legal limits, and its detail is not repeated here. The question of continuity, however, concerns what passes after the disposition or after the succession of mutawallīs:

The questionThe selected Ḥanafī caseThe Indian comparator in the texts examined
Do the waqf’s stipulations transfer to the substitute?Yes, in the texts cited, without being created anewThis detailed ruling was not examined in the comparator here
Does the succession of the office-holder transfer a particular special power?The detailed rulings on agency and testamentary appointment rule out an automatic equation between the casesEstablishing the succession of the office does not settle whether every special power transfers

These are two points at which to widen the comparison, not two differences established by the absence of a corresponding text. As for Kuran’s question about the cost of adaptation, the place where it is set out is Chapter 7, §7; what is needed here is that the existence of a legitimate route for disposition does not establish the continuity of the benefit or that the cost of its transfer is low.222

Footnotes

  1. Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta, Supreme Court of India, 18 February 1969, [1969] 3 SCR 742, 747; AIR 1969 SC 1089; (1969) 1 SCC 555. The statement on personality comes from the Court’s reasoning in a tax case, not from an operative ruling independent of that case. And the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, sections 34, 44, 54 and 60, the revised version from India Code. The latest amendment that the version’s footnotes mention is Act 26 of 2013. The addition of the prior approval of the Government is documented by Act 38 of 1998, whose date of entry into force is 22 January 1999 according to the footnote of the revised version. This is the specific version of the historical comparison, not a certification that all amendments have been covered up to the day on which this chapter was written. ↩

  2. Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, pp. 227–228; and Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, pp. 384–387, especially p. 387 on the judge’s not needing to carry it out himself, and p. 386 on his overriding supervisory authority; and Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, pp. 179–180. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan’s disagreement on the stipulation, with the waqf held valid, is mentioned in the context. The three pieces of evidence are of distinct rank, so they are not to be equated, and this view is not to be raised to a Ḥanafī consensus. ↩

  3. Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 180. He mentions the nearness of the property to the nāẓir’s place of residence and the ease of supervision, and makes leaving the assessment to him conditional on his having been given the right by the founder. ↩

  4. Kuran, “The Provision of Public Goods,” 841–898, especially pp. 861–864, p. 866 and p. 869. The exception for repetition was checked against the text of p. 864; we did not go back to the sources of the researchers whom he cites. This citation distinguishes the critique of cost from the claim that every change was impossible. ↩

8. From the Continuity of the Right to the Continuity of the Service: The Maḥmūdiyya

The history of the Maḥmūdiyya library changes the kind of evidence. In the earlier detailed rulings we looked at what makes a disposition valid and at the rights and powers that result from it. Here we read a report of work that took place, and then a report of the faltering execution of a later order concerning the same books or some of them. We do not use it as an application of the Ḥanafī rulings on substitution; the books whose return was required are not a purchased substitute. Its function is to test what still needs explanation after waqf status has been established.

Al-Sakhāwī reports that Ibn Ḥajar took charge of keeping the books of the Maḥmūdiyya madrasa, that he compiled for it one catalogue by the titles of works and another by disciplines, and that he used to set out his needs for consulting the books in his weekly list. He reports that through him the return of some things that had been lost before him was made possible, and that the post of keeper remained in his hands until he died and then passed to someone else.223

This is an affirmative report about the institution’s work. Cataloguing made the property consisting of knowledge identifiable and open to request; follow-up served reading and research; and the recovery of lost books restored assets to the possibility of use. The source relates that these works took place and that use was made of them, even though it does not establish that cataloguing alone caused the recovery, or that everything lost returned. In this way the sciences of the book, of classification and of knowledge management enter the interpretation of waqf with a specific function, not through a general cultural connection.

Ibn Ḥajar’s will then reveals another situation: in his hands were works of his own that he wished to dedicate, and with them volumes from the awqāf of the Maḥmūdiyya, which he ordered to be set apart and transferred promptly to the madrasa. Their being together in one hand did not make the source of the right in them one; part of what he said was the creation of a dedication of his own property, and part was the return of property already endowed.224

Al-Sakhāwī later reports that what was intended was not fulfilled, even for the waqf books that had been in his hands, that books were dispersed and reached the nāẓir al-khāṣṣ (the official in charge of the sultan’s privy purse), and that use of what the report speaks of ceased. The report is enough to establish that knowledge of the waqf status and an explicit order to return did not prevent this disruption; it is not correct to generalise it to the disappearance of the Maḥmūdiyya as a whole.225

The chapter links the two aspects without inventing a causal chain: in the history of the institution there were useful works of safekeeping, cataloguing and recovery, and then, after the death of the holder of the post, a failure occurred in carrying out what was intended for specific books. The report of failure is not enough to erase the earlier work, and the precedent of the work is not enough to guarantee the automatic transfer of its holder’s knowledge, capacity and relationships. The post may transfer while the problem of inventorying, sorting and handing over what is in its holder’s hands remains.

From here a third level of continuity appears. After the survival of the dedication and the identification of authority, there remain knowledge of the object, the capacity for recovery, and the availability of the benefit. In a library the catalogue carries some of this knowledge; elsewhere it may be carried by a register of entitlement-holders, a description of a property, an account or technical expertise. These are analytical examples of possible functions, not a claim that all their facts were established by the Maḥmūdiyya. What the example establishes is that a specific work of knowledge took part in actual use, and that the will alone did not guarantee the continuation of what it required.

Shared custody and the limits of what passes to it. Ḥassān al-Rudayʿān relates that he transferred the manuscripts of the charitable library at the al-ʿUrayfī Mosque in Ḥāʾil to the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives (Darah), after they had remained with him for cataloguing, on condition that they remain under the name of their collection and on separate shelves, and that the mosque be supplied with copies of them if it organised its library on shelves. The transferor’s report establishes that the transfer took place and the conditions that he announced; but it does not show that those conditions were carried out, nor does it identify whether the Darah received the assets for safekeeping or whether the niẓāra passed to it.226 His later reliance on a general fatwā (juristic opinion) on transfer for safekeeping and service does not establish prior permission in this particular event, nor that its answer applies to all the awqāf of the collection.227

The event reveals four relations that must be identified when a safekeeping service is combined: possession of the asset and its maintenance; permission to dispose of it; knowledge of its provenance and its stipulations; and access to its benefit. Some of these functions may be assigned to a single body on its own basis, without the other functions automatically following them. The name of the collection does not take the place of a statement of the rights of each waqf in it, just as making a copy of a book available does not by itself establish that it suffices for every use that was sought from the original. Cataloguing, the preservation of documents and the design of access enter here into a specific institutional decision: what is combined, who has the power to change it, and how does each waqf recover its property and the knowledge needed to use it if the provider of the service changes? These are questions that the book draws from the limits of the report, not a description of an arrangement whose full implementation at the Darah has been established.

Footnotes

  1. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, al-Jawāhir wa-l-durar fī tarjamat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Ḥajar [Jewels and Pearls: The Biography of Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Ḥajar], ed. Ibrāhīm Bājis ʿAbd al-Majīd, first edition (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1419 AH / 1999), vol. 2, pp. 609–610, “Waẓīfat khazn al-kutub” [The Post of Keeper of the Books]. The images of the two pages were examined. We do not equate this post with all the powers of a waqf’s nāẓir, nor do we attribute the recovery of the books to cataloguing alone. ↩

  2. Al-Sakhāwī, al-Jawāhir wa-l-durar, vol. 3, p. 1205, image of the printed edition. The finding that books previously endowed were held together with those that Ibn Ḥajar was dedicating is drawn from our study “Ḥuqūq al-waqf fī riḥlat al-kitāb” [Waqf Rights on the Journey of the Book], sixteenth version, the case of Ibn Ḥajar, unpublished paper. ↩

  3. Al-Sakhāwī, al-Jawāhir wa-l-durar, vol. 3, p. 1207, image of the printed edition. The phrase “wa-taʿaṭṭala al-intifāʿ bihi” [and use of it ceased] is read as referring to what the report speaks of, and is not made a description of all the books of the library or of its whole history. The failure is established by the report, but this passage alone does not identify all its causes. ↩

  4. Ḥassān ibn Ibrāhīm al-Rudayʿān, Fahāris al-makhṭūṭāt al-aṣliyya fī madīnat Ḥāʾil [Catalogues of the Original Manuscripts in the City of Ḥāʾil], Riyadh: King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives (Darah), 1431 AH, pp. 511–512, checked against the two images of the printed edition. The conditions are related by the transferor, and their implementation was not established here. The event and its limits were analysed earlier in our study “Ḥuqūq al-waqf fī riḥlat al-kitāb”, sixteenth version, the case of Ḥāʾil; this attributes the earlier analysis, while the report here relies on its own source. ↩

  5. The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Iftāʾ, Fatwā No. 23194, 3/4/1426 AH, reproduced in al-Rudayʿān, Fahāris al-makhṭūṭāt, pp. 581–582, the third and fourth questions; the two images were checked. The question is general, and the account on p. 512 states that the transferor’s reassurance by it came later. The verification did not settle whether the fourth answer applies to all the awqāf of the collection, so it is not to be credited with permitting the Ḥāʾil event in full or with creating a new class of entitlement-holders. ↩

9. How Is the Benefit Preserved During the Transition?

This detail may attract the attention of a body working in development, the protection of heritage or social services, because it identifies questions that can be regulated and examined. Its usefulness begins from a familiar situation: an institution dedicated property to a service, and then needed to change an asset, change a manager or move work to another body. Before deciding whether the waqf model suits it, we must know what ought to continue, what may change, who assesses that, and how the right is preserved during the transition.

The proposal drawn from the chapter is a transition document that deals with five interrelated matters: (1) the link of the substitute property to the dedication and its stipulations; (2) the source of the power of disposition, the validity of the route by which it is conferred and the limits of its repetition; (3) the fate of the property in the period between sale and purchase; (4) what is handed over to the new person in charge in property, documents and powers; and (5) how the benefit continues to reach those to whom it belongs. This is a design formulation that we propose on the basis of the questions, not the transfer of a complete historical system or a newly devised juristic obligation. Where safekeeping or administration is combined for several awqāf, a statement is added of the extent of the shared service, of what each waqf retains in decision or stipulation, and of how the assets, catalogues, records and items in custody are handed over when the relationship ends. The basis for recovery or reassignment, and what may restrict it, is identified, and an absolute right of exit is not assumed from the mere permissibility of cooperation. Consideration is given to the continuation of some of the service during the transition, to its funding and to who holds the permission for it, without confusing the end of a safekeeping contract with the extinction of the waqf’s right to an asset or a debt.

Let us suppose, for the purpose of design, property dedicated to a library service that needs to change the building it occupies. The value of the two properties alone does not settle the soundness of the decision. It must be identified whether the substitution preserves the conditions of the service, who has the power to assess the maṣlaḥa, where the price is kept, and whether the power includes repeating the disposition. Then the effect of the transition must be identified on readers’ access to the books, and on the catalogues, the lending of books and the items in the custody of staff. If the institution preserves the value of the property and loses the possibility of access to knowledge, a partial financial continuity has been achieved, and the continuity of the service for which the property was dedicated has not been established.

Preserving the waqf may be invoked both for keeping the library’s building and for changing it, so this heading alone does not favour either alternative. The higher objective (maqṣad) works here in identifying the basis of the trade-off: what recognised benefit does each alternative preserve, and what right does it expose to loss? Then the state of the waqf and the alternatives are examined, while the conditions for the validity of the disposition and the power of the person who makes it are preserved. That the aim of a decision is good is not enough to establish that it is permissible, just as the soundness of its effect is not established by the soundness of its reasoning.228

If an aesthetic quality or an artistic value is a recognised part of the purpose, its continuation enters into this trade-off, so it is not always reduced to the form of the building as against its service. First the basis for preserving it is identified, then what is needed for its work and its expenditure, and the effect of its change on the recipient. Chapter 4 showed how a description of performance appears in a specific stipulation.

The proposed transition document lends itself to comparison with arrangements that face the same service and the same transition. Chapter 11, §9, sets out the comparison between funding policy and the institutional vehicle.229 The same section examines what remains of the parties’ rights and of the public body’s responsibility for the service after the proposed intervention.230 What this chapter adds to that test is the identification of what ought to be preserved and handed over, and of how the benefit continues with its recognised qualities; the superiority of the waqf arrangement, however, needs the evidence of the comparison and its result.

When the rules of the system itself change. The dedication of property may continue while the general rules that determine the rights of its parties change. In Egyptian Law 48 of 1946 on the Rulings of Waqf, Article 56 made its provisions apply to earlier awqāf, with named exceptions; Articles 57 and 58 tied specific effects to earlier events and to what was stated in the waqf deed (ḥujjat al-waqf). Article 59 then confined to the income arising after the Law came into operation any claim to an entitlement that applying the Law had established or increased; and Article 60 kept earlier final judgements in force as between the two parties to the dispute, in matters other than authority over the waqf, even where they conflicted with the Law.231

This evidence cannot be reduced to absolute protection of acquired rights or to subjecting all of the past to a new rule. It distinguishes between the awqāf that the rule addresses, the event on which it bases the ruling, the period to which the financial claim relates, and the effect of what had already been adjudicated. The survival of a waqf does not mean that every earlier position survives, and a change of rule does not automatically permit the redistribution of all past income or the setting aside of every earlier judgement. This is different from the difference, set out in Chapter 7, §5, between the start of the Regulation’s entry into force and the period for meeting its requirements. The Egyptian example is used in its historical form; a system that is being established or revised chooses its transitional rules on their own basis, and does not borrow the answers of 1946 for all countries.

Footnotes

  1. See Chapter 3, §2: Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā [The Collected Fatwās], vol. 31, pp. 46–54 and pp. 67–69, within the limits of the questions examined there; the distinction between the higher objective and the basis of authority does not create a new permission for substitution. And Bandar, Taḥqīq manāṭ maqāṣid al-waqf [Establishing Where the Objectives of Waqf Apply], “al-Kitāb al-jāmiʿ” [The Comprehensive Book], first release, the introduction; cited for the question of whether the higher objective can decide a ruling against its alternative. Applying the question to moving the library is an analytical proposal, neither a new historical event nor a claim of a measured causal effect. ↩

  2. Bandar, “Ḥujjat al-tabannī” [The Case for Institutional Adoption], sections 6–7. The reference attributes the distinction between the two comparisons and the precedent of proposing a comparative feasibility study. The applied example and the formula of the transition document in this chapter are analytical proposals; they attribute no successful trial, or approval, to an international body. ↩

  3. Bandar, “al-Waqf bi-waṣfihi tartīban muʾassasiyyan” [Waqf as an Institutional Arrangement], section 10.1, unpublished paper. The work is cited because it is where the restriction was proposed that a waqf’s contribution should not replace the public obligation to provide the service; no historical evidence in this chapter rests on it. ↩

  4. Egypt, Law 48 of 1946 on the Rulings of Waqf, Arts. 56–60, pp. 8–9. The images of the two pages of the gazette issue were checked. The question was examined earlier in our paper “Ḥīna taghayyara al-ḥaqq wa-baqiya athar al-waqf” [When the Right Changed and the Effect of the Waqf Remained], which is unpublished. Art. 60 is restricted to the two parties to the dispute and to matters other than authority over the waqf, and Art. 59 to the income arising after the Law came into operation. The evidence is historical, and does not claim to trace the amendments or the Law’s current force. ↩

10. The Rules of Continuity and Its Characteristics in the Waqf System

The rulings presented preserve the link between property and the dedication while its asset changes, regulate the power of whoever disposes of it, and identify some of what protects it during the transition. These are connected relations that explain the continuity of the waqf in the case studied. The repetition of the name of the waqf over two successive assets does not by itself show which stipulations transferred to them, and the succession of persons in a single office does not show which powers validly transferred. The report of the Maḥmūdiyya adds that the survival of the right and the order to return the property were not enough on their own to bring about what they required in the books that it speaks of.

Four rules are drawn from the examined Ḥanafī detailed rulings, each of which keeps its own object. They are rulings on founder-stipulated substitution and what connects with it, not a comprehensive formulation for all forms and schools of waqf:

The rule within its limitsWhat it regulates in waqfIts basis within the chapter
A substitute bought for the waqf becomes waqf without a new formula of creation, and the stipulations of the first attach to it, subject to the validity of the exchange that brought it into the dedicationThe continuity of the rulings of dedication through substitute property, without disregarding a third party’s right in the first asset§2: Ibn al-Humām, and the base text of al-Tanwīr with its commentary and gloss; and the qualification that the link is undone when the first asset is claimed by a third party (istiḥqāq), under the istiḥsān mentioned
The transfer of the stipulations does not by itself carry the power to substitute the substitute again; the scope of the stipulation and the cause of the asset’s return affect the ruling on the next dispositionControlling repetition, and separating the identity of the physical asset from its character in the new transaction§§2–3: the text distinguishes between return by a rescission in every respect and return by a new contract, and preserves the exception of a general power of substitution
Agency during life is valid in the power presented, and testamentary appointment is not enough to establish it for the waṣīSeparating the continuity of looking after the waqf from the validity of transferring a special power, even where its transfer is expressly stated§4: Ibn al-Humām’s detailed rulings on the person who stipulated substitution for himself and on the qayyim; they are not generalised to other agencies and bequests
The protection of substitution money regulates the validity of the disposition and the destination of the price: gross undervalue is prohibited, a debt is established in the cases of receipt followed by death without declaration, or of consumption, and these are not equated with the case of its loss in the handKeeping the price tied to what it was received for, and identifying where a claim lies if it cannot be returned in kind§5: distinct rulings in the text; not every loss is made a ground of liability, and the price does not escape its restrictions when the first asset disappears

The first rule reveals the continuity of dedication through changing assets within the scope of a valid transfer. The survival of the waqf in this case concerns the link of rights and stipulations to the substitute property, and is not confined to the survival of a particular asset. The qualification of the validity of the exchange prevents separating the purpose from the basis of the property through which it is to be served. This is a characteristic of the form of continuity described; it is not enough to establish the independence of the purpose from every asset or every cause of acquisition.

The next two rules reveal the difference between what follows the property and what is established for the holder of authority. Stipulations transfer to the substitute without the power of change necessarily widening with them, and work in the office continues without every special permission passing to the successor in it. This is why the description of the waqf system connects the rules of property with the rules of representation and appointment. Al-Zarqāʾ’s view on legal personality sheds light on the bearing of rights and debts, but identifying the bearer of the right leaves the limits of its representative’s power in need of their own rulings, as §6 showed.

The rulings on the price and the report of the Maḥmūdiyya show the importance of declaration and work in achieving continuity, although the two kinds of evidence differ. The ruling on death after receiving the price without declaration identifies an effect in the estate; and the report on the books establishes that cataloguing, safekeeping and recovery were useful works, and that a disruption then occurred in carrying out the return. We do not make them a single juristic rule, nor do we attribute the failure of the return to the absence of cataloguing alone. What unites them is the question of what must be known and handed over so that the property remains able to serve its purpose. In this way accounting, records management and knowledge management enter specific places in the work of the system.

The comparison of prior permission established a limited difference, set out in Chapter 7, §4; it did not establish a superiority in durability or a lower cost. As for the question of continuity here, two detailed rulings remained unexamined in the comparator: the transfer of the stipulations to the substitute, and the transfer of a personal power; so the absence of their examination is not to be turned into an established advantage of waqf.

This chapter reaches the higher order through the conditions of the judiciary and of legal permission, and institutional work through the safekeeping and handover of property and knowledge. It did not treat the links between multiple awqāf in a way that establishes a general ruling on them. It carries into the decisions on institutional adoption (tabannī, that is, choosing a waqf arrangement in a particular context, with a justification of what it adds and a comparison with the possible alternatives) of Chapter 11, §§8–11, known questions: what dedication continues, what authority may validly be conferred, what received property is declared, what is needed for the service to continue with its recognised qualities, and by which benefit or right the alternatives of continuity are weighed. This is an outcome that can be tested and adapted, and its value lies in identifying specific rights and works whose rulings and results may differ, not in assuming that a single arrangement suits every environment.

The evidence of this chapter adds three distinctions to the four rules: possession of property does not exhaust authority over it, the survival of its dedication does not settle the rulings on what happens to it during the period of transition, and the continuity of a waqf does not freeze the general rules that determine the rights of its parties. These distinctions connect with shared custody, temporary investment and transitional provisions, while each piece of evidence keeps its scope. The decisions of Chapter 11, §4, bring together their effect on the establishment of the system, and section D of the Appendix tests how the answers change when one of their conditions changes.