Level One: The Theoretical Framework and East–West Dialogue
The following chapters study the rules and characteristics of waqf in their sources and contexts, and connect them with rights and work and with comparative counterparts. Each piece of evidence comes with the limits of what it establishes; from the evidence the decisions of the second level draw their reasons and their constraints.
Part One: How a Waqf Is Formed and Becomes Binding
When does the dedication of property become a waqf, and what is made binding by it?
Its link to the blog’s introductory texts: An Introduction to the Waqf System sets out the concept of its question and its history in §§1–3, and The Waqf Public Policy Framework uses it in decision domains 1–3.
1. Waqf, the Waqf Deed and the System That Gives Them Effect
A waqf, at the institutional level that this book studies, is an arrangement created by the will of a person entitled to dedicate property, who by it dedicates property to a purpose or to entitlement-holders in a manner recognised by the governing normative framework. Its rules regulate the administration of the property, the protection of its dedication and the delivery of its benefit, and it may be perpetual or temporary, as its governing ruling permits. By “institution” we mean here this arrangement of property, work and rights; the existence of an independent organisation or of a legal person is another question, which Chapter 2 treats in detail. This definition draws on our earlier formulation of waqf and its system, while keeping the differences in rulings and effects visible.1
The owner’s intention alone, however, does not answer all the questions of formation: Did he have the power to dedicate in this way? Were the purpose and the stipulation valid? When did revocation become impossible? Was a right of another person attached to the property? And which effect depends on delivery (taslīm), ratification (ijāza) or an official procedure? The claim of this chapter is that the rules on creation are part of the distribution of power within the waqf: they determine what the founder can bind himself and others to, and what remains subject to a normative framework beyond his will.
The ḥadīth of ʿUmar’s waqf shows the root of the link between property and benefit. Al-Bukhārī relates from Ibn ʿUmar that ʿUmar acquired land at Khaybar and asked the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, about it, and he said: “If you wish, you may make its principal inalienable (ḥabbasta aṣlahā) and give it in charity (taṣaddaqta bihā).” The report states that ʿUmar gave it in charity on the condition that its principal not be sold, given away or inherited, for the poor, kin, the freeing of slaves, the path of God, the guest and the wayfarer, and that it allowed whoever administered it to eat from it in accordance with what is customary (bi-l-maʿrūf).2 The report brings together an inalienable principal, a directed benefit, specified designated uses and a person in charge whose use of the benefit has a limit; the understanding of waqf begins from these relationships, before the disagreement over its rulings is set out in detail.
Ibn Qudāma’s definition in al-Muqniʿ [The Satisfying] helps to pin this link down: “making the principal inalienable and devoting the benefit to charitable ends” (taḥbīs al-aṣl wa-tasbīl al-manfaʿa). Al-Mardāwī reported this definition in al-Inṣāf [Fairness], and reported al-Zarkashī’s qualification of it by its recognised conditions. The sentence is thus a key to the conception, and judging a particular waqf requires knowing the conditions of its form.3 The benefit may be the use of the asset itself, or the beneficiary may obtain it from the asset’s yield (rīʿ); Chapter 4 examines how it passes from the resource to its entitlement-holder.
The object of dedication needs to be stated separately from the manner in which the benefit is used. An asset may be dedicated for the entitlement-holder to use directly; or an asset may be dedicated that produces income with which the service is financed; or the owned usufruct itself may be the object of the waqf while the substance of the asset remains outside the dedication. Shari’ah Standard No. 60 lays down for this form: “The waqf of usufructs by their owner is permissible, and the waqf may be for use, for exploitation or for leasing.” It restricts the waqf of a usufruct owned by way of lease by the conditions of the lease (ijāra) and its term. The third form thus falls within this institutional conception where the governing normative framework holds it valid, and the word “property” is not to be taken to confine it to the substance of an asset or to cash.4
The point of disagreement here is the dedication of a usufruct on its own, not the use of an endowed asset. Al-Tatāʾī permits the waqf of a usufruct owned in return for rent, for the period that the founder owns or for part of it, and reports the contrary view of Ibn al-Ḥājib. In the Shāfiʿī text that Ibn Sumayṭ compiled, the waqf of a usufruct is not valid even if the usufruct is owned in perpetuity by bequest. The validity of this form is therefore not reduced to its durability, and the Standard’s choice is not presented as agreement between the schools.5
This requires specifying what usufruct the creator owned and what he was able to dedicate, its duration and the limits of its use, and the prior right that restricts it. Mere permission to use does not amount to the creation of a waqf, just as the waqf of a usufruct does not establish that the substance of the asset follows it. These are questions of the system’s ambit and of the ways in which rights are proved and protected; they do not bind every context to a single juristic form. Chapter 4 shows their effect on the production of benefit, and Chapter 11 connects their recognition with decisions on administration and protection.
Among the best-known classifications by designated use are the charitable waqf, such as a waqf to serve the sick; the family (ahlī) waqf, such as a waqf whose yield goes to the founder’s descendants; and the joint (mushtarak) waqf, which combines a charitable designated use with a family entitlement.6 Different from this classification is whether the waqf provides the service directly or finances a body that provides it, and whether its administration is in the hands of an individual, a group or a public body. The benefiting side, the manner of work and the status of the manager are thus distinct questions; no single type-name answers them all.
The waqf deed is a document that specifies one side of this dedication. But it does not by itself encompass everything that validates, completes and restricts it. Abū Zahra described the waqf deed as “dustūr al-waqf”, and then laid down that, where there is no text, the sharia rulings specific to awqāf apply, and that the founder’s will itself is restricted by the rulings of the Lawgiver.7 This book draws on that link between will and normative framework, and widens the question to the rules, bodies and relationships through which the waqf works. This is an analytical widening for the purposes of the study, not a meaning that we attribute in its entirety to Abū Zahra’s usage.
In this way the individual waqf, with its property, purpose, parties and rulings, is distinguished from its document, which is one of the pieces of evidence by which it is identified, and from the waqf system: the totality of the rules, actors and relationships through which a waqf is established, administered and used, its dedication protected and its disputes resolved. The study of the system also covers the relationships between awqāf and what links them to the courts, the state and the market; this is what Chapter 9 makes room for. The existence of a document does not in itself establish that the benefit is delivered or that oversight is in place, just as a breakdown in the delivery of the benefit or in oversight does not by itself establish that the waqf has ceased to exist.
Among the actors of this system are the founder, who dedicates and stipulates within the limits of what he owns; the nāẓir, who undertakes the work with specified powers; the workers and experts who provide the service; the entitlement-holders; and the judicial, legislative and oversight bodies, depending on the context. Some of these roles may be combined in one person, or distributed among persons and bodies. The position of the beneficiary needs to be specified: he may be entitled to a known share, or he may belong to a class whose members use a facility. Whether entitlement is established, and whether there is individual standing to initiate a claim or to call for an account, are two distinct questions, which Chapter 6 treats in detail.
Dustūr al-Waqf is a study of the rules of the system and of how they work, and of what can be learnt from them, criticised in them or put to use. It is not a proposed law to replace the legal schools and legislation, or a single formula in which every founder must write. It begins with creation because differences there explain differences in the rights and powers established after it.
Footnotes
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Bandar, “Taḥrīr mafhūm al-waqf niẓāman muʾassasiyyan: mā qīla wa-mā lam yuqal baʿd” [Defining the Concept of Waqf as an Institutional System: What Has Been Said and What Has Not Yet Been Said], release 2.1, 16 October 2026, section 4, at both its levels: waqf as an institution, and the waqf system; unpublished paper. The definition of waqf has been reformulated here and its detail distributed across the Introduction, while the definition of the waqf system and the distinction between entitlement and individual standing to bring a claim have been kept. The reference to the earlier work is made to attribute the formulation, not to take an unavailable result as the basis for a ruling on waqf. ↩
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Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī [al-Bukhārī’s Authentic Collection], first edition (Cairo: Dār al-Taʾṣīl, 1433 AH / 2012), chapter “al-Waqf kayfa yuktab” [How a Waqf Is to Be Written], ḥadīth 2789 in this edition’s numbering. Quoted from its digital copy; there the verb of the answer is written with a doubled b: “ḥabbasta”. The report brings together the designated uses mentioned and the ruling on the benefit allowed to the person in charge of it; it is not cited to settle the later juristic disagreement on ownership or all the forms of substitution. ↩
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Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāma, al-Muqniʿ [The Satisfying], with al-Sharḥ al-kabīr [The Great Commentary] by Shams al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī and al-Inṣāf [Fairness] by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Mardāwī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥilw, first edition (Cairo: Hajr li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ wa-l-Iʿlān, 1415 AH / 1995), vol. 16, p. 361. The definition is from the base text of al-Muqniʿ, and al-Zarkashī’s qualification is from al-Mardāwī’s report of it. The passage was located in the digital text; its printed image has not been compared again. ↩
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Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, al-Miʿyār al-sharʿī raqm (60): al-Waqf (miʿyār muʿaddal) [Shari’ah Standard No. (60): Waqf (Revised Standard)] (Riyadh: Sharikat Idārat Istithmār al-Mustaqbal al-Maḥdūda, 1441 AH), clause 2/4/12, p. 1397 in the print pagination, and p. 13 in the digital library’s pagination. The digital text was compared in full; the page image was not compared here. The clause permits the owner of usufructs to make them waqf for use, exploitation or leasing, and requires, where they are owned by lease, that the lessor not prohibit re-leasing and that the term of the waqf not exceed the term of the lease. The citation is of a specific standard-setting reference, not of a juristic agreement or of its institutional adoption in all laws. ↩
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Abū ʿAbd Allāh Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Khalīl al-Tatāʾī al-Mālikī, Jawāhir al-durar fī ḥall alfāẓ al-Mukhtaṣar [Pearl Gems in Unravelling the Wording of the Mukhtaṣar], ed. Abū al-Ḥasan Nūrī Ḥasan Ḥāmid al-Misallātī, first edition (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1435 AH / 2014), chapter on waqf, p. 109; and Muṣṭafā ibn Ḥāmid ibn Ḥasan ibn Sumayṭ, Mukhtaṣar Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj bi-sharḥ al-Minhāj [Abridgement of The Gift to the Needy in Explaining The Path], first edition (Markaz al-Nūr li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Abḥāth, 1429 AH / 2008), vol. 2, p. 467, Book of Waqf; the passage was compared with the facsimile of volume 2, and the printed wording is: “so the waqf of a usufruct is not valid even if he owns it in perpetuity by bequest”. Al-Tatāʾī’s page, however, is from the digital text; the number of its volume has not been determined and its image has not been compared. The comparison establishes the difference in ruling between these two texts, and does not exhaust the views of the schools; Ibn Taymiyya has a preferred view permitting this form, reported in the collection al-Fatāwā al-kubrā [The Major Fatwās], “Kitāb al-Ikhtiyārāt al-ʿilmiyya” [The Book of Scholarly Preferences], p. 426, in a digital text whose image needs to be compared before any extended quotation. ↩
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International Working Group on Waqf Core Principles, Core Principles for Effective Waqf Operation and Supervision (Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Waqf Board, and IRTI-IsDB, October 2018), para. 2. The document counts the charitable, the family and the joint waqf, and the waqf for oneself, among the most prominent types; the illustration in the text serves to clarify the difference in the benefiting side, not to list the types exhaustively or to affirm the validity of every form in all schools and laws. ↩
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Muḥammad Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf [Lectures on Waqf] (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, n.d.), p. 145, para. 132. The passage was compared with the scan; the phrase “dustūr al-waqf” in his usage describes the waqf deed, and is not a name for the analytical material in this book. ↩
2. The Constituents of Creation, and the Difference between Formation, Legal Effect and Binding Force
Al-Zarqāʾ counts three material pillars (arkān) of the waqf: the founder, the property and the benefiting side (al-jiha al-mawqūf ʿalayhā); he then distinguishes from them the legal pillar (al-rukn al-sharʿī), which is the contract, and defines it as the founder’s declaration (ījāb) in its recognised formula. This is al-Zarqāʾ’s arrangement of the question, not a claim that the jurists agree on a single way of counting the pillars.8 Its use is that reading the waqf through the roles of the founder, the nāẓir, the beneficiary and the reviewer needs to be preceded by a reading of the disposition itself. The nāẓir does not take the place of the formula of creation in counting the constituents, and the absence of his name from the wording is not by itself enough to judge that there is no waqf.
Al-Zarqāʾ describes waqf as a disposition by unilateral will, but he restricts the independence of this will by the rights of others, mentioning the debt that exhausts the estate and the disposition of a person in his final illness (maraḍ al-mawt). He then separates the fulfilment of the conditions of formation (inʿiqād) from that of the conditions of legal effect (nafādh): a waqf may be formed with immediate legal effect, or it may be formed suspended pending ratification.9 If a prior right is attached to the property, the reader may not pass from the issuing of the formula to the conclusion that the property has become available to the purpose as against every right-holder. Here the waqf system appears where it meets the rules on debts, capacity (ahliyya) and inheritance; the study of dedication does not dispense with the study of the rights that came before it.
Likewise, acceptance is not in every form the same as the acceptance of a contracting party in an exchange. Al-Zarqāʾ explains, for a waqf in favour of a specified person, that what counts is the absence of rejection, and gives as an example the passing of disbursement to the poor named after that person when the specified person rejects it. In this form, the rejection by the immediate beneficiary does not entail that the whole dedication lapses. The question of the creation of the waqf differs from the question of whether the benefit is established for a particular person.10 This is a practical consequence of distinguishing between the waqf and the mawqūf ʿalayh (the one for whom the waqf is made): the benefiting side may change according to a valid order, while the purpose and the dedication remain.
Binding force (luzūm), for its part, concerns whether revocation is possible after the disposition has been made in the recognised manner. Al-Zarqāʾ presents Abū Ḥanīfa’s view that the waqf is not binding, with the exception of cases in which he holds that it is; so the rule of non-binding force is not to be reported from him without qualification. He also presents the disagreement between Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad on delivery: Abū Yūsuf does not require delivery to a mutawallī (waqf administrator), whereas Muḥammad ties the completion of the waqf to delivery, in the manner set out in al-Zarqāʾ’s presentation.11 The formula and delivery are thus not identical acts, and the effect of the second is not agreed even among those who hold that the waqf is binding.
The questions of formation, validity (ṣiḥḥa), legal effect, binding force and proof should therefore be read as distinct, according to the terminology and the ruling of the source. We do not propose by them five stages through which every waqf passes in the same order. Some of them may come together in a single act, some may need a further act, and one may be established while another remains suspended. What matters is to specify the effect on which the source rules, and whose right is attached to it. Hence the statement “the founder created a waqf” is the beginning of the inquiry, not the end of its description.
This caution extends to duration. Al-Zarqāʾ preferred the Mālikī juristic view (ijtihād) that limited duration is permissible, after presenting the disagreement; so al-Zarqāʾ is not to be presented as holding perpetuity alone.12 Whether a waqf is perpetual or temporary affects the statement of its ultimate destination (maʾāl) and of the obligations, but it does not by itself allow conclusions to be drawn about the ownership of the principal or the power to sell it during the term. Chapter 2 is devoted to property, ownership and entitlement, and Chapter 8 to what continues and what ends when the asset or the persons change.
Each source must also be asked for its ruling where the founder is silent, and for the destination of the property when the term ends. AAOIFI’s Shari’ah Standard No. 60 makes perpetuity the default rule (al-aṣl), permits limited duration or restriction to a circumstance if the founder so stipulates, and lays down that the endowed property returns to the owner or his heirs at the end. To make a temporary dedication sound, then, it is not enough to state its term; there must also be a statement of which rights and obligations end and which continue, according to their basis. What the Standard chose is a permission on a disputed question: it agrees with the authoritative view (al-muʿtamad) of the Mālikīs and with one opinion (wajh) among the Ḥanbalīs, and departs from the requirement of perpetuity held by the majority. It is therefore not presented as an agreed ruling or as a rule in force in every country, and the basis for its institutional adoption (tabannī, that is, choosing a waqf arrangement in a particular context, with a justification of what it adds and a comparison with the possible alternatives) is to be sought wherever its application is intended.13
When legislation is read, the scope of application of its rule on duration is specified with it. Under Egyptian Law 48 of 1946, the waqf of a mosque can only be perpetual; for other charitable purposes both limited duration and perpetuity are permitted, and a waqf without qualification is taken as perpetual. A waqf for non-charitable purposes, by contrast, can only be temporary and may not extend to more than two generations (ṭabaqatayn); and if it is limited to a specified period, that period may not exceed sixty (60) years from the founder’s death. Article 56 excluded the first three paragraphs of Article 5 from applying to existing awqāf. Paragraph 4 of Article 5, however, allowed a founder to limit the duration of his earlier waqf in accordance with those provisions whenever he had the right of revocation. The text thus distinguishes between an obligation for the new waqf and an option of change in the old one for whoever holds the basis for it. Then came Decree-Law 180 of 1952, prohibiting waqf for non-charitable purposes and ending the awqāf specified in its Article 2, with a ruling on the share assigned to charitable purposes; so the 1946 law remains here a specific piece of historical evidence. This distinction connects with what comes in Chapter 8, §9, when the rules of the system itself change, and with the test of the end of a term in section D of the Applied Appendix.14
Footnotes
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Muṣṭafā Aḥmad al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf [Rulings Governing Awqāf], first edition (Amman: Dār ʿAmmār, 1418 AH / 1997), pp. 37–39, especially para. 34, p. 38. The passage was compared with the image of the printed edition; the way of counting the pillars is not attributed to consensus. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, pp. 37–39, and the footnote on p. 38 on acceptance and rejection by the specified person. Page 39 was examined again. The rulings on the disagreement here follow al-Zarqāʾ’s presentation; we did not consult, by opening them independently, the original sources of all the views to which he refers. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, pp. 37–39. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, pp. 30–33, paras 25–27. This passage does not cover exhaustively the cases that Abū Ḥanīfa excepts from non-binding force; it only rules out attributing the unqualified position to him, and specifies the effect of the disagreement on delivery. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, pp. 49–50, especially the first footnote, which runs on to p. 50. This is his preference after presenting the disagreement, and the passage was compared with the image of the printed edition. ↩
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AAOIFI, al-Miʿyār al-sharʿī raqm (60) [Shari’ah Standard No. (60)], clause 2/4/1/5, p. 1393. The text is digital; the image of the printed edition was not compared here. On the disagreement: al-Amāna al-ʿĀmma li-l-Awqāf (Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation), compiler, Mudawwanat aḥkām al-waqf al-fiqhiyya [Compendium of the Juristic Rulings on Waqf], first edition (Kuwait, 1439 AH / 2017), the passage “Ishtirāṭ taʾqīt al-waqf” [Stipulating a Limited Duration for the Waqf], pp. 195–198 in the pagination of the digital copy; this copy brings the three volumes together with separate pagination for each volume, and the volume of the passage has not been determined. It records the authoritative Mālikī view and one opinion among the Ḥanbalīs in favour of permissibility, and the view of the majority of the Ḥanafīs and the well-known view among the Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs in favour of prohibition. This attribution does not imply a claim that the Standard has been institutionally adopted in any particular country. The statement of what obligations remain is what follows from connecting the ruling with the subject of this book, not a detail taken from the Standard’s clause. ↩
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Egypt, Law 48 of 1946 on the Rulings of Waqf, al-Waqāʾiʿ al-Miṣriyya [Egyptian Gazette], no. 61, 17 June 1946, Art. 5, p. 4, and Art. 56, p. 8; and Decree-Law 180 of 1952 Abolishing the Waqf System for Non-Charitable Purposes, al-Waqāʾiʿ al-Miṣriyya, no. 132 bis (extraordinary), 14 September 1952, Arts 1–3, p. 2. The passages were compared with their images; the 1946 law is used as historical evidence on the design of duration and of transition, and the system in force is not described by it alone. ↩
3. The Lawful Purpose, the Language of Qurba and the Founder’s Motive
The purpose is part of what the dedication is judged by. Specifying it shows who may use the benefit, what may be spent upon, and what would be a departure from the waqf’s course. But whether the purpose qualifies under a juristic or legal ruling is a different question from knowing the founder’s psychological motive, and from measuring what the waqf brought about in society. A phrase about religious reward (thawāb) is not by itself enough to establish altruism in conduct, and benefit to the family is not by itself enough to establish evasion. Each interpretation needs its own evidence, and a comparison with the alternatives that were open to the person making the disposition.
Among the most precise points that Abū Zahra worked out in this area is the separation between the basic requirement of qurba (an act of drawing near to God) and the conditions governing transactions. He uses al-Shāṭibī’s distinction between acts of worship (ʿibādāt) and transactions (muʿāmalāt), and prefers to govern the stipulations of waqf by the criteria of transactions, while barring contravention and harm; so he does not require a specific proof of qurba for every permissible detail of a stipulation.15 This is Abū Zahra’s preference in reading stipulations, and it does not take the place of verifying the validity of each purpose within its school. Its consequence is that setting the date of accounting, the order of work or the manner of disbursement can be examined as an arrangement for reaching the purpose, while the ruling on the purpose itself remains prior to it.
In the waqf of a non-Muslim, the creator’s capacity to make this dedication, the religion of the entitlement-holder, the purpose and the form of the disposition are distinct. Al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī [Burhān al-Dīn’s Comprehensive Compendium] reports from the fatwās of Abū al-Layth that a Christian’s waqf for his children and then for the Muslim poor is permissible, and gives the reason in these words: “for a waqf for what is an act of qurba in our view and in theirs is permissible”. It also reports from them the prohibition of the form in which the ultimate destination is the Christian poor. But it reports from al-Khaṣṣāf the permissibility of forms of waqf in their favour and in favour of the Jewish and Magian poor, and states explicitly: “what al-Khaṣṣāf mentioned on these questions is contrary to what is mentioned in al-Fatāwā”. It then derives (yukharrij) the difference between the two reports from the disagreement on bequest between Abū Ḥanīfa and his two companions. The criterion of qurba thus appears here in the reasoning for a specific form, and it does not dispense with presenting the disagreement that the source records for the other forms.
The effect of the purpose becomes clear in what it reports from al-Khaṣṣāf: “If a dhimmī [a non-Muslim living under the protection of the Muslim polity] made his house a waqf for a bīʿa, a kanīsa [Christian and Jewish houses of worship] or a fire temple, it is void.” In the form in which the income is assigned to a bīʿa and then to the poor if it falls into ruin, he says: “Nothing is to be spent on the bīʿa.” By contrast, he permits assigning the income to the lamp of Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem), giving as the reason that it is “an act of qurba in our view and in theirs”. The creator’s capacity is linked with the purpose in the form of the dhimmī who makes his house a mosque for Muslims, builds it and permits them to pray in it, so that they pray in it, and then dies; he says: “It becomes an inheritance for his heirs, and this is according to the view of all”, and gives as the reason that it is “a sin according to them”. This is a ruling on capacity to create this particular dedication, not a denial of the dhimmī’s capacity to make any waqf. The form of the disposition also has an effect. In the form in which a dhimmī makes his house a bīʿa, a kanīsa or a fire temple while in good health and then dies, the source lays down that it passes as inheritance, and then distinguishes from this the bequest, which Abū Ḥanīfa holds valid in this form. The source thus presents a disagreement, derives it, and connects the ruling with religion, purpose and form; it cannot properly be reduced to a single ruling for all the awqāf of non-Muslims or for all their institutions. The designer of the system specifies what he endorses on the capacity of persons, the validity of purposes and the forms of dedication, and who interprets what is disputed.16
In a historical Egyptian codification, Article 7 of Law 48 of 1946 provided that “the waqf of a non-Muslim is valid unless it is for a cause forbidden in his religious law and in the Islamic sharia”. Its explanatory memorandum justifies departing from the Ḥanafī school by the complaint of non-Muslims about their awqāf for churches and temples, and by mosques that wealthy non-Muslims build for farmers, craftsmen and others: “it is in the social interest that such awqāf not be rejected”; so it chose invalidity where the two religious laws agree on prohibition, and validity where the waqf is permitted in both or in one of them. It attributes the permissibility of a waqf for what is an act of qurba for the non-Muslim but not for Muslims to the Mālikīs, and of a waqf for what is an act of qurba for Muslims but not for him to the Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs. In this way the elements of the “decision dossier” that the second level calls for appear in the memorandum: identifying the normative framework, giving reasons for the choice and stating its intended effect. The text remains a piece of historical evidence, not a description of the law in force today.17
Reading practice calls for a further distinction. In al-Ghazzī’s table of waqf deeds, the Syriac church appears after the descendants in one entry, and “the synagogue of the Jews in Aleppo” (kanīsat al-yahūd bi-Ḥalab) appears with the descendants in another. The kanīsa here is thus an entitlement-holder in a table extracted from the register of a sharia court, which on its face contradicts the earlier Ḥanafī source’s ruling that a waqf for it is void, and raises the question of the deed (ḥujja) itself: how was the waqf held valid, if the deed contains a ruling of validity? The summary establishes the presence of these two bodies in the order of entitlement that it reports; it does not by itself reveal the wording of the ruling or its reasoning, or whether the event was a creation, an act of proof (ithbāt) or a ruling of validity. We therefore do not treat the mention of the kanīsa as sufficient evidence that a ruling of validity was issued or of the school under which the waqf was held valid, nor the presence of the body in the table as evidence of a uniform juristic ruling. This distinction links the study of the purpose here with the study of proof and competence in §5, and with the decisions on the normative framework in Chapter 11, §1.18
In “Min al-waqfiyya ilā al-manẓūma” [From the Waqf Deed to the System] we earlier separated three kinds of evidence, none of which can stand in for another: the presence of the language of religious reward in the document; the actual restriction of the founder’s options that the stipulations carry; and what can be established about his motive or the effect of his choice. We proposed measuring the density of that language separately from the cost of the restriction, because the language of qurba may be a scribal formula shared by different documents.19 We endorse this distinction, attributing it to the work named. One who mentions the continuation of religious reward did not necessarily deny himself every benefit, and one who confined the use of the benefit to his family did not necessarily choose the weakest legal restriction possible.
This precision is useful in dialogue with economic and social researchers. The researcher can study what return or power the founder gave up, and compare its effect on financing and continuity. But he does not turn a relinquishment laid down in the text directly into verified conduct or a readable intention. Likewise, the jurist can examine the validity of a stipulation without the ruling of validity being a finding of its economic efficiency. The waqf system brings these questions together in a single case, while the ways of proving them remain different.
Footnotes
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, pp. 146–151, paras 134–138. The general distinction that he reports from al-Shāṭibī is different from Abū Zahra’s application of it to the stipulations of waqf; the preference in this passage is attributed to Abū Zahra. ↩
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Burhān al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Māza, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī fī al-fiqh al-Nuʿmānī [Burhān al-Dīn’s Comprehensive Compendium of the Jurisprudence of al-Nuʿmān], ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm Sāmī al-Jundī, first edition (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424 AH / 2004), vol. 6, pp. 227–228, “al-Faṣl al-khāmis wa-l-ʿishrūn: fī waqf al-kuffār” [Section Twenty-Five: On the Waqf of Unbelievers]. On p. 227 are the criterion of qurba, the two reports from the fatwās of Abū al-Layth and from al-Khaṣṣāf, their derivation from bequest, and the form of making a house a bīʿa during one’s lifetime; on p. 228 are the reasoning for the difference between building and bequest, and the forms of the mosque, the kanīsa, the spending of the income and the lamp of Bayt al-Maqdis. The digital text follows the pagination of the edition; the image of the printed edition was not compared. The attribution of the views and their derivation are from Ibn Māza’s presentation; there is no direct quotation here from the original of the fatwās of Abū al-Layth or from al-Khaṣṣāf’s book, and no exhaustive treatment of the disagreement among the schools. ↩
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Egyptian Ministry of Justice, Qānūn bi-aḥkām al-waqf al-ṣādir bi-l-qānūn raqm 48 li-sanat 1946, muʿallaqan ʿalā mawāddihi bi-aʿmālihi al-taḥḍīriyya [The Law on the Rulings of Waqf Issued as Law No. 48 of 1946, with Its Articles Annotated from Its Preparatory Works], compiled by Ibrāhīm Ḥanafī, with the annotations reviewed and approved by Muḥammad Aḥmad Faraj al-Sanhūrī (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1953), pp. 33–34, Art. 7 and its explanatory memorandum. The text of the article and of the memorandum was compared with the images of the two pages. The article is on p. 33, where its reasoning also begins; the statement of the complaint, the interest, the choice and the attribution of its two parts to the schools follows on p. 34. The attribution of views to the schools here is the memorandum’s own, not an independent verification of their sources; the use of the text is historical, not a statement that the law is in force today. ↩
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Kāmil ibn Ḥusayn al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab fī tārīkh Ḥalab [The River of Gold on the History of Aleppo], second edition (Aleppo: Dār al-Qalam, 1419 AH), vol. 2, pp. 432–433. Quoted from the digital text; the passage is the two entries of Shamūna ibn Sulaymān and of Abrāhām walad Khalīfa al-Yahūdī; neither their printed image nor their original deeds were compared. The description of the father was not carried over to the son as a judgement on his identity. And Bandar, “al-Jihāt al-naṣrāniyya wa-l-yahūdiyya fī jadāwil al-Ghazzī li-l-waqfiyyāt: taḥqīq al-mādda wa-ḥudūd al-istidlāl bihā” [Christian and Jewish Bodies in al-Ghazzī’s Tables of Waqf Deeds: Verifying the Material and the Limits of Reasoning from It], unpublished paper, sections 2.4 and 2.5; a reference to the origin of the separation between the founder’s identity, the body and its rank, which does not stand in for al-Ghazzī’s evidence. ↩
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Bandar, “Min al-waqfiyya ilā al-manẓūma” [From the Waqf Deed to the System], section 3.2, “al-Muḥarrikāt al-thalātha wa-sullam al-qurba” [The Three Drivers and the Ladder of Qurba], in the work Kayfa yubnā al-waqf wa-kayfa yabqā [How Waqf Is Built and How It Endures], unpublished paper. The separation of the density of the language from the cost of the restriction is attributed to it, with the statement that motive and effect need evidence; no established empirical result was taken from it. ↩
4. Where Does the Founder’s Will Acquire Its Force?
The private formula makes property, a purpose and an order of entitlement-holders the subject of obligations that may outlast the life of their creator. Even so, not every power in the waqf arises from the founder’s text. There are rules that validate his choice, others that complete what he left unstated, and others that prohibit some of what he intended. This is why describing him as the maker of the private rule is an incomplete description unless the law or the jurisprudence that gives this rule its effect is mentioned.
H. L. A. Hart’s observation about the rules that confer on individuals powers to bring about legal changes by wills, contracts and transfers of property helps here. We use it for an analytical comparison between the person’s act and the rules that enable him to produce an effect, not as a theory that Hart put forward about waqf.20 The founder’s ability to choose the designated use does not entail that he holds the power to determine all the conditions for the validity of his choice, or to waive every protection connected with it.
This appears in the stipulation concerning the dismissal of the nāẓir. In the passage referred to in al-Durr al-mukhtār [The Choice Pearls] and Radd al-muḥtār [The Reply to the Perplexed], a stipulation that prevents the removal of the nāẓir when there is a ground for removal is not given effect, because it contravenes the sharia ruling.21 What appears in the document as a safeguard for the administration may, under the governing normative framework, be a void stipulation. The founder’s strength is therefore not measured by the number of imperative phrases in his waqf deed alone, but by which of these phrases the normative framework recognises, and by the bodies that have the power to enforce or reject it.
The normative framework may also give the founder a power that he did not stipulate. In Abū Zahra’s account of the founder’s status in the niẓāra (the office of waqf administration), he distinguishes between the founder’s authority being established without stipulation according to Abū Yūsuf, and its needing a stipulation according to Muḥammad. The possibility of dismissing him when a ground for it arises remains, in the form that Abū Zahra presents.22 Silence about the tawliya (appointment to the administration of the waqf) does not mean the same thing under the two views, and combining the status of creator with that of nāẓir does not take the founder outside the rules governing the office. This is an example of how knowing the rule of creation changes the reading of the administration and accounting that follow it.
The direction of the reasoning cannot properly be reversed: if a particular law confers a power, it may not be assumed that the founder can waive it merely because some stipulated powers can be waived under a juristic view. This appeared in Abū Zahra’s distinction between the ruling on stipulations within the school and some of what the Egyptian waqf law of 1946 conferred on the founder; it is set out in detail in Chapter 7.23 The source of a power is part of its meaning, and it affects who holds it, its limits, and whether it can be transferred or waived.
Aḥmad ʿĪsā’s reading of the al-Qaymarī inscription attests to a reference to the sharia and a reference to the waqf deed being combined in a single phrase. It is evidence of how the normative framework was formulated in the text he read, not proof of how the judge decided every later dispute.24 This evidence leads to a rule of reading: a waqf deed may combine what the founder chose with what it referred to outside itself, and verifying that both were acted upon needs other evidence. The interpretation of a stipulation when it is ambiguous or its words conflict is the subject of Chapter 3.
Footnotes
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H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., with a Postscript edited by Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 96. The passage concerns the private powers that rules confer for bringing about legal change. The comparison with waqf is this book’s. ↩
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Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār ʿalā al-Durr al-mukhtār sharḥ Tanwīr al-abṣār [The Reply to the Perplexed: A Gloss on The Choice Pearls, the Commentary on Enlightening the Eyes] (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1412 AH / 1992), vol. 4, p. 382, on the stipulation that the nāẓir not be removed when there is a ground for removal. In this passage a distinction is drawn between the base text of Tanwīr al-abṣār, al-Ḥaṣkafī’s commentary and Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s gloss; the reference here is to the question as it comes together in this passage, not a claim that all its wording is by a single author. ↩
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, pp. 338–340, paras 289–290, on the founder’s status in the niẓāra and the disagreement between Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad. This reports his presentation; it does not infer a general authority from mere ownership or creation. ↩
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 165 and p. 169; the first deals with the ruling on waiving stipulations under the view he prefers, and the second presents what Law 48 of 1946 conferred. The detail of the powers and the limits of the form are in Chapter 7. ↩
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Aḥmad ʿĪsā, Tārīkh al-bīmāristānāt fī al-Islām [The History of Hospitals in Islam], second edition (Beirut: Dār al-Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1401 AH / 1981), pp. 242–244. The reference is to his published reading, which was compared with the printed edition; we have not seen the original waqf deed or the record of its dispute. ↩
5. What Do Attestation, Documentation, Registration and Recognition Do?
Counting official procedures is not enough to judge the strength of the state or the independence of the waqf. What is required is to specify the effect of each procedure: does it enter into the validity of the disposition, prove a fact, permit an offering, or create the institution itself? The texts studied present different forms that cannot be reduced to a binary of the free waqf and the waqf subject to the state.
Article 1 of Egyptian Law 48 of 1946 made attestation (ishhād) before the sharia court by the person entitled to make it, and its recording in the court’s register, a condition for the validity of the acts named in it: the waqf, the founder’s revocation, his changing of the designated uses and stipulations, and his substitution. Article 4 restricted the refusal to hear the attestation to a ground relating to the prohibition or invalidity of the disposition under the applicable rules, or to the lack of capacity of the person making the attestation.25 The procedure thus enters into the conditions of validity by the text of the law, while the grounds for refusal are restricted. The first does not imply that the body has an absolute discretionary power, and the second does not imply that its role is merely a neutral record of a disposition whose effect was already complete.
The Saudi Regulation Organising Niẓāra Work (Lāʾiḥat tanẓīm aʿmāl al-niẓāra), in the version we consulted, requires the waqf and all its assets to be registered with the General Authority for Awqaf within thirty (30) working days of its documentation with the competent body or of the date on which the Regulation came into force. Its definition of the competent body refers to documentation, the appointment of the nāẓir and permissions in accordance with the laws.26 This text establishes that documentation and registration are distinct acts, and that registration follows documentation in the form described. But it does not by itself settle whether documentation creates the waqf or reveals it, nor does it determine all the conditions of its formation.
By contrast, section 80(2) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), in the version enacted in 2021 and in force in this area since July 2023, provides that the act of establishment and recognition by the competent authority of the Land are required for a foundation to come into being.27 Recognition, by the text of this section, is thus a condition for the foundation to come into being. This text may not be turned into a claim that the authority is free in every refusal, just as it is not to be inferred from the comparison that waqf in every country can do without a constitutive procedure. Chapter 10 presents the comparison and its limits; the aim here is to fix the question against which the forms are compared.
The text of Article 140 II of the French law of 2008 adds a distinction within the procedure itself: publication of the declaration of an endowment fund (fonds de dotation) is linked to the coming into being of its legal personality, whereas publication of an amendment to its statutes is linked to the amendment’s being opposable to third parties. The text also provides that the statutes be available for consultation and for obtaining a copy. Publication may thus enter into the coming into being of the person, or it may determine the effect of a change to its rules on those dealing with it. This ruling is not carried over to waqf; it reveals, rather, what should be specified when building a register for waqf: what is established by entry, what changes by amendment, who can rely on it, and when?28
In the 2008 text, this coming into being is accompanied by subsequent oversight: paragraph VII allows the administration to request documents and to investigate, and requires an annual report. In the event of a serious failing affecting the achievement of the purpose, and after a formal notice that has not been complied with, activity may be suspended by a reasoned and published decision for a period not exceeding six (6) months; dissolution, where the public-interest mission is not performed, must be sought from the courts. Coming into being by publication does not therefore mean the absence of oversight, and a difference in its timing does not turn into a ruling that the whole function of protection differs. This is a comparison with the specified version as enacted, not with all later amendments.29
Accordingly, when it is said that a waqf is documented or registered, one must look for the text that determines the effect of that documentation or registration. The administrative name does not stand in for the ruling. The time must also be specified: the Egyptian form mentioned is evidence from the law of 1946, the German form from a specific amendment, and the Saudi Regulation has its own scope and force. None of these pieces of evidence by itself describes the whole history of its country or all its institutions dedicated to a purpose.
Footnotes
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Egypt, Law 48 of 1946 on the Rulings of Waqf, Arts 1 and 4, p. 4; and Art. 62, p. 9. The text is from the image of the official issue. The evidence is historical, and this chapter does not lay down that all its provisions are in force in Egypt today. Nor does it extend the procedures for the founder’s revocation, change and substitution to all the dispositions of the nāẓir and the judge. ↩
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General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat tanẓīm aʿmāl al-niẓāra [Regulation Organising Niẓāra Work], endorsed by Resolution of the Authority’s Board of Directors No. 31/1/18/43 dated 30/5/1443 AH, and published in Umm al-Qurā, no. 4920, 3 Rajab 1443 AH / 4 February 2022, Art. 1, p. 4; and Art. 8/1, p. 7 of the access copies compared. The number and date of endorsement and its publication were compared with the Ministry of Justice’s statement in Mustajaddāt al-anẓima wa-l-lawāʾiḥ wa-l-qarārāt wa-l-taʿāmīm [Updates on Laws, Regulations, Decisions and Circulars], issue 34, Rajab 1443 AH, p. 13. The wording that the period starts from documentation or from the date on which the Regulation came into force has been kept in presenting the ruling. The time at which the waqf, or its personality, arises is not to be inferred from the order of the two procedures alone; nor is the date on which an electronic copy was made available to be turned into the date on which legislation was issued. ↩
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Gesetz zur Vereinheitlichung des Stiftungsrechts und zur Änderung des Infektionsschutzgesetzes, 16 July 2021, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I, Nr. 46, 22 July 2021, S. 2947, Art. 1, sec. 80(2); Art. 11(2), S. 2958, on the entry into force of Article 1 on 1 July 2023. The image of p. 2947 was compared. Subsection 2 was also compared with the page for section 80 on the official German website on 21 October 2026, and agreed with the text used; the attribution of the amendment’s enactment and entry into force remains to the Gazette. This comparison is not an examination of all the provisions on German foundations. ↩
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Loi n° 2008-776 du 4 août 2008 de modernisation de l’économie, art. 140 II et VII, Journal officiel de la République française, 5 August 2008; the text as enacted on WIPO Lex. The saved version of the text, compared on 19 October 2026, was used; the reference does not claim to follow its current provisions or its implementing decrees. ↩
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Loi n° 2008-776 du 4 août 2008 de modernisation de l’économie, art. 140 II et VII. ↩
6. A Contemporary Example: The Creation of a Waqf Investment Product
The Saudi Waqf Investment Products Regulation, published in June 2026, allows these differences to be seen together in a single piece of regulation. Approval of the offering, the waqf annex, the waqf document and the registration certificate are not names for a single paper. Their distribution shows that the dedication is connected with the capital market, while its waqf rulings remain specified in its documents. This is a reading of the regulatory text, not a report on whether all products comply with it.30
Article 7 makes the waqf annex part of the product’s documents and a main reference for its waqf rulings. Article 8 requires that the object of dedication and the formula of creation be specified, together with its designated uses, how returns are calculated and distributed, the powers of the nāẓir, and the destination of the assets when the product ends or the offering is not completed. Article 12 then specifies the object of the waqf as the security or its value. These are choices that affect the meaning of the dedication: what the disposition preserves is determined in its documents, and is not known merely from the investment being described as waqf.
A product that requires an offering has a prescribed sequence: the General Authority for Awqaf approves the offering; then the requirements of the Capital Market Authority are met before marketing; after the offering is completed, the authorised person applies to the documentation body for the issue of a document consistent with the annex within five (5) working days; he then applies for registration of the waqf within five (5) working days of the document’s issue, and the certificate is issued once the requirements are met. This is what Articles 5, 11, 13 and 14 lay down, within their terms, so their steps are not to be compressed into a single procedural moment.
By contrast, Article 19 exempts the creation of a waqf investment portfolio from the Authority’s prior approval. Under Articles 20–23 there remain the documentation of the waqf with the required particulars and its registration, then the opening of an investment account, the creation of a portfolio and the start of the procedures for transferring the assets to it, and then the registration of the account and portfolio particulars with the Authority. What is meant regarding the transfer of the assets is the start of the procedures, not proof that the transfer was completed within the prescribed period. The exception is specific to the Authority’s prior approval; it does not abolish the other documentation and market requirements. In this way the path of creation differs within the same regulation according to the form of the product.31
| Provision | The effect the text establishes | The question it does not settle by itself |
|---|---|---|
| The waqf annex, Arts 7–8 | Specifying the particular rulings, including the formula of creation, the object, the designated use, the powers and the ultimate destination | Did the specific event complete the conditions of its creation, and were the rulings carried out? |
| Approval of the offering and meeting the market requirements, Arts 5 and 11 | Allowing the move to offering and marketing the product in accordance with its conditions | Did every amount subscribed become waqf at this moment? |
| The waqf document, Art. 13 | Applying for its issue after the offering is completed, and its consistency with the annex | Does the constitutive effect, for every type, occur at this document alone? |
| Registration, Art. 14 | Applying for registration, then the issue of the certificate once the requirements are met | Are the creation of the waqf, the creation of an independent personality and its registration one and the same effect? |
| Creation of the portfolio, Arts 19–23 | An exception from the Authority’s prior approval, while documentation, registration and the account and portfolio procedures remain | Were the assets actually transferred, and which rights and obligations are governed by another instrument? |
Article 28 adds, for waqf investment sukuk specifically, that the annex state whether the waqf arises from the subscription proceeds at issuance or from the resulting assets at redemption, and that it state the rights of the sukuk holders to the face value and the returns, or their waiver of them. This is explicit evidence that the time at which the dedication arises, and its subject, are questions of legal design in themselves; describing a sukuk as waqf is therefore not enough to conclude that everything connected with it is endowed from the first procedure.
This point connects creation with the later chapters. Before examining who changes the principal or is entitled to its return, it must be specified whether the object of the disposition is property collected for the purpose of creating a waqf, or property whose dedication has already arisen according to its form. Before ruling that redeeming the value of a sukuk is an encroachment on the waqf, one must know the rights laid down for its holder, and the time at which the waqf arose and its object. This chapter does not lay down the ruling on redemption for a particular sukuk; it shows why the ruling changes as these data change. Nor do the general articles take the place of reading the annex of the chosen product and its conditions.
The reading also preserves the differences in the scope of the texts. The two periods for documentation and registration mentioned for the offering path are specific to that path, and it may not be inferred from them that the thirty (30) working-day period in the Niẓāra Regulation has been abolished. The new Regulation also regulated its entry into force and the regularisation of existing arrangements, and it superseded the Funds Instructions and the Portfolios Regulation in accordance with its final provisions. So the terms of an old fund are not enough to establish its status under the new regulation.32 These are questions that show how the waqf system works when its rules meet the rules of the market, and what needs a special inquiry when moving from the text to its application.
Footnotes
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General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat al-muntajāt al-istithmāriyya al-waqfiyya [Waqf Investment Products Regulation], endorsed by Board Resolution No. 21/1/47/T dated 26/11/1447 AH, Umm al-Qurā, 12 June 2026, Arts 1, 5, 7–14, 28 and 35–37. The official text was consulted on 19 October 2026. Entry into force is ninety (90) days after publication, and existing products are to be regularised within twelve (12) months of entry into force under the final provisions; this does not establish that any particular product has been regularised. ↩
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General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat al-muntajāt al-istithmāriyya al-waqfiyya (Umm al-Qurā, 12 June 2026), Arts 19–23. The official text was relied on; the periods are specified according to each article, and the wording about starting the transfer of the assets in Art. 22 is not to be read as its completion. ↩
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Lāʾiḥat al-muntajāt al-istithmāriyya al-waqfiyya, Arts 1, 5, 7–14, 28 and 35–37. ↩
7. Creation Determines What Follows
The preceding forms lead to characteristics that can be described precisely without extending a single ruling to all waqf. The first is that dedication ties property to a purpose and to limits on disposition, but specifying those limits needs the form of creation and its normative framework. The second is that the force of the founder’s will operates within rules that give it effect, complete it and restrict it; so his freedom is not measured merely by the number of his stipulations. The third is that the establishment of the benefit for a specified person, the legal effect of the disposition as against right-holders, and its binding force on the founder are connected questions whose effects are distinct. The fourth is that an official procedure is known by its legal effect in its form, not by its name or by the mere presence of the state in it.
From this follows a specific way of reading the event of creation. We begin with the property, who has the power to dispose of it and the rights prior to it; then the purpose and who receives the benefit; then the formula and the juristic view or the law that governs it; then the additional act on which a required effect depends. If ratification, delivery, documentation or recognition remains outstanding, what depends on it is specified, together with who is to carry it out and the effect of its occurring or not occurring. This gap is not filled by a general moral description of the founder, or by borrowing a ruling from another country or school.
This reading is the basis for making comparative use of the waqf system. Someone concerned with financing education, medical care or urban development needs to know when the resource became committed to the purpose, as against whom, and who has the power to complete what remains, before calculating the expected return or promising beneficiaries a service. The historian needs the same evidence when distinguishing between a declared project, an established dedication and an institution that has begun its work. In this way juristic and legal grounding becomes part of explaining how waqf works, and it prepares for the next chapter on property, purpose, ownership and entitlement.