Part Three: How a Waqf Changes, Continues and Connects with Others
How does the work change while the dedication remains binding?
Its link to the blog’s introductory texts: The Introduction prepares the ground for its question in §§3, 4, 8 and 11, and the Framework uses it in decision domains 1–3, 8 and 18, which the question of change brings together.
1. What Kind of Change Does a Waqf Need Permission For?
If we call it a “change” when a nāẓir (waqf administrator) alters the way waqf property is invested, sells an asset in order to buy a substitute, adjusts the share of an entitlement-holder (mustaḥiqq), or seeks to change the stipulation that gives him the power of disposition, we have gathered different acts under a single word. Some of these acts may fall within an existing power, while others need another power; some change the property from which the benefit is produced, while others touch the distribution of the benefit or the rule of decision itself. It is therefore not enough to describe waqf as flexible or rigid before identifying the object of the change and its basis.
The question bears on understanding waqf as a system. Dedication links property to a benefiting side (jiha), but honouring this link requires renewed dispositions. If we allow those in charge of it to change everything that impedes their dispositions, the restriction with which the waqf was created may disappear; and if we equate preserving the dedication with fixing every means of administering it, the wording may survive while the benefit is disrupted. This question is not resolved by choosing a middle term between stability and change, but by identifying the rules that make a disposition permissible, that determine who assesses its justification, and that specify what the justification alone does not have the power to change.
For this purpose the chapter reads three layers: disposition within a power, modification of the limits of a power, and permitted intervention to override a stipulation in a specific case. This is an analytical division of the detailed rulings (furūʿ) presented, not names of ranks agreed upon in all the schools. More than one of these acts may be combined in a single person; what matters is the basis of each act and its limits, not merely a difference in the names of the bodies. We then test the usefulness of the division on a contemporary waqf fund, where the stipulation of the founder (wāqif) connects with the regulation of the capital market, and participation in the decision is separated from the ability to redeem the money.
2. A Stipulation Creates a Power but Does Not Leave Its Holder Free to Dispose at Will
Al-Hidāya [The Guidance], in Ibn al-Humām’s commentary, presents the validity of a stipulation of substitution (istibdāl) of one plot of land for another on the view of Abū Yūsuf, and the disagreement of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, who holds the waqf valid and the stipulation void. The commentary states that a stipulation that does not contravene a rule of the sharia has legal effect. Under the first view, therefore, the will that creates the waqf can retain a capacity for disposition; but it operates within a ruling that determines which of its stipulations are valid, not above that ruling.182
The limits of such a grant appear in adjacent detailed rulings. In the case presented, the qayyim (waqf administrator) does not hold the power of substitution merely by virtue of being in charge of the waqf; he needs it to be expressly stipulated for him. If his right is restricted to the founder’s lifetime, it does not extend beyond it. And if the substitute is specified as land, he may not make it a house, nor the reverse. The holder of the power, its duration and the kind of its object are thus parts of the ruling itself; they are not administrative details that may be overridden on the claim that the general purpose is the same.183
It follows that there is a difference between using a permission and reformulating it. A person permitted to take land in place of land cannot rely on this permission alone to decide that buying a house is equivalent to it. If another justification for this disposition exists, we examine its basis; we do not make the power to implement an argument for a power to modify its limits. This rule helps in understanding what the earlier chapters said about separating the office from its holder: taking charge of the maṣlaḥa (legally relevant benefit) does not by itself generate all the powers that the person in charge of it may need.
Juristic disagreement reveals another constraint on building Dustūr al-Waqf: we may not turn a selected view into a comprehensive description. We are speaking here of the validity of the stipulation of substitution in the form that Abū Yūsuf permits, with the disagreement mentioned, and with what Abū Zahra states about excepting the mosque when he presents the stipulation of substitution. Substitution without a stipulation has other routes and rulings. The general rule that we draw is therefore the requirement to identify the source of the power of change; the answer of each school and each law remains part of the interpretation of a particular case.184
Footnotes
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Burhān al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya [The Guidance], as its base text appears in Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-qadīr ʿalā al-Hidāya [The Commentary “The Triumph of the Almighty” on al-Hidāya], first edition (Egypt: Sharikat Maktabat wa-Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa-Awlādihi, 1389 AH / 1970), vol. 6, pp. 227–228. The validity of the stipulation and the disagreement are attributed to the base text of al-Hidāya, and the qualification of non-contravention to the commentary. The source of this reading is the digital text; the image of the printed edition was not checked for this passage. ↩
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Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, pp. 228–229. We kept the examination to the detailed rulings whose digital text is sound at the places indicated, and did not use the garbled adjacent wording on a difference of town and the word “aḥsan” [better]. ↩
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf [Lectures on Waqf], pp. 179–180, para. 167. These pages were checked against images of the printed edition; the date of the scanned edition is not determined. His account does not stand in for an independent witness of practice. ↩
3. Repetition and Waiver Reveal That the Power Itself Has Limits
Ibn al-Humām restricts the use of a stipulation of substitution to a single occasion, unless the wording indicates that it is to last. Abū Zahra presents the rule of the single occasion within the ten stipulations (al-shurūṭ al-ʿashara), and then sets out where repetition applies in increasing and decreasing the shares of entitlement-holders: increasing one person’s share is not the same as increasing another’s, and disposing of a particular share is what is examined for repetition in this example.185
The question “Has the power been used before?” is therefore incomplete unless we add: which power? Over which object? And in what form was it granted? This is why we do not carry the detail on shares over to the sale of several properties without evidence; nor do we say that all of a waqf’s capacities are exhausted by the first change made in it. Conversely, the phrase “preserving the purpose” does not allow the repetition of every act whose repetition the stipulation prohibited. Chapter 8 shows, through the detailed ruling on an asset’s return by rescission (faskh) or by a new contract, how the route of the transaction itself affects the ruling on the next disposition.
Waiving a power, however, is a different act from using it. Abū Zahra states that the ten stipulations can be waived on the most preponderant Ḥanafī view that he presents, and he sets out the disagreement over whether they are to be construed as rights or as requirements of the sharia. So it is not correct to attribute to him a denial of waiver; nor is it correct to make this preference a permission to waive the rights of entitlement-holders or to revoke the waqf itself. Its object is the powers reserved in the stipulations under examination.186
Abū Zahra then moves to a different, legal layer. In his reading of Article Eleven (11) of Egypt’s Law 48 of 1946 on the Rulings of Waqf, some of the founder’s powers to change the designated uses (maṣārif) and the stipulations do not depend on his having reserved them; and he concludes that this part, which is established by force of law, cannot be waived. He distinguishes it from change in the assets by ibdāl, istibdāl and tabdīl (exchange, substitution and alteration), which requires an express stipulation. This is an attribution to his interpretation of a specific law; it is neither a description of current Egyptian law nor a rule for every right whose source is law. The second paragraph of the same article, however, restricts the power of revocation and change in some awqāf that predate the Law’s entry into force: the founder may not revoke or change what he dedicated before it and whose entitlement he assigned to others, if he had deprived himself and his descendants “of this entitlement and of the ten stipulations in respect of it”, or if it is established that the entitlement was given for a financial counter-value (ʿiwaḍ) or to secure established rights against the founder.187
The value of the comparison is that the source of a power enters into interpreting the effect of an attempt to waive it. A single word, such as the right of change, does not indicate a single ruling on survival and extinction. If we look at the waqf document alone, we may see that its author deprived himself of disposition, and not see a higher ruling that did not give this deprivation legal effect in the particular case. Here the connection between the single waqf and the waqf system appears: the school, legislation and the judiciary determine the effect of the will, and their work is not limited to executing what was written in the document.
Footnotes
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Ibn al-Humām, Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, p. 228; and Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 158 and p. 165, para. 153. The detail concerning each share occurs in the example of increase and decrease, and does not on its own support generalising the ruling to the repeated sale of several properties. ↩
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, pp. 165–166, para. 154. He presents the disagreement and then states the most preponderant view; not every view cited in a single context is to be attributed to him as his chosen view. ↩
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 169, para. 157, quoting Article 11 of Law 48 of 1946 and interpreting it. The legal text at this point is as Abū Zahra quotes it; p. 169 was checked against the scan, and the article was checked against the image of the gazette issue: Egypt, Law 48 of 1946, Art. 11, p. 5, including the restriction on earlier awqāf in its second paragraph. ↩
4. Maṣlaḥa: Who Assesses It, and What Does It Permit Him to Do?
The word “maṣlaḥa” does not identify the body that decides it, nor the route by which a disposition becomes valid. In Abū Zahra’s presentation of founder-stipulated substitution, the assessment of the maṣlaḥa is left to the nāẓir if the founder has granted him that right; among its examples are the nearness of the property and the ease of supervising it. His presentation states expressly that the judge’s permission need not be sought in this case. Ibn ʿĀbidīn places in the first category of his division the substitution that the founder stipulated for himself or for another, and then mentions the judge’s permission in the second category, which the founder did not stipulate and in which use of the benefit has ceased. This is a contextual indication that supports the distinction, not an explicit statement denying the need for permission in the first category. Ibn ʿĀbidīn denies that the judge must carry out the substitution himself where the stipulation exists, and affirms, in another transmitted passage, that his overriding supervisory authority remains. Ibn al-Humām reports from al-Anṣārī the requirement of the permission of the ḥākim (judge), and then construes the report as concerning “the case where he did not stipulate it for himself”; so it must be made clear, when comparing the cases, for whom the stipulation was made, and the report remains a qualification when identifying the textual basis for denying the need for permission. Not carrying out the disposition oneself does not by itself establish that permission is not required, and the survival of overriding supervisory authority does not by itself determine whether it comes before the disposition or after it.188
In Ḥusnī ʿAbd al-Hādī’s translation of ʿUmar Ḥilmī’s lectures there is another route: question 165 permits the mutawallī (waqf administrator) to depart from the founder’s stipulation with the opinion of the ḥākim in cases of pressing necessity or where benefit to the waqf is realised. Its example is a stipulation against leasing (ijāra) the property for more than a year. So not every legitimate change is a use of a flexibility stipulation reserved by the founder; it may be an override of a stipulation by a procedure and a justification that jurisprudence establishes. Nor is this question alone enough to establish that every restriction can be overridden, or that permission can be repeated without limit.189
The importance of this detail becomes clear in comparison with section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, in the revised version that we relied on. The exchange, sale and mortgage of immovable property, and its lease for more than five (5) years, require the permission of the Commissioner, on the ground that the transaction is necessary for the institution or beneficial to it. The permission is preceded by the publication of the proposal so that objections and suggestions can be received and considered, and by the prior approval of the Government; and the Act allows a challenge before the court. Establishing benefit alone therefore does not take the place of these procedures.190
Abū Zahra’s presentation and section 34 agree in requiring a justification for the disposition, and differ on whether prior permission is required in the two corresponding cases. The denial of permission in the first case is limited by its attribution to his presentation. In Abū Zahra’s presentation, the holder of the right of substitution assesses a maṣlaḥa that is restricted by the basis of his right, with supervision remaining; whereas the Commissioner in the Indian text holds a power of permission that he cannot exercise independently of the government approval added by the 1998 amendment. Neither text alone establishes how long the procedures actually take, what they cost or how good their results are. Moreover, the comparison here concerns specific dispositions of property, not every change of the purpose or of the entitlement-holders.
Accordingly, in each case we distinguish between who proposes the disposition, who assesses its justification, who permits it, and who reviews it or decides on objections to it. We do not fill these functions with names by guesswork: the comparable provision of the Act describes the publication of the proposal, and is not enough on its own to identify who makes each proposal in practice. The benefit of this distinction between functions is that it reveals what a difference of body means: has the name of the holder of a single power changed, has a required approval been added, has the right of objection widened, or has the criterion of decision changed?
Footnotes
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, pp. 179–180; and Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār [The Reply to the Perplexed], Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 384 on the division of substitution into stipulated and unstipulated, p. 387 on the judge’s not needing to carry it out himself, and p. 386 on the overriding supervisory authority, quoting al-Baḥr from al-Ṭarsūsī. Ibn al-Humām sets out al-Anṣārī’s report and its construction in Fatḥ al-qadīr, vol. 6, pp. 228–229. The statement that permission need not be sought is confined to Abū Zahra’s presentation of the case; the division is a contextual indication, and denying direct performance is not denying permission. Al-Anṣārī’s report at the end of p. 228, and its construction “the case where he did not stipulate it for himself” at the beginning of p. 229, were checked against the Dār al-Fikr facsimile of the Ḥalabī edition (file pages 232–233) on 25 October 2026; the check of 19 October 2026 had covered, from p. 229, only the two detailed rulings on the first asset’s being claimed by a third party and of the return of the sold asset (nn. 207 and 209). Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s text remained digital and was not checked against the image. ↩
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ʿUmar Ḥilmī, “Ḥuqūq al-awqāf” [The Law of Awqāf], translated by Ḥusnī ʿAbd al-Hādī, al-ʿIrfān, part 7, Shaʿbān 1340 AH / April 1922, p. 397, question 165; see also p. 395, questions 161 and 163. The text was checked against images of the pages. The word “ʿadam” [not] in the example is confirmed by the image and missing from the digital transcription; the Ottoman original is not among what was read here. ↩
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The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, section 34, pp. 29–30 of the revised version from India Code. The two images of the passage were examined in the facsimile. The prior approval of the Government is among the additions made by Act 38 of 1998, s. 2, Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, p. 129; the date of entry into force, 22 January 1999, is taken from the version’s footnote, not from a fresh examination of the commencement notification. The latest amendment that the version’s footnotes mention is Act 26 of 2013, and later amendments up to Act 19 of 2024 were examined within the limits of the texts obtained. This is the verified version used for the comparison, not a claim to have completed every amendment to date. Section 34(5) excludes inam grants, referring them to section 41; so the section is not to be generalised to all charitable property. ↩
5. The Waqf Fund: Where Dedication Meets Investment Law
In Saudi Arabia this structure appears at a level that combines two jurisdictions. In the published version of the Investment Funds Regulations, as amended by the decision of 24 November 2025, Article 60 binds the manager of a waqf fund to the requirements of the General Authority for Awqaf, without prejudice to the requirements of the Capital Market Authority, and exempts it from the provisions on redemption requests that it refers to. Articles 64 and 65 set out the procedures for fundamental and non-fundamental changes.191 The Waqf Investment Products Regulation was then issued, published on 12 June 2026, and replaced the earlier instructions for approving the establishment of funds and the earlier portfolios regulations. It comes into operation ninety (90) days after publication, with a separate period for existing products to regularise their position within twelve (12) months of entry into force. The transitional period is therefore not a general postponement of the Regulation, nor does it establish that a particular fund has regularised its position.192
The first effect of the new Regulation is to identify what the dedication attaches to. It makes the waqf annex the main reference for the waqf provisions of the product, requires the annex to specify whether the waqf is of the assets themselves or of their cash value, and names the security or its value as the object of the waqf. It also requires a statement of which profits distributed in the form of shares belong to the principal and which to the yield (rīʿ). If the securities held by the product change, it is not correct to rule that the waqf has ended, or that the disposition is valid, before identifying the object of the dedication and the power of administration. This is a legal link between the theory of waqf property and the regulation of investment, and it helps in interpreting what remains and what may change.193
The second effect is to identify when the dedication attaches. Waqf investment sukuk may represent endowed shares, or shares that will become waqf. Article 28 requires a statement of whether the waqf arises from the subscription proceeds at issuance or from the resulting assets on the extinguishment of the sukuk, together with a statement of the holders’ rights in the returns, to recover the original value and specified returns, or of their waiver of them. It is therefore not correct to generalise the prohibition of redemption in a particular waqf fund to every product that bears a waqf label; for the restricted property, the time at which it is restricted and the rights of the person who funds it differ. This does not mean that every endowed property may be redeemed; rather, it prevents confusing an existing waqf with a financing arrangement that will become waqf.194
The third effect is to regulate change and termination without confusing notification with permission. Article 29 requires the nāẓir to notify the Authority of a material change within five (5) working days of its occurrence, and Article 30 counts changing the designated uses, or spending otherwise than under the founder’s stipulation, among the material events. Including an event in the duty to report does not make it permissible, nor does it dispense with an approval that another article requires; merging one waqf fund with another waqf fund requires the approval of the General Authority for Awqaf and an examination of its effect on the founders, the beneficiaries and the nāẓirs, and on the interest of the beneficiaries, the sustainability of the waqf and the founders’ aims. On the termination of a product, Article 18 provides that the waqf annex is to be followed for the destination of the assets, and then says, where that is impossible: “these assets shall be substituted by other assets consistent with the founder’s stipulation, or what the preponderant maṣlaḥa of the waqf requires after the permission of the competent body”. “The competent body” is the Capital Market Authority by the Regulation’s definition; so the brevity of the wording does not settle whether the requirement of permission attaches to both alternatives or to one of them. Nor is competence over the destination of the assets carried over from old instructions to the new text merely because the subject is similar.195
The connection between the two jurisdictions is clear in these provisions: regulating the financial vehicle does not erase the dedication, and the waqf restriction does not dispense with the regulation of investment and disclosure. To identify a dated practice, we read the SNB Capital King Saud University Waqf Fund in the version of its terms whose update was notified on 8 April 2025, together with its report for that year. Both predate the Products Regulation; so we do not present its terms as a complete description of the position in force after the Regulation, nor do we apply the later text to it retroactively. In what we examined, we did not find a document regularising this fund’s position after the Regulation came into force.
The first thing the terms reveal is a difference in the object of disposition. The fund is open-ended and has no fixed term, but its terms prohibit the redemption of units and the transfer of their ownership because of its waqf nature. At the same time, its work rests on investment. Hence prohibiting the founder from withdrawing his contribution does not contradict changes in the components of the portfolio: the restriction on leaving the dedication and the room for investment disposition lie at two different levels. Nor does this entail permitting any investment or dropping its restrictions.196
The second thing they reveal is that permissions multiply according to the object of the change. A fundamental change requires, under the terms, the approval of the founders by an ordinary fund resolution, then that of the Capital Market Authority, together with the approval of the Sharia committee and the board. Changing specified requirements that concern the waqf arrangement requires the approval of the General Authority for Awqaf. A non-fundamental change requires the approval of the board, notification and disclosure. The right to participate in the decision therefore does not give the founder a right of redemption, nor does it make the majority the holder of absolute power over the waqf’s purpose. Likewise, the approval of one body does not take the place of all the other approvals.197
This result connects with the examination of the beneficiary in Chapter 6: the participation of the founders is not in itself evidence that the benefiting side, or every recipient, holds a like participation. The multiplicity of bodies does not settle the independence of some of them or the effectiveness of their oversight; but it requires a distinction between protecting the investment, protecting the dedication and representing stakeholders. Moving from an individual nāẓir to the management of a fund does not resolve the question of authority (wilāya) merely by increasing the number of participants.
The third thing they reveal is that terminating the vehicle is not the same as voiding the waqf. The terms of the 2025 version provide that, after the obligations have been settled, the assets are to be transferred as waqf assets to the University’s awqāf, and that their destination follows the rules of the dedication; and where the specified destination is impossible, the General Authority for Awqaf may transfer the assets to another beneficiary entity in a manner that does not conflict with the founder’s stipulation. This is the rule of the dated version of the fund, and the 2026 Regulation specifies the body and the destination differently, as set out above. It is thus evidence that links the question of change with what Chapter 8 will examine: what ends may be the form of administration, while the dedication of what passes from it remains. The rule does not guarantee that the value of the capital is preserved in economic terms; it determines the character of the assets and their designated use after the obligations have been met.198
Footnotes
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Capital Market Authority, Investment Funds Regulations, as amended by Resolution of the Board of the Authority No. 1-135-2025, 3/6/1447 AH, corresponding to 24/11/2025, Art. 60, p. 66, and Arts. 64–65, pp. 69–71, published text. The date of the indexing page, 26 November, differs from the date of the resolution; neither of them is taken here as a date of entry into force that has not been verified. This version is read together with the later Waqf Investment Products Regulation, not with the old instructions as the regulation in force. ↩
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General Authority for Awqaf, Waqf Investment Products Regulation (Umm al-Qurā [the official gazette], 12 June 2026), Arts. 35–37. They correspond to p. 16 of the Authority’s official facsimile. Entry into force is ninety days after publication, and the transitional period runs from the date of entry into force. The repeal and entry-into-force articles were compared in the two versions. ↩
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Waqf Investment Products Regulation, Art. 1, Arts. 7–8, Art. 12 and Art. 28. The provision distinguishes a waqf of the assets themselves from a waqf of their value, the principal from the yield, and a waqf at issuance from a waqf on the extinguishment of the sukuk; it does not call every investment permissible, nor does it establish any particular application. ↩
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See n. 193. ↩
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Waqf Investment Products Regulation, Arts. 1, 18, 27 and 29–30. The wording of Art. 18: “Where that is impossible, these assets shall be substituted by other assets consistent with the founder’s stipulation, or what the preponderant maṣlaḥa of the waqf requires after the permission of the competent body.” The requirement of permission was carried over with the text, and no licence to change the designated use or the founder’s stipulation was inferred from the duty of notification. ↩
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SNB Capital, SNB Capital King Saud University Waqf Fund: Terms and Conditions, the version whose p. 9 states that the Authority was notified of the update on 8 April 2025, p. 9 and p. 23, clause 11, the manager’s Arabic version, accessed 19 October 2026. The prohibition of redeeming units and of transferring their ownership is explicit on p. 23; it is not inferred from the mere use of the label “waqf”. This is a description of the terms of this version, not a resolution of how all the redemption provisions of the Regulations overlap; for Art. 60 excludes Art. 67, whereas provisions on redemption upon change appear in Arts. 64 and 65 of the November 2025 version. ↩
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SNB Capital, Terms of the SNB Capital King Saud University Waqf Fund, pp. 26–27, clause 19. The fund’s terms refer to the numbering of the Regulations in their own version; the numbering of the November 2025 amendment is not to be used in its place without a chronological comparison. The chapter describes the two kinds of procedure and does not generalise the founders’ approval to every amendment whatever its kind. ↩
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SNB Capital, Terms of the SNB Capital King Saud University Waqf Fund, pp. 27–28, clause 20, especially items 7–10. Transfer after settling the obligations is a necessary condition, and the permission for termination and the destination of the assets are different from distributions of benefit during the life of the fund. ↩
6. What Does the Published Practice of This Fund Establish?
The fund’s annual report for 2025 helps to distinguish between using the investment power and changing the written rules. In describing its activity, the manager mentions increasing investment in equities and alternative investments and reducing investment in money markets. He then gives a separate place to changes to the terms and conditions, which he describes as non-fundamental, among them updates to paragraphs on investment policy, fees, the manager, the board, the Sharia committee, the auditor and financial disclosure.199
The first item discloses a change in the allocation of the invested money; the second discloses an amendment to texts that regulate the work. Updating the paragraph on the fund manager does not necessarily mean a change of manager, and updating the paragraph on investment policies does not by itself mean a change in the objective or in the level of risk. To know the content of each amendment, its earlier and later wording must be compared; that comparison was not carried out here. The report therefore establishes that the manager disclosed that amendments he called non-fundamental had been made, and it does not dispense with examining their approvals or with judging whether this classification was correct.
Within this limit, the disclosure adds something specific to the regulatory text: the power of amendment did not remain a theoretical door in the terms; its use in a particular year was attributed to the fund while it continued to be described as a waqf. How much benefit the amendments produced, what it cost to obtain them, or whether their effect reached the entitlement-holders, are other questions that the list of amendments does not answer. This is why the size or return of the fund is not taken as evidence of the suitability of the waqf system; the point of argument here is the relation of a declared act to the rules of dedication and decision.
The case does not give the ruling for all Saudi funds or for all contemporary awqāf. Its value is that it reveals a point that can be examined in other legislation and applications: can the administration be amended without revoking the dedication? Is the right to vote tied to the right to exit? And who holds the power to change the purpose if it becomes impossible to carry out? The difference in the answers between countries is part of research on the waqf system, and is not reduced to the existence of a regulation that bears its name.
Footnotes
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SNB Capital, SNB Capital King Saud University Waqf Fund: Annual Report 2025, pp. 10–11, the paragraphs on investment activities during the period and on changes made to the fund’s terms and conditions, the Arabic version published by the manager. They are pages 11–12 of the file because of the cover. We compared their images; the updates concern named paragraphs and do not in themselves establish a change in every person or substantive rule that bears their heading. We did not consult the minutes of the approvals or a comparison of all the earlier versions of the terms. ↩
7. What Changes in the Debate on Flexibility and Rigidity?
This theoretical grounding helps to read Timur Kuran for what he actually says. He distinguishes between flexibility at founding and operational flexibility, mentions the exception for an express stipulation of repetition, and presents broad forms of delegation as well as instances of change that did occur. So he is not refuted merely by finding a stipulation that permits amendment, or a sale that took place. His question remains about the cost of using the capacity to change, and about amendments that may never have been attempted. The existence of a legal route does not establish that its cost is low, and the absence of a change from a document does not establish that it was impossible.200
Kuran also explains some restrictions by their protective function. In examining the origin of these restrictions in the charitable waqf, he mentions the risk of embezzlement by the mutawallī and the staff, and of mismanagement, and considers that tightening the rules of disposition may protect the entitlement-holders. He acknowledges restrictions in the history of the trust and in European counterparts, and so places part of the comparison in the extent and timing of the transformation. In the family waqf (waqf dhurrī), he assumes a balance between operational flexibility to achieve financial security and restricting the mutawallī to preserve the founder’s priorities, among them avoiding market risks that the entitlement-holders do not want. Where the second consideration prevails, he explains by it why some founders supported the restrictions. This is his explanation of the motives for the restriction and of the change in its cost; it is neither a measure of its success nor a description that necessarily holds for every founder or entitlement-holder.201
The question of the cost of a restriction and of its protective function helps in choosing the rules of the system: what risk does narrowing the power address, what delay or expense does it create, and who bears them? And if the power is widened, what information reveals its use, and who can request a review? Describing something as flexibility or as oversight does not favour either alternative before the disposition, the right and the evidence of its effect have been identified. This is an analytical link that the book proposes; it does not attribute to Kuran a specific recommendation on distributing the powers of the contemporary system.
R. D. McChesney identifies another limit: the nāẓir’s discretionary power that he describes is connected with the absence of specific stipulations from the founder; and it is different from what he mentions in the same context about judicial intervention for the maṣlaḥa that goes beyond specific stipulations. If we combine the two statements into a single claim, we attribute to the nāẓir a power that the text presented does not give him. The comparison between him and Kuran is the work of our study; it is not a direct debate between the two authors that we establish took place.202
Murat Çizakça, for his part, uses flexible waqf deeds in replying to part of Kuran’s explanation of the fragmentation of wealth and the short lifespan of institutions, and cites partial evidence, while restricting the scope of his reply to the material he presents. But the flexibility with which a waqf deed was drafted does not by itself establish that the person in charge of it can change it after its creation. Here the study of the source of the power and of its object is useful: the founding formula may be broad, and yet changing that formula itself may still need another basis.203
The case of the Saudi fund does not settle a dispute in Ottoman economic history, nor does it carry a contemporary system over into the interpretation of an old practice. But it gives the debate a more precise question: which layer of the capacity to change are we measuring? The portfolio may move within the policy, the policy may change by a procedure, and exit from the dedication may remain prohibited. The soundness of a decision may increase with the number of its stages, and its cost may increase with them; this is a possibility that needs measurement, not a conclusion that the multiplicity of approvals alone yields.
Footnotes
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Timur Kuran, “The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System,” Law & Society Review 35, no. 4 (2001): 841–898, especially pp. 862–864 and pp. 869–872. The places indicated were read in the text of the article. The sources of Akgündüz, Little and Hoexter to which he refers were not consulted independently here, and the examples drawn from them are not presented as documents that we examined directly. ↩
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Kuran, “The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law,” pp. 867–869, with the context of delegation and of the relationship between the represented party and the agent on pp. 864–866. The passage was read in the saved text of the article; its images were not re-examined when this comparison was drafted. The article is a direct source for Kuran’s interpretation, not an independent consultation of the facts and sources that he cites. The description of protection in the charitable waqf, and the balancing of motives in the family waqf, are possible interpretations in his view, not a measure of the success of the restrictions. ↩
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R. D. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 11–13. Pages 12–13 were checked against the image, including his note 39, which carries a dissenting view on substitution; no consensus is to be constructed from the body of the page that ignores it. The books of jurisprudence cited at this point are as McChesney quotes them, except those that we opened in their own places. ↩
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Murat Çizakça, Was Shari’ah Indeed the Culprit? (Kuala Lumpur: INCEIF, 2010), MPRA Paper 22865, 13, 16–17, 40. Its places are from the text transcription; this is not a reference to his book published in 2000. On pp. 16–17 he presents partial material, so the unqualified claim that the possibilities were never tested at all is not to be revived; and on p. 40 he describes the reply as partial because it relates mainly to the Ottoman sphere. ↩
8. What Does This Add to the Rules of the Waqf System and to the Possibility of Drawing on It?
The evidence falls into an interpretive rule: commitment to the purpose and the power to change the means are two rulings, each tied to a specific basis, and neither is to be inferred in full from the other. The details that make this rule useful are the object of the power, its duration and whether it can be repeated or waived, and then the criterion for its use and the route for objecting to it. If it is said that the founder or the nāẓir “holds the power to change”, most of the ruling remains unknown until these relations are identified.
The cases studied show important characteristics of waqf as a system. Disposing of dedicated property may be a means of honouring the dedication; power over it may be granted by a stipulation or established by a higher rule; participation in its administration may exist alongside a prohibition of redemption; and the end of an administrative arrangement may be followed by the continuation of waqf status in the property that passes from it. These relations explain how the system combines restricting individual appropriation with the possibility of renewed work. The comparison does not make them characteristics unique to waqf: what is shared in the basic requirement of a maṣlaḥa was established, a specific difference remained in prior permission, and not every counterpart was tested here for every characteristic.
Hence what is offered for dialogue with systems of charitable work and with development institutions is not a promise of superiority by virtue of the name of waqf, but a legal construction that can be examined and adapted: endowed property that, in the case studied, does not pass back to the contributor merely because he wishes it, while financing that will become waqf is distinguished; a power of administration that can be changed according to a basis; a destination for the assets, when the vehicle ends, governed by the waqf’s stipulations and the competent rules; and a route for making the decision visible and reviewing it. Names and bodies may change between countries; the question remains what these rules accomplish and to whom rights are established under them. The Saudi example shows that waqf law and the regulation of investment can be combined in a single institution, without establishing that transferring them to another country would succeed.
To turn this understanding into a proposed application, its document needs to set out (1) what the administration may change, (2) what needs another approval, (3) what may not be returned to the participants, and (4) what the property passes to when the arrangement ends; and to couple this with a route for information, objection and remedy. This is a design recommendation drawn from the comparison, not a description of a universal model endorsed by an international body. Testing it begins with an event in which controlling the power results in protecting a right or correcting a disposition, and then with measuring the cost of that and its effect on the benefit. In this way applications become part of the proof of how waqf works, not a list appended to it.